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Abstract 
        This study focuses on the interplay between institutions, technology and markets in industry 
evolution. Existing research on industry evolution may be categorized into two distinct explanatory 
logics. At one end there are market based explanations, which assume competition and imitation, and 
emphasize the role of technological change as a key determinant of long term change. At the other end is 
the institutional approach, where the focus is on the impact of history and social structures. Most 
industries exhibit both explanations. The key goal of this study is to build a bridge between these distinct 
streams of research and to identify the characteristics of the focal mechanisms that explain organizational 
survival and death and subsequently the patterns of industry lifecycles in regulated industries. 
        This study conveys the principles of causality as addition to the prevailing theories of industry 
evolution and evolutionary economics. In order to provide causal explanations the analysis is extended to 
multiple levels. The empirical analysis of the study focuses on a heavily regulated, and later deregulated, 
industry – the electric power industry in Finland between 1889 and 2005.  
        This study provides four key contributions. First, it offers causal explanations as a complementary 
element to provide an evolutionary explanation. Second, in addition to the existing constructs, the 
research provides an evolutionary explanation through mechanisms, which are either evolutionary or 
causal, and either emergent or with identified agency. Consequently, the long-run change is seen as a 
result of the interplay of both the causal and evolutionary mechanisms. Third, the study produces a multi-
level research framework, which is needed when giving a causal explanation in evolutionary research. 
Fourth, compared to the extant studies of industry life cycles, the causal explanations provide explication 
of the differences in the industry life cycle caused by public policy actions and external shocks.         
        The research also has implications for practice. It shows that public policies have primary causal and 
secondary emergent impacts on industry structure and firm survival. It also provides evidence that 
evolutionary path dependence and asset constraints cause far-reaching impacts on public policies at both 
industry and firm level. Moreover, its shows how external shocks intervene the ‘normal’ evolution of the 
industry and the antecedent intended causal impacts of public policies. And finally, it provides evidence 
that in a deregulated industry a firm’s business model and its vertical integration act as a key selection 
criteria both prior to and after deregulation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Focus of the research and research motivation 
According to the existing scholarly literature long-term change in industries and 
organizations – changes in industry structure, shakeouts and firm survival – are a 
result of an interplay of firms and underlying market mechanisms (Schumpeter, 
1934), technological change (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Klepper, 1997), and 
surrounding institutions and public policies (Nelson, 1995a, 1995b; Nelson and 
Sampat, 2001; Murmann, 2003; North, 1990, 2005). Accordingly, we may identify 
distinct streams of research, which diverge from each other both methodologically 
and by the assumptions of the major influential forces and determinants of the 
change. At one end market based explanations assume free competition and 
imitation, and emphasize the role of technological change as a key determinant of 
long-term change (Klepper, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2003; Klepper and Simons, 2000a, 
2000b, 2005; Mowery and Nelson, 1999). At the other end, we may identify a 
historical, qualitative approach with a focus on the impact of institutions (North, 
1990, 2005; Murmann, 2003; Lamberg and Laurila, 2005; Lamberg and Tikkanen, 
2006; Ingram and Inman, 1996; Holm, 1995).  
2       INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
The market based explanations of industry life cycles (Klepper, 1997) emphasize the 
role of technological change in shaping the evolution of industry structures. 
Following the basic tenets of product life cycle theory, industries are considered to 
evolve through distinctive phases. This body of research provides explanations of 
why the number of firms in an industry falls sharply after a long period of steady 
growth and what types of firm survive the shakeouts. The conclusions are, in short: 
the older and larger a firm is and the more it invests in research and development 
(R&D) the better potential it has to survive over the life cycle of the industry. The 
older and larger firms are seen to be closer to the technological frontier, which 
enables them to survive longer. The research on industry life cycles also provides 
useful perspectives on one important characteristic of industry evolution, namely 
path dependence (Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002; Puffert, 2002; Cattani, 2005, 
2006) – this is the reliance of one of several preceding actions and decisions in the 
past. There is a large volume of empirical evidence that the theoretical model of 
industry life cycles introduced by Klepper (1996, 1997) holds over a wide set of 
industries (see Klepper 2002, 2003; Klepper and Simons, 2000a, 2000b, 2005; 
Mowery and Nelson, 1999). However, as Klepper and Simons (2000) have pointed 
out, the model does not take into account the impact of institutions such as 
government policies and market institutions. 
 
However, conversely, there are a group of studies that emphasize the importance of 
institutions on long-term change in industries (North, 1990, 2005; Nelson, 1986, 
1995a, 1995b, 2005). In addition to the benefits of age and size, and exploitation of 
technology, these studies examine the impact of institutions in order to provide a 
central explanation of the grounds of a firm’s competitive advantage and their long-
term survival. These studies provide explanations for cases in which dynamic 
change comes from outside of an industry, such as an external development of 
science (Nelson, 1986; Nelson and Winter, 2002), from environmental uncertainty 
(Lewin et al., 1999; Anderson and Tushman, 2001), or from institutions such as 
public policy actions, legislation and regulation (Holm, 1995; Ingram and Inman, 
1996; Murmann, 2003; Lamberg and Laurila, 2005; Breznitz, 2005). 
Methodologically this approach frequently employs historical narratives (Abrams, 
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1982; Sayer, 1992; Griffin, 1993; Mahoney, 1999) supported by descriptive 
numerical analysis (see Murmann, 2003; Geels, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007) or 
quantitative analysis (see Lamberg et al., 2008). 
 
Both of the perspectives outlined above have their merits. However, most real 
industries manifest the importance of both explanations. It could be argued that 
market based explanations dominate in open market industries, while public policy 
actions dominate in more or less regulated industries, such as telecommunications, 
electric power industries, airlines, train and postal services, and in banking and 
insurance1, many of which are, or have been, considered as natural monopolies 
(Winston, 1998; Joskow, 2007). Legislation and regulation define, without doubt 
many of the 'rules of the game' (North, 1995; Coleman, 1995) or the environmental 
conditions (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Aldrich, 1999; Nelson, 1995b) in the 
regulated industries. On the other hand, the firms in regulated industries still strive 
to get the best possible results according to the rules of the game. Thus there are also 
market mechanisms active in these industries. In addition, in long-term change 
evolutionary processes (Campbell, 1969) evolutionary mechanisms (Nelson, 1995b) 
are always active.  
 
The impact of institutions and public policy actions on industries cannot be 
explained solely with evolutionary and market mechanisms. Nor can it be explained 
simply with the “rules of the game” type of reasoning. The often sudden and 
purposeful impact of public policies on industries asks for more fine-grained 
explanations. Causal research offers a solution for this dilemma. In the industry 
evolution literature mechanisms as constructs are considered to be the ‘causal links’ 
between events of phenomena (Nelson, 1995b; Murmann, 2003). However, 
traditionally causality (Pearl, 2000) has not been recognized or been taken into 
account as part of the evolutionary explanation. Recently, on the other hand, 
                                                 
 
1 Regulated industries are here considered industries, in which – at least during some episodes 
–government legislation, regulation and public policies has determined the principles of 
competition, pricing and rights to carry on business in the industry. 
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Lamberg et al. (2008) introduced causal arguments and causal pathways as a 
fundamental part of an explanation for long-term organizational survival. The use of 
mechanisms has, however, moved towards rigorous definitions in other areas of the 
social sciences to explain organizational processes or to find out why and how 
something occurs (Coleman, 1990; Glennan, 2002; Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; 
Machamer et al., 2000; Pajunen, 2004, 2008; Sawyer 2004; Tilly 2001). According 
to this body of research, mechanisms explain causal connections between events 
across multiple levels of analysis. In some cases mechanisms form chains which 
ultimately cause the long-term change to occur. Mechanisms are also frequently 
interlinked with agents who induce the mechanisms. Indeed, the need to provide 
further explanations of how and why institutions impact evolutionary change and 
industry life cycles, and the potential for that explanation with the use of the concept 
of a mechanism jointly shaped the research motivation of this study; to identify the 
characteristics of the mechanisms that explain organizational survival or death and 
subsequently the patterns of industry lifecycles in regulated industries.  
 
In this study, I will, as Whetten (1989) and Aldrich (1999) suggested, draw ideas 
and perspectives from several approaches and fields. This is carried out by 
conveying the principles of causality (Pearl, 2000; Sawyer, 2001; Hodgson, 2007; 
Morgan and Winship, 2007) together with the prevailing theories of industry 
evolution. I also make use of ideas of mechanisms from sociology (Coleman, 1990; 
Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Hedström, 2005) and offer a complementary 
evolutionary explanation by adding causal explanations to the evolutionary ones. 
Conceptually, the explanation therefore includes the combined impact of both 
evolutionary and causal mechanisms. In order to provide causal explanations I 
perform the analysis at multiple levels (Pettrigrew, 1992; Geels, 2002, 2005). I 
provide explanations with mechanisms that are active across different levels of 
analysis and thus explain causal micro-macro links (Alexander et al. 1987; Coleman, 
1990) within the long-term change process. Accordingly, I selected the electric 
power industry as the focus of the empirical analysis of the study since, as a 
regulated industry, it is distinguished from open market industries, and during its life 
cycle has been heavily affected by surrounding institutions in the form of legislation, 
regulation and public policy actions. The goal of the empirical analysis of the 
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electric power industry in Finland between 1889 and 2005 is to explain the process 
and the key mechanisms and determinants that have caused the industry structure to 
evolve over the years and to explain why certain kinds of firm have survived while 
others have disappeared from the industry.  
This study offers the potential to enrich theories of organizational change by 
combining several streams of research. However, it should be noted that many of the 
discourses that have been linked in the study are often disparate and disconnected 
with different interests and in some cases conflicting theoretical assumptions. 
Hence, it is relevant to draw attention to the relevant scholarly discussions that this 
study is associated with and contributes to and consequently the target audiences for 
the dissertation. 
 
First, the study follows the tradition of an eclectic approach to the evolution of 
industry and organizational change (such as Ingram and Inman, 1996; Ingram and 
Simons, 2000; Rao, Monin and Durand, 2003; Durand, 2006; Durand and Calori, 
2006) and thereby is able to offer a more holistic picture of the actors and processes 
operating at multiple levels. It has been showed that the distinct approaches of 
industry evolution can be connected in order to offer a wide view of organizational 
change (Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Volberda and Lewin, 2003b; Durand, 2001, 
2006) and that pan-disciplinary research that combines several theories can extend 
our understanding of the process of change (Ingram and Clay, 2000). 
 
Second, by extending our understanding of industry life cycles (Klepper, 1996, 
1997, 2002, 2003; Klepper and Simons, 2000a, 2000b, 2005; Mowery and Nelson, 
1999) this study contributes to the discourse concerning the impact of surrounding 
institutions and public policies and technology on industry evolution (Nelson, 
1995a, 1995b; Nelson and Sampat, 2001; Murmann, 2003; North, 1990, 2005) and 
co-evolution (Nelson, 1986, Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Lewin et al., 1999; 
Volberda and Levin, 2003a; 2003b) as a particular phenomenon.  
 
Third, the findings concerning the generative mechanisms active throughout the 
industry life cycle builds on the research of causality in social sciences presented by 
Coleman (1990) and Hedström and Swedberg (1998) and continues the recent 
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discourse on mechanisms and their characteristics (Machamer et al. 2000, Glennan, 
2002, 2005, 2007; Mayntz, 2004; Bunge, 2004; Pajunen, 2004, 2008).  
 
Finally, the empirical part of the dissertation offers interesting new insight on 
regulation and deregulation; especially in the electric power industry (Amundsen 
and Bergman, 2005; Bergman, 2002; Bergman et al., 1999, Jamasb, 2002; Joskow, 
1998, 2003a, 2003b, 2007; Newbery, 2002; Sine and David, 2003; Kara et al. 2008; 
Verbruggen, 2008).  
1.2. Key contributions and results 
This study contributes to the industry evolution and evolutionary economics 
literatures in three distinct ways. First, the conceptual integration of the different 
streams of literature offers a novel way to explain long-term industry and firm 
evolution. Conveying the principles of causality and the characteristics of 
organizational mechanisms offers a new and complementary component to the 
evolutionary explanation. The study also utilizes a methodologically interesting 
research framework, which offers a conceptualization of the high-level 
interdependencies between the different levels of analysis. Complementing the 
existing literature on industry dynamics the analysis drills downs to underlying fine-
grained mechanisms to explain how change occurs. Thus, this study provides an 
insight into the multi-level nature of industry evolution and to the fine-grained 
causal and evolutionary connections between the macro and micro levels of change 
in particular. In addition, the analysis shows that visual mapping (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, Langley and Truax 1994; Mintzberg et al., 1976) with causal 
diagrams (Pearl, 2000; Pajunen, 2004) that interlink the distinct levels of analysis is 
a plausible and logically consistent method in order to provide an explanation.  
 
Second, the study elucidates the characteristics of the focal mechanisms that explain 
organizational survival and death in a novel way. The fine-grained explanation of 
evolutionary change is not only composed of the impact of evolutionary 
mechanisms, but also of the effect of causal mechanisms. Whereas the evolutionary 
mechanisms are by nature emergent, the causal mechanisms may either be emergent 
 INTRODUCTION       7 
 
 
 
 
or agency identifiable. When the two types of mechanism are in action 
simultaneously, the outcome is the combined result of both. This provides a fine-
grained explanation for a phenomenon, in which an intervention of a public policy 
action induces a causal mechanism, which interferes with the underlying ‘natural 
evolution’ of an industry, and thus modifies the outcome of the active evolutionary 
mechanisms. The explanation of an industry life cycle and individual firm survival 
includes three kinds of processes and mechanisms: (1) an underlying evolutionary 
process with mechanisms to induce variation, selection and retention, (2) market 
mechanisms according to the both the formal in informal “rules of the game” in the 
industry, and (3) the causal mechanisms activated by several institutions and 
environmental shocks. 
 
Third, the study shows that the pattern of a regulated industry life cycle is, to some 
extent, different from the life cycles of traditional open market industries (cf. 
Klepper, 1997). The Finnish electric power industry underwent two shakeouts 
during the end of the 20th century. The latter was caused by legislation and 
regulation and the preceding and subsequent events in the three levels of analysis: 
society and institutions, industry and firms. Furthermore, the business model (Amit 
and Zott, 2001; Venkatraman and Henderson, 1998; Tikkanen et al., 2005) of a firm 
was a key evolutionary selection criterion during the overall life cycle of the 
industry – and during the shakeouts in particular. The business model of a firm is a 
manifestation of its blueprint or DNA – a long-term storage of information of the 
firm and its evolution. The corollaries of historical path dependence and coevolution 
with surrounding society, particularly other industries and firm owners, are stored in 
the business model of a firm.   
 
The study provides evidence that the structure of the electric power industry in 
Finland in 2005, the dominant firms and the distinct business models, cannot be 
understood without coming to terms with the interplay of institutions, external 
shocks, technology and markets, and the complex impact of underlying causal and 
evolutionary mechanisms throughout the history of the industry. In addition to the 
theoretical contributions, this study has several practical implications for both public 
policy making and for the key stakeholders of electric power industry firms. First, I 
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explain how the public policy makers have an agency role and use a ‘visible hand’ – 
sometimes purposively, sometimes unintentionally – with causal impact on both 
industry structure and on individual firm survival. This is due to the fact that public 
policies have primary causal and secondary emergent impacts on industries and 
firms. The emergent and often unintentional impact is a result of the interplay of the 
direct causal mechanisms and the underlying evolutionary mechanisms. Second, I 
explain how and why evolutionary path dependence and asset constraints cause far-
reaching impacts on public policies at both industry and firm level. Third, I show 
that external shocks intervene the ‘normal’ evolution of the industry and are the 
antecedents of intended causal impacts of public policies. Good examples of such 
external shocks are the Oil Crisis in the 1970s and the recent challenges associated 
with climate change. Climate change has attested again that great environmental 
challenges will increase the uncertainties of upcoming changes of regulation and 
public policy actions – such as taxation of windfall profits or government subsidies 
on new energy technologies. The investment lifetime of power generation plants is 
often tens of years and a substantial amount of financial capital is tied up in these 
investments. It is therefore crucial to understand the long-term impacts of the 
distinct actions on different levels, as deregulation might not be the end of the story 
of regulation – there might be new kinds of regulations on the horizon for the 
industry and for society as a whole. 
1.3. Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. After this introduction, mechanisms 
and causality as part of the evolutionary explanation are presented and reviewed in 
Chapter 2. The chapter starts with a definition of the hierarchy of the temporal 
scopes of analysis. Thereafter, the different approaches to mechanisms and their 
characteristics that are found in the industry evolution scholarly literature are 
reviewed. Next, causal explanations and the key characteristics of mechanisms in 
the social sciences scholarly literature are reviewed. Following this, two important 
concepts and phenomena in industry evolution; co-evolution and path dependence 
are explained by making use of mechanisms. In the concluding part of the chapter 
the findings of the review are summarized in the form of the research motivation and 
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research problem. In order to provide an answer to the research problem defined at 
the end of the second chapter, I first build an extensive research framework for the 
remainder of the study. The framework is presented at the start of Chapter 3. The 
components of the research framework are thereafter thoroughly reviewed based on 
the existing scholarly literature. Three research questions, which were built on the 
findings of the review, are presented at the end of the chapter. In Chapter 4, a 
detailed review of the existing research of the electric power industry is carried out 
on the basis of the research questions. Based on the findings of this review three 
research propositions are offered which are scrutinized in the empirical analysis.  
 
The methodology of the study; the research site, research design and data sources 
are presented in Chapter 5. There follows the historical analysis of the electric power 
industry in Finland between 1889 and 2005 which is presented in Chapter 6. First, 
the four periods of the history of industry are portrayed. Following this the structure 
of the research framework, the evolution of public policies in the industry is 
analyzed. Subsequently, the evolution of electricity consumption and power 
generation technology and the evolution of distinct firm business models are studied 
and the key selection criteria are summarized. Finally, the two shakeout episodes of 
the industry are scrutinized, causal diagrams of the key events leading to the 
shakeouts are depicted and the key mechanisms during the evolution of the industry 
are outlined. The key theoretical findings are discussed in Chapter 7: the nature of 
mechanisms in an evolutionary explanation and characteristics of a regulated 
industry evolution. Finally, in Chapter 8 the key contributions to scholarly discourse 
are summarized, practical implications are offered and the limitations of the study as 
well as suggestions for further studies are discussed. 
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2. MECHANISMS AND CAUSALITY IN 
EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION 
 
The organization and management literature has for a long time been interested in 
long-term change. The principal interest for scholars is how the change takes place 
and what the reasons behind the change are. Furthermore, their profound aspiration 
is to understand and explain why the change occurs. For scholars of industry 
evolution the centre of attention is on the interplay of an organization and its 
environment. According to the prevailing theories, change originates from distinct 
mechanisms, which cause a change to occur (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Aldrich, 
1999; Nelson, 1995b). Analytically the focus is on “a variable or a set of them that is 
changing over time and the theoretical quest is for an understanding of the dynamic 
process behind the observed change; a special case would be a quest for 
understanding of the current state of a variable or a system in terms how it got there” 
(Nelson, 1995b:54). Consequently, the change that is seen in a variable of a given 
level of analysis between two selected points of time is a result of a chain of 
multiple events and the active mechanisms between the events. As Van de Ven and 
Poole (2005:1385) have put it, a process theory of change “needs to go beyond a 
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surface description, to penetrate the logic behind observed temporal progressions. 
This explanation should identify the generative mechanisms that cause observed 
events to happen in the real world, and the particular circumstances or contingencies 
when these causal mechanisms operate.”  
 
In this chapter, mechanisms will firstly be placed in the multidimensional landscape 
of levels of analysis and temporal scopes of analysis in the organization and 
management literature. Thereafter, the approaches to mechanisms in industry 
evolution and evolutionary economics literature are reviewed. Since causality is one 
of the key characteristics of mechanisms, causal explanations are reviewed and 
discussed first as part of the industry evolution literature and then in the social 
sciences scholarly literature in general. Next, the key characteristics of mechanisms 
are reviewed and summarized. Then, two important evolutionary concepts and 
phenomena – coevolution and path dependence – are elucidated by making use of 
mechanisms. Finally, based on the review, the research motivation of the study is 
summarized at the end of the chapter. 
2.1. Temporal scopes of analysis 
The analysis of industry evolution is a multi-dimensional exercise, in which one has 
to select not only the level of analysis, such as society, the institutions, an industry, a 
firm, or the individuals2 (Aldrich, 1999), but also the span and scope of the temporal 
dimension of analysis. The selection of both the level of analysis and the temporal 
scope of analysis depends on the desired graininess of the analysis. It also often 
represents the selected epistemological standpoint of the research; methodological 
collectivism or methodological individualism, as elaborated in the next chapter. The 
four scopes of analysis in the temporal dimension of social sciences, and industry 
evolution research in particular, are described in Table 1.  First, starting from the 
bottom of the table, mechanisms form the lowest temporal scope of analysis, 
                                                 
 
2 The distinct levels of analysis in this study are presented in detail in Chapter 3 together with 
the research framework. 
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combining a set of events and the change relations between the events in identical or 
closely similar ways over a variety of situations (Tilly, 2001). Thus, mechanisms are 
useful constructs to provide a fine-grained analysis of a phenomenon. Second, 
processes are concatenations of mechanisms, frequently occurring combinations of 
mechanisms. In the industry evolution tradition, which builds on general 
evolutionary theory, processes – such as variation, selection and retention 
(Campbell, 1969) – are often at the center of the analysis.  
 
Table 1: Distinct temporal scopes of analysis in the temporal dimension of social science 
research  
Temporal Scope 
of Analysis Presented by Description 
Lifetime Nelson and Winter 
(1982) 
Hannan and Carroll 
(1992) 
Klepper (1997) 
Whole life of a population or an 
organization from the entry of the first 
member to the exit of the last one. 
Episode 
 
Tushman and 
Romanelli (1985) 
Tilly (2001) 
Temporally selected, bounded stream of 
social life. 
Process Campbell (1969) 
Van de Ven and Poole 
(2005) 
High-level causal process explaining 
long-term change (e.g. variation, 
selection, retention). 
Mechanism Nelson (1995b) 
Coleman (1990) 
Hedström and 
Swedberg (1998) 
Machamer et al. (2000) 
Bundge (2004) 
Mayntz (2004) 
Construct explaining the relationship 
between two entities or events. 
 
 
Third, episodes are bounded streams of social life. Episodes are, in general, the areas 
of interest during the lifetime of an organization. Certain episodes have a more 
important effect on industry structure and survival than others; thus they have a 
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cohort effect (Aldrich, 1999) on firms and industries3. Examples of such episodes 
are shakeouts, during which the number of firms in the industry rapidly decreases 
after a long period of growth (Klepper, 1997), environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982) 
and episodes with increased environmental turbulence (Lewin et al., 1999). The 
research challenge in the analysis of these kinds of episodes typically includes the 
question of why the shakeout occurs and how the environmental turbulence impacts 
the industry structure and organizational survival. Fourth, lifetime represents the 
highest temporal scope of analysis and includes the entire life cycle of a population 
from the entry of the first member to the exit of the last. In this study, I have used 
several temporal scopes of analysis depending on the purpose of the analysis. I start 
from the entire lifetime of an industry to identify the key episodes during the life 
cycle of an industry. Then I drill down in the episodes and elucidate and explain the 
phenomena observed in the higher scope of analysis by making use of mechanisms.  
2.2. Mechanism as a fine-grained construct of explanation 
2.2.1. Approaches to mechanisms in the industry evolution literature 
The concept of a mechanism is used in industry evolution theories to explain how 
high level change processes operate at three different levels of analysis; on the level 
of the industry, within the firms, and between the levels. A summary of the 
approaches to mechanisms in the industry evolution literature is presented in Table 
2.  
 
First, the most general use of the concept is at the level of the industry. At this level 
mechanisms are used to explain high-level evolutionary Variation-Selection-
Retention (VSR) (Campbell, 1969) change processes.  
                                                 
 
3 Aldrich (1999) defined three components of an evolutionary-historical framework for 
understanding organizational change. The three components are an age effect, a period effect 
and a cohort effect. The age effect is inherently associated with the existence of the firm or 
the industry. The period effect and the cohort effects are related to certain time frame during 
the life cycle of the industry. In the period effect the impact is same for all firms; in the cohort 
effect the events and forces have different effect on different organizations.   
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Table 2: Mechanisms in industry evolution literature 
Related to Mechanism (m.) Presented in article 
General  Selection mechanism 
 
Variation mechanism 
Retention mechanism 
Mutation mechanism 
Change inducing and winnowing m. 
Rolling snowball mechanism 
Self-reinforcing mechanism 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Murmann, 
2003; Nelson, 1995b 
Campbell, 1969; Nelson, 1995b 
Nelson, 1995b 
Levinthal, 2006  
Nelson, 1995b 
Nelson, 1995b, Murmann and Frenken, 
2006 
Murmann, 2003; Nelson and Winter, 2002 
Industry 
level  
Internalization mechanism 
Structural change mechanism 
Puffert, 2001, 2002 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977 
Market and 
competition 
Market mechanism 
 
 
Competition mechanism 
Co-operation mechanism 
Sponsorship by 
powerful actors and organizations 
Isolating mechanism 
Niche-cumulation, technological add-
on and hybridization 
Market stabilizing mechanism 
Imitation mechanism 
Nelson 1995b; Nelson and Sampat, 2001, 
Murmann et al., 2003, Verbong and Geels, 
2007 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977 
Barnett and Hansen, 1996  
Hannan and Carroll, 1992 
 
Mahoney and Pandian, 1992 
Geels, 2002 
 
Geels, 2005, 2006 
Nelson and Winter 1982; Nelson, 1995b 
Dominant 
design and 
path 
dependence 
Successful variation retention m. 
Know-how isolating m. 
Founder effect mechanism 
Internal selection mechanism 
Anderson and Tushman, 1990 
Cattani, 2006 
Arthur, 1989 
Bannet and Burgelman, 1996 
Firm level 
 
Person-to-person mechanism 
Routine changing mechanism  
Lobbying mechanism 
Resource allocation mechanisms 
Adaptive learning  
Local search  
 
Learning mechanism 
 
Cognitions, ideologically inclined 
strategy and performance outcomes 
mediating mechanism 
Habit  
Nelson, 1995b 
Nelson, 1995b 
Nelson, 1995b 
Gilbert, 2005 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson and 
Winter, 2002; Murmann et al., 2003 
Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Zollo and 
Winter, 2002 
Lamberg and Tikkanen, 2006 
 
 
Hodgson, 2007 
Institutions State control mechanism 
Enforcement mechanism 
Regime transformation mechanism 
Mechanism of negative feedback  
Mechanisms to enforce law and 
make new law 
Reconstitutive downward causation m. 
Backward-looking rationalization  
Hannan and Freeman, 1977 
Ingram and Inman, 1996 
Geels, 2006 
Holm, 1995  
Rosenberg and Birdzel, 1986 
 
Hodgson, 2007 
Jennings et al., 2007 
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Thus the most general mechanisms at the industry level are the ‘mechanisms for 
inducing change’, ‘mechanism to winnow the variation’, and ‘selection 
mechanisms’ (Nelson, 1995b).  For example, Nelson (1995b) used the concept of a 
mechanism to explain how more productive and profitable techniques replace less 
productive ones. According to Nelson the outcome was a result of two mechanisms: 
firms using more profitable technologies will grow, and more profitable 
technologies tend to be imitated and adopted by firms who had been using less 
profitable approaches. Furthermore, the concept of a ‘market mechanism’ is widely 
used to explain the phenomena of how the market sorts out (or selects) the more 
desirable solutions to problems and suppresses the undesirable ones. Thus, market 
mechanism can be considered to be one of the master mechanisms in economic 
change (Schumpeter, 1934). 
 
Second, there are mechanisms that are active within a firm. Nelson and Winter 
(1982) referred to mechanisms such as ‘local search’ or ‘routine changing 
mechanisms’ that serve to change the internal routines of a firm. Moreover, Nelson 
(1995b) mentioned ‘innovation mechanisms’ and ‘person-to-person transmission 
mechanisms’ as examples of interfirm mechanisms. In the same spirit, Murmann 
(2003) identified ’internal optimizing mechanisms’ to find out optimal solutions 
under external selection pressure. Recently, Lamberg and Tikkanen (2006) 
identified mechanisms that created causal links between the political structure of a 
firm and ideology and finally to managerial cognition as a basis for competitive 
advantage in the Finnish retail industry 1945–1995. A further example of using 
mechanisms to explain the evolution of institutions is Rosenberg and Birdzell’s 
(1986) study which identified ‘mechanisms to enforce law’ and ‘mechanisms to 
make new law’.  
 
Third, there are mechanisms that explain a change that can be identified in at a 
certain level of analysis, but are induced from another level of analysis. Examples of 
these are the dominant design (Murmann and Frenken, 2006), which causes a 
‘rolling snowball’ or ‘self-reinforcing mechanism’ within an industry to take place, 
and ‘lobbying mechanisms’ (Nelson, 1995c) which result from corporate political 
activity (Lenway and Rehbein, 1991; Mahon and McGowan, 1998) with a goal to 
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evoke a change in an institutional level. In his empirical study of the synthetic dye 
industry in Europe at the beginning of the 1900s, Murman (2003) identified three 
kinds of self-reinforcing mechanisms between the German dye industry and the 
social institutions that formed the basis for dominance in the industry: exchange of 
personnel, the formation of commercial ties, and lobbying. In these cases the 
mechanisms were not one-way, but rather were combined as two-way mechanisms 
thus forming the basis for the concept of coevolution (Nelson, 1995a). Furthermore, 
Jennings et al. (2005) identified the impact of shock events such as wars, to have a 
periodic effect that increases the number of rules and the likelihood of revision in 
legislation. They suggest that much of the evolution of the British Columbia Water 
Law involved consolidating and resolving tensions between a set of rules which 
originated from history. They called this a ‘backward-looking rationalization 
process’4.  
 
Indeed, understanding the process of change and the influencing mechanisms is at 
the center of research of economic and organizational change; both during stable 
circumstances and for periods of external or internal shocks. Most of the 
mechanisms identified in the existing industry evolution literature are by nature 
evolutionary; they explain the higher level evolutionary processes. The variation, 
selection and retention mechanisms (Campbell, 1969; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 
Nelson, 1995b; Murmann, 2003) are archetypal manifestations of evolutionary 
mechanisms. However, some of the mechanisms identified in the industry evolution 
and evolutionary economics scholarly literature are by nature causal. For example, 
Nelson (1995a) used the expression causal arrow to describe the process of 
coevolution. Likewise Murmann (2003) identified several self-reinforcing causal 
mechanisms. Recently, Lamberg and Tikkanen (2006) identified a causal link from 
structure to ideology and finally to managerial cognition, and Lamberg et al. (2008) 
                                                 
 
4 The terminology that Jennings et al. (2007) use shows that a common terminology of 
processes and mechanisms as presented by Tilly (2001) would help the theory development in 
industry evolution and institutional research –what they called ‘processes’ are clearly the 
same constructs as what is called ‘mechanisms’ in many other studies. 
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provide a causal explanation of competitive behavior in conjunction with the 
evolution of the firm and its business environment.  
 
It should be noted however that most of the existing evolutionary theories are not 
causal in the sense that they do not specify the engines driving variation, selection 
and retention. Instead, many of the current models are algorithmic; specifying that if 
certain conditions are met, then a particular outcome will occur (Aldrich, 1999). For 
example, Nelson and Winter (1982) described the evolutionary change process 
algorithmically as a Markov process. Other examples of algorithmic modeling are 
the hazard models of industry life cycle developed by Klepper (1996), and the 
density dependence models of population ecology (Hannan and Carrol, 1992).  
 
Causality, on the other hand, has not received much attention among existing 
industry evolution research. However, the value of causal explanations is not denied 
in the literature. On the contrary, many causal explanations are considered to be 
compatible with the underlying evolutionary explanations (Nelson and Winter, 
2002; Nelson, 2005). Nelson and Winter (1982) argued that it is a question of two 
different levels of abstraction. The causal explanations, generally manifested in the 
form of stories (Nelson, 1995b), are seen as ‘appreciative theorizing’ (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) in contrast to the ‘formal theorizing’ represented by the algorithmic 
models. Likewise, more generally in economic explanations, ‘covering law’ 
(Hempel, 1965) explanations have dominated. On the other hand, as Runde (1998) 
argued, causal methods and causal explanations are also viable in economics to 
provide alternative and complementary economic explanations. Understanding the 
impact of sudden environmental shocks, such as public policy interventions, require 
different explanations than can be solely offered by evolutionary mechanisms. As 
Pearl (2000) pointed out, causal effects permit us to predict how systems would 
respond to hypothetical interventions such as public policy decisions. Such 
predictions “are the hallmark of causal modeling, since they are not discernible from 
probabilistic information alone, they rest on – and in fact, define – causal 
relationships” (Pearl, 2000:65).  
 
Causality has a long tradition for providing explanations in social sciences in 
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general. In the last decade, causality has undergone a major transformation from a 
mysterious concept to mathematical and graphical models (for a good review see 
Pearl, 2000). Moreover, the use of mechanisms has evolved in the other areas of 
social sciences to include rigorous descriptions of the characteristics of mechanisms. 
Indeed, as recent empirical studies (Murmann, 2003; Lamberg and Tikkanen, 2006; 
Lamberg et al., 2008) indicate, causal explanations and causal mechanisms are an 
important complementary component of the evolutionary explanation. The 
principles of causal explanations in social sciences and the characteristics of 
mechanisms as presented in other areas of social sciences are reviewed next.  
2.2.2. Causal explanations in the social sciences 
In much of social sciences the quest is to determine the process through which the 
assumed cause is related to the outcome (Kendall and Lazarsfeld, 1950). The central 
goal of this type of investigation is to explain this process between a causal variable 
X and outcome variable Y.  
 
 
Figure 1: Different methods of causal effects 
X Y
Cause / Input Outcome / Output
X M Y
X Y
A
B
Statistical 
coefficient
Mechanism
Mechanisms 
decomposed to its 
component parts
Method of 
explanation of 
causal inference
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Adequate explanations for how causes bring about their affects must, at some level, 
specify in empirically verifiable ways the causal pathways between causes and their 
outcomes (Morgan and Winship, 2007). The different methods of the causal 
inference are described in Figure 1.  
 
First, the mainstream method to test and give evidence of causality has traditionally 
been single-equation statistical models, in which the causes and outcomes are 
evaluated next to each other and in which the causal influence of the cause X upon 
the outcome Y is, in the simplest form, simply a regression coefficient. These 
probabilistic methods, often called ‘black-box explanations’ (cf. Duncan, 1975), 
have been criticized because they oversimplify the causal relationship (Hedström 
and Swedberg, 1998; Hedström, 2005; Morgan and Winship, 2007; Durand and 
Vaara, 2009) and neglect the social science tradition, in which “much of the 
scientific quest is concerned with the search for intervening variables that will serve 
to interpret of explain gross associations presumed to reflect a causal relationship” 
(Duncan et al., 1972). Moreover, from a point of methodological individualism, 
many sociologists have criticized pure statistical techniques as a method of 
providing adequate causal explanations in social phenomena (see Goldthorpe, 2001). 
These kind of explanation just show the relationship between X and Y, not how and 
by whom the relationship is produced (Coleman, 1990; Abbott, 1992; Hedström and 
Swedberg, 1998). 
 
Second, Hedström and Swedberg (1998) argued that the search for mechanisms 
signify that the establishment of systematic covariation between variables or events 
is not enough; a satisfactory explanation requires that the social 'cogs and wheels' 
(Elster, 1989:3) that have brought the relationship into existence, should be 
specified. Thus, the second diagram in Figure 1 represents the view of Hedström and 
Swedberg (1998), where a mechanism provides the inference between the input and 
the output or between the explanans and the explanandum. They highlighted the 
importance of the existence of the structure of the link; the mechanism. In essence 
this is the answer to the questions of how and why; the interpretation and 
explanation of the relationship between X and Y is what mechanisms are all about 
(Kendall and Lazarsfeld, 1950; Morgan and Winship, 2007). 
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Third, the last diagram in Figure 1 depicts the decomposing of a mechanism to its 
component parts. This can be achieved with mediating and intervening variables, as 
described by Pearl (2000) and by Morgan and Winship (2007). Mechanisms occur in 
nested hierarchies in which “the lower level entities, properties and activities are 
components in mechanisms that produce higher level phenomena” (Machamer et al., 
2000:13). Thus, the analysis of social phenomena requires that the complex totality 
is decomposed “into its constituent entities and activities” and then “bring into focus 
what is believed to be its most essential elements” (Hedström, 2005:2).  
 
In addition to the approaches to causality mentioned above, ; which can be called (1) 
probabilistic and (2) mechanistic accounts of causality, there are three other notable 
accounts or approaches to causality in social sciences: (3) regularity, (4) 
interventional, and (5) counterfactual accounts (Reiss, 2009).  
 
Regularity accounts use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and Boolean 
algebra (Ragin, 1998, 2008; Rihoux and Ragin, 2008) to examine macro-social 
phenomena. In QCA the identification of the causes of a particular phenomenon 
starts by arranging all observed instances of that phenomenon in a table. Then a list 
of factors of the phenomenon is constructed, and it is noted whether each factor is 
present or absent. A factor is judged to be a cause whenever it is a member of a 
group such that group of factors is always associated with the phenomenon of 
interest and no subgroup is associated with the phenomenon (Reiss, 2009). 
Regularity accounts are widely used in sociology (Amenta and Halfmann, 2000), 
political science (Marx, 2008) and criminology (Williams and Farrell, 1990). 
 
Interventional accounts (Gaskins, 1955; Woodward, 2003) highlight the possible 
change or manipulation of the cause and the subsequent effect to the outcome. 
Woodward (2003) calls this a 'what-if-things-had-been-different' question: "the 
explanation must enable us to see what sort of difference it would have made for the 
explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans would have been different in 
various possible ways" (2003:11). Reisman and Forber (2005) build on Woodward's 
ideas and argue that conducting controlled manipulations is a reliable strategy for 
identifying causal relations. In their response to Matthen and Ariew (2002) and 
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Walsh et al. (2002), who argued that evolutionary selection and drift are best 
understood as statistical trends rather than causes, they show that evolutionary 
natural selection and random drift can be manipulated to produce different kinds of 
evolutionary change.  
 
Counterfactual accounts (Lewis, 1973, 1978; Pearl, 2000; Morgan and Winship, 
2007) are one of the most dominant models of causation used widely in statistics and 
economics (Roy, 1951; Quandt, 1972; Heckman, 1974, 1996, 2000), as well as in 
social sciences (Manski, 1995, 2003, Moore, 1978, Brady, 2003). Recently, Durand 
and Vaara (2009) proposed the counterfactual approach as an explanatory tool for 
strategy research. They offered two methodologies, counterfactual history and causal 
modelling as solutions for providing explanations in strategy research. 
 
The counterfactual approach is also rooted in philosophy. In the philosophical 
tradition, initiated by Lewis (1973, 1978), the counterfactual dependence between 
two events X and Y is defined so that X causes Y if X and Y both occur and if X 
had not occurred and all else remained the same, then Y would not have occurred. 
Woodward (2003), building on Lewis’ (1973) definition and the work of Pearl 
(2000) takes the definition further and includes the values or characteristics of X and 
Y to the notion of counterfactuals. According to Woodward there is a counterfactual 
causal relationship between X and Y, if and only if an intervention on X (that 
changes the characteristics of X) would change the characteristics of Y and the 
relationship would remain invariant.  
 
Counterfactual and interventional accounts are philosophically similar in the sense 
that in seeking the causes of an event the focus is on alternative options. However, 
where interventional accounts pay attention to the manipulation of the explanans, 
counterfactual research is seeking answers to questions of what would have 
happened if the preceding event had not occurred (Griffin, 1993; Abell, 2001; 
Pajunen, 2004).  
 
Causation has two faces; necessary and sufficient (Pearl, 2000). The fundamental 
counterfactual definition of causation captures the notion of necessary cause. In 
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order to identify law-like 'general causes' (and related mechanisms), all factors 
should be known, all relevant details should be spelled out and nothing should be 
left to chance or guessing (Pearl, 2000). In general, however, this is in practice never 
the case. Especially in historical analysis the "real history" with all its facts and 
details is neither known nor knowable (Griffin, 1993). As Weber (1949) argued, a 
'concrete event' (p. 165) is too complex to subsume under causal generalizations or 
theoretical laws. The extension of the counterfactual notion to also include the 
sufficient component of causation is important in order to be able to identify the 
actual causes5 (Pearl, 2000:309) and the representations of the mechanisms. This 
parallel notion of causation has been used, for instance in policy analysis (Khoury et 
al. 1989), to identify the sufficient or threshold level of certain characteristic of an 
event to cause an effect in a population. Counterfactual reasoning can be used as a 
supportive tool to identify the relevant events (Moore, 1978), the actual causes and 
the representations mechanisms between the events. Although in most cases we 
possess only partial information of the research subject, "the more episode-specific 
evidence we gather, the closes we come to the ideals of token6 claims and actual 
causes” (Pearl, 2000).  
 
The search for general causes (Pearl, 2000) leads to covering-law explanations. 
However, as Mayntz (2004) emphasized, laws are basically general statements of 
covariation and they point out causal factors, not processes. For this reason, in social 
sciences, in order to avoid a search for social laws, social mechanisms are used as 
building blocks of middle-range theories, advocated by Merton (1957), to explain 
social processes.  
                                                 
 
5 Pearl (2000) makes a notable distinction between actual causes and general causes. 
According to Pearl, statements like "a car accident was the cause of Joe's death" represent a 
single-event statement and an actual cause. On the other hand statements of the type "car 
accidents cause deaths" when made relative to a type of events or a class of individuals may 
be classified as general causes. 
6 In Pearl’s (2000), terminology token equals singular or single-events, which represent actual 
causes in contrast to generic or type-level events, which represent general causes. 
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2.2.3. Identification of mechanisms and causal diagrams 
The identification of mechanisms from empirical data is challenging because most 
mechanisms do not have names that can be found in common everyday language. As 
Pearl (2000) pointed out; "complex descriptions of…how mechanisms interact with 
one another are rarely communicated explicitly in terms of mechanisms. Instead, 
they are communicated in terms of cause-effect relationships between events and 
variables" (2000:225-226). Bhaskar (1978) argued that the world consist of 
mechanisms, not events. Although he admitted that "it is rarely that they 
[mechanisms] are actually manifest and rarer still that they are empirically identified 
by men" (1978:34), he urges science to generate knowledge of mechanisms that 
"produce the phenomena of the world". 
 
The dilemma of the fact that mechanisms are on the other hand key concepts of 
explanation in social sciences, but on the other hand are challenging to identify, has 
been lifted up in the philosophy of science discourse. For instance, Bunge 
(2004:200) argued that "there is no method, let alone logic, for conjecturing 
mechanisms…one reason is that, typically, mechanisms are unobservable, and 
therefore their description is bound to contain concepts that do not occur in 
empirical data", but concludes that "no law, no possible mechanism; and no 
mechanism, no explanation” (2004:207).  
 
Being aware and respecting the philosophical challenge of identifying mechanisms, 
several scholars have seized the challenge presented by Bhaskar (1978) to identify 
mechanisms from empirical phenomena. Goldthorpe (2001) proposed a three-phase 
process of causal analysis: establishing the phenomena that form the explananda, 
hypothesizing generative processes (or mechanisms) at the level of social action, and 
testing the hypothesis. Following the logic of Goldthorpe (2001), Glennan (2005) 
offered the concept of a mechanical model to link real world phenomena and 
mechanisms. A mechanical model consists of two parts; a description of the 
mechanism's behavior (a behavioral description), and a description of the 
mechanism that accounts for that behavior (the mechanical description). The 
behavioral description deals with real life events and describes what a mechanism is 
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doing, while the mechanical description deals with a theoretical tells one how the 
mechanism does it. The division between the behavioral description and the 
mechanical description is analogous to the division between explanandum and 
explanans (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998). However, it should be noted that what 
emerge from mechanistic explanations are not the organizational mechanisms per se, 
but models of mechanisms which are operative in the organizational processes 
(Pajunen, 2008). 
  
Methodologically, causal diagrams provide a useful tool for combining empirical 
(event based) data with causal information and thus performing and presenting the 
analysis and the mechanistic explanations. Causal diagrams are helpful both to 
describe the behavioral description; the chain of events, and the mechanical 
description; the component parts of the mechanism. The process of identification of 
a mechanism "begins from an initial condition or setting that may be, and usually is, 
the result of preceding processes and mechanisms, but can be idealized as a static 
situation, and ends with an end condition or outcome that may, for example, be the 
state of affairs that we are trying to understand” (Pajunen, 2008:1454). The causal 
diagram is therefore not only a tool for presentation; it may also be used as a tool to 
identify the mechanisms that are active during the period of investigation. The 
graphical identification of causal mechanisms and their characteristics fit well 
together with the statistical and descriptive analysis; they are not exclusive methods 
but complement each other (Mayntz, 2004). Or as Steel (2004:71) put it: "without 
the aid of statistical data, the best one can hope to establish by means of process 
tracing is purely qualitative causal claims". 
 
Causal diagrams are based on graph theory (Harary et al., 1965; Hage and Harary, 
1983) with di-graphs (Abell, 2004) with nodes and arrows (or arcs) as basic 
elements. The nodes represent the phenomena and the arrows the causal relationship 
between the phenomena (Laukkanen, 1994). There are several examples in the 
scholarly literature of distinct methodologies using causal diagrams.  
 
First, directed graphs or directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) (Pearl 1995, 2000) have 
been extensively used in the engineering, computer and medical sciences, and also 
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in social sciences (Morgan and Winship, 2007) to represent causal or temporal 
relationships.  
 
Second, causal maps (Ross and Hall, 1980; Eden et al., 1992; Nadkarni and Shenoy, 
2001), also called cognitive maps or cause maps, have been widely used in the areas 
of policy analysis (Axelrod, 1976) and in organization and management research. 
They have been used as tools to facilitate decision making and problem solving 
within the context of organizational intervention (Eden, 1992; Laukkanen, 1994, 
1996). Moreover, (Klein and Cooper, 1982) used causal maps to examine the causal 
belief systems of decision-makers, their behavior and perceptions.  
 
Third, event-structure analysis (ESA) (Heise, 1988, 1989; Griffin, 1993) and the 
related ETHNO software were developed to link narratives to causal inference. The 
method was used by Griffin (1993) to analyze lunching in Mississippi in 1930. 
Stevenson and Greenberg (2000) used event-structure analysis to explain the success 
and failure of actors in a network of relationships who were trying to influence 
policies on environmental issues in a small city. Uehara (2001), in turn, utilized the 
method to explain the dynamics of illness and help-seeking in a Cambodian-
American family. In addition, Pajunen (2004) examined three organizational decline 
and turnaround processes in the Finnish pulp and paper industry and Pajunen (2008) 
analyzed the decline and failure process of the Finnish conglomerate Tampella using 
event-structure analysis. The analytical core of ESA is the temporal ordering and 
sequencing of action, rather than historical scope (Griffin, 1993). Fourth, building 
on the sequence methods (Abbott, 1990, 1995), Abell (2004) offered a graphical 
presentation of a historical narrative in the form of a di-graph. In the graphs the 
nodes are states of the world and the arcs are actions of actors, who are either 
individual or collective.  
2.2.4. Key characteristics of mechanisms 
Productive behavior, component parts and hierarchical structure 
Mechanism as a concept has been broadly used in social science and philosophical 
literature to explain processual phenomena (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bennet 
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and George, 1997; Elster, 1989; George and Bennett, 2005; Glennan, 2002; 
Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Hedström, 2005; Little, 1991; Machamer et al., 
2000; Mahoney, 2001; Pajunen, 2004, 2008; Stinchcombe, 1991). In recent years 
there has been a more systematic approach to this area of research. A summary of 
the major definitions of mechanisms in the existing scholarly literature is presented 
in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Definitions of mechanisms in the social science scholarly literature 
Presented by Definition of Mechanism 
Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen, 2005:423 
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its 
component parts, component operations, and their organization. 
The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible 
for one or more phenomena. 
Bennett and George, 
1997:1 
 The processes and intervening variables through which causal 
or explanatory variables produce causal effects. 
Elster, 1989:3 Nuts and bolts, cogs and wheels –that can be used to explain 
quite complex social phenomena. 
Glennan 2002:344 A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces 
that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the 
interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, 
invariant, change-relating generalizations. 
Hedström and 
Swedberg, 1998:45 
Mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable 
causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown 
conditions or with indeterminate consequences 
Little, 1991:15  A causal mechanism, then, is a series of events governed by 
law-like regularities that leads from the explanans to the 
explanandum. 
Machamer et al., 
2000:3 
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they 
are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or 
termination conditions. 
Mahoney, 2001:580 A causal mechanism is an unobserved entity that—when 
activated—generates an outcome of interest. 
Tilly, 2001:25-26 Mechanisms form a delimited class of events that change 
relations among specified sets of elements in 
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The definitions recapitulate well the key characteristics of mechanisms (see Pajunen, 
2008). Thus, based on the existing body of knowledge, the three important 
characteristics of mechanisms can be summarized as follows:  
 
1. Mechanisms explain a causal connection between events or phenomena,  
2.  Mechanisms consist of their component parts and their activities, and 
3.  Mechanisms have a hierarchical structure and operate across multiple 
levels of analysis.  
 
First, mechanisms have a productive behavior – they cause events or phenomena to 
occur (Coleman, 1990; Machamer et al., 2000; Glennan, 2002). According to 
Hedström and Swedberg (1998) mechanisms are constructs that provide explanation 
on how and why an output of social phenomenon is caused by a particular input. 
Thus mechanisms are the constructs to open the ‘black-box’ between observed 
events or phenomena and are often considered to be the building blocks of middle-
range theories (Merton, 1957; Mayntz, 2004).  
 
Second, mechanisms consist of their component parts (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 
2005). In mechanistic explanations one is looking not just at what the system is 
doing, but also 'into the system' at how it is doing what it is doing (Vromen, 2008). 
The component parts form a complex system with interaction between the 
components (Glennan, 2002). Or, to look it from the whole-part viewpoint as 
Hedström (2005) does, the total can be dissected to its component parts.  
 
Third, a further important characteristic of the component parts of mechanisms is 
that they are organized hierarchically (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Machamer et 
al., 2000; Stinchcombe, 1991). The lower level components together activate the 
mechanism as a whole, or at a higher level (Pajunen, 2008). This spatial 
organization of the components is of obvious importance for biological mechanisms, 
such as those presented by Machamer et al. (2000). However, the spatial role has not 
been systematically discussed in the social sciences (Mayntz, 2004), except for a 
few exceptions (cf. Pajunen, 2004, 2008). One reason for this is different 
assumptions and subsequent tension between methodological individualists and 
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collectivists (Bunge, 2000; Pajunen, 2008). For example, Vromen (2008) criticized 
the impact of individuals in social macro-micro phenomena presented by Felin and 
Foss (2007) and argued that individuals, their properties and their actions and 
interactions are not related to the causal relationship between the macro and micro 
levels of analysis. Rather, for Vromen, they are constitutive component parts of the 
macro phenomena. Similarily, Durand and Vaara (2009) argued that even if social 
actors are able to trigger or hinder the actualization of social mechanisms, cannot 
change the causal mechanisms per se, but they can influence the conditions of the 
social phenomenon in question and consequently the outcome of the mechanisms. 
 
Despite the different views of methodological individualism and collectivism it is 
clear that the internal structure of a mechanism should be differentiated from a 
causal chain of events and the effect of multiple active mechanisms. Craver and 
Bechtel (2007) do this by distinguishing between etiological and constitutive 
explanation. The etiological mechanistic explanation aims to explain how some final 
or terminal condition of a system is brought about by the working of a mechanism 
which is activated (or triggered) by some start or set-up conditions. The constitutive 
mechanistic explanation aims to show how the mechanism works internally. Craver 
and Bechtel (2007) argue in particular that the relation between the entities 
identified at adjacent levels in mechanistic explanation is not a causal one (Craver 
and Bechtel 2007). Thus, for them levels relate to each other as wholes to their 
component parts, not as causes and their effects.  
 
Bunge (2004) suggested that a distinction be made between the internal spatial 
structure of a mechanism and the mechanisms between the macro and micro levels 
of analysis. This can be achieved by labeling the latter mechanisms, such as the 
effect of institutional events (for example commercial codes and government 
regulations) metamechanisms. Bearing in mind the difference, as the focus of this 
study is precisely on these kinds of metamechanisms, I have chosen  to simply call 
them mechanisms. 
 
 
 
MECHANISMS AND CAUSALITY IN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION       29 
 
 
 
 
Evolutionary and emergent mechanisms and the role of agents  
In the industry evolution tradition the nature of mechanisms is often considered to 
be evolutionary, and the impact of individuals is often considered to be leveled off 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). These kinds of mechanisms can be compared in 
grammatical terms with sentences, in which there is no subject and the verb is in the 
passive. In these cases the related mechanisms are emergent by nature (Nelson, 
1995b; Lewin et al., 1999; Murmann, 2003; Murmann and Frenken, 2006).  
 
In the scholarly literature the philosophical notion of emergence (Sawyer, 2001) is 
often used together with the micro-macro link (Alexander et al. 1987; Coleman, 
1990). Lewes (1875) distinguished two types of causal effects: resultants and 
emergents. According to Lewes an emergent effect is not additive, not predictable 
from knowledge of its components, and not decomposable into those components 
(Lewes, 1875). Scholars who represent methodological collectivism use the concept 
of emergence to argue that collective phenomena are collaboratively created by 
individuals, but are not reducible to explanation in terms of individuals (Archer, 
1979; Bhaskar, 1978). On the other hand, emergence as a concept has also been used 
by methodological individualists, who accept the existence of emergent social 
properties, but argue that they can be reduced to explanations in terms of individuals 
and their relationships (Axelroad, 1997; Coleman, 1990). Whereas methodological 
collectivists propose that the micro level social properties are results of the macro 
level causal laws through a process of downward causation, methodological 
individualists only emphasize the emergence of macro level properties from the 
micro level (Sawyer, 2001; Hodgson, 2007). However, it is notable that both sets of 
scholars agree on the empirical importance of analyzing the temporal mechanisms of 
emergence (Sawyer, 2001). 
 
On the other hand, several scholars have highlighted the importance of causal 
agents (Bhaskar, 1978) and their agency role (Durkheim, 1982) in inducing 
mechanisms. Machamer et al. (2000), for example, pointed out that the component 
parts consist of entities and activities; activities are the producers of change, entities 
are the actors engaged in activities. According to Hedström and Swedberg (1998) 
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agents generate the relationship between the entities being observed. They argued 
that “it is by explicitly referring to these causal agents that the relationship is being 
made intelligible” (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998:11). In the organizational change 
literature the role of agents in change is also clearly identified. For example, 
Schumpeter (1955) highlighted the difference between the outcome of the actions of 
‘mere managers’ and ‘entrepreneurs’. According to Schumpeter, the entrepreneur is 
the leader who is ‘carrying out of new combinations’ and thus causes different 
outcomes for the firm. On the other hand, there are only small variations in the 
outcomes of the ‘mere managers’.  
 
Similarly, Lewin et al. (1999) identified the role of managerial actions in the 
coevolution of new organizational forms. North (1990:104), in turn, highlighted the 
role of actors in long-term economic change, which is “the cumulative consequence 
of innumerable short-run decisions by political and economic entrepreneurs that 
both directly and indirectly (via external effects) shape performance.” Recently, 
Winter (2006) emphasized the difference of outcomes when routines are performed 
by different people. Durand and Calori (2006) underlined the role of ‘powerful 
agents’ within the organization as potential conveyors of organizational change or, 
as they call it, ‘otherness’ in comparison to ‘sameness’ of other organizations. 
Moreover, according to Hodgson (2007) there is a two-way causal impact between 
institutions and individuals. Institutions depend for their existence upon individuals, 
and it is sometimes possible for individuals to change institutions. In addition, 
institutions can involve downward causation to change the dispositions and 
behaviors of the agents through a mechanism of ‘habituation’.   
 
There are two interesting characteristics of the agents with regard to their actions: 
(1) the intentionality (Aldrich, 1999; Lewin and Volberda, 1999) of the actors and 
the consequent purposive actions (Granovetter, 1985), and (2) the effect of desires 
and beliefs (North, 2005; Hedström, 2005) in connection with the available 
opportunities as causes of an action. Aldrich (1999) distinguishes two kind of 
variation; intentional and blind. According to Aldrich "intentional variations occur 
when people or organizations actively attempt to generate alternatives and seek 
solutions for problems" (1999:23). In contrast, blind variations, "occur 
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independently of environmental or selection pressures” (Aldrich, 1999:23). Indeed, 
as Durand and Vaara (2009) argue, the socials actors' interpretations of the situation 
affect their actions and can trigger or hinder the actualization of causal mechanisms, 
leading to expected or unexpected effects to the social phenomena in question.  
 
Volberda and Lewin (2003) build on Baum and Singh (1994)7 and distinguish 
between macro-evolution (the external selection environment of an organization), 
and micro-evolution (the internal selection environment of an organization). For 
these authors, the intentionality of the agent may be identified in micro-evolution 
and the subsequent effects in macro-evolution are results of the co-evolution 
between the micro and macro levels.  
 
The two-way interaction between an agent and the environment (Hodgson, 2007) is 
also emphasized by Granovetter (1985:487) as he argues that “actors do not behave 
as atoms outside the social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written 
for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to 
occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, 
ongoing systems of social relations.” The purposive actions highlighted by 
Granovetter (1985) manifests an important characteristic of agents: their 
intentionality. The intentionality of agents enables us to explain an action by 
reference to the future state it was intended to bring about (Hedström, 2005). The 
DBO (Desires, Beliefs and Opportunities) theory8 introduced by Hedström (2005) 
enables the actions of an agent to be explained by preceding mental events (desires 
and beliefs) and the available alternative actions that exist independently of the 
agents beliefs about them. The DBO theory provides a useful tool to disclose the 
mediating and intervening events (desires and beliefs) and variables (opportunities) 
and thus explain the component parts of a causal connection. 
                                                 
 
7 Baum and Singh (1994) make a distinction between genealogical hierarchy and ecological 
hierarchy. 
8 According to Hedström (2005), a belief is as a proposition about the world held to be true, a 
desire is a wish or want, and opportunities describe the ‘menu’ of alternative actions available 
to the actor. 
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Macro-micro link and mechanisms 
Coleman (1990) highlighted that mechanisms are constructs that explain the causal 
connection between the component parts – and particularly between the component 
parts at the macro and micro levels of analysis (Alexander et al. 1987; Coleman, 
1990). Thus the ‘real structure of the world’ is represented by the microphysical 
causal structure, whereas the higher macro-level represents the social or business 
explanation (Glennan, 2002). Theoretically, the lower level combination of events 
describes why the outcome at the higher level that is produced by the mechanism is 
true (Machamer et al., 2000; Pajunen, 2008). Such an explanation of a particular 
event or phenomenon in the macro level of analysis is often also found in the micro 
level of analysis (Hedström, 2005). According to Hedström and Swedberg (1998), 
the transitions between the macro and micro levels can be explained with three key 
mechanisms: (1) situational mechanisms describe how the macro-level events or 
conditions affect the micro-level, (2)  action-formation mechanisms characterize 
how the micro level – organization or individual – assimilates the impact of the 
other micro-level events or conditions, and (3) transformational mechanisms define 
how micro level actions and events generate the macro level outcomes. The 
transition between macro and micro levels of analysis (Coleman, 1990) and the 
distinct mechanisms presented by Hedström and Swedberg (1998) are depicted in 
Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2: Mechanisms that operate between the levels of analysis 
 
Event a Event b
Macro level
Micro level
Event x Event y
Situational 
mechanisms
Transformational 
mechanisms
Action-formation 
mechanisms
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Mechanisms are used to explain the change between different levels of analysis such 
as those between society and social systems (Coleman, 1990), between social 
systems and individuals (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998) or between multiple levels 
of analysis (Baum and Powell, 1995; Dansereau et al., 1999; Geels, 2002, 2005, 
2006; Lepak et al., 2007). For example, Lepak et al. (2007) used a multi-level 
approach to explain the sources of new value creation between levels of society, 
organizations and individuals. They identified two key mechanisms; competition 
and isolation, which operated across all levels of analysis and which explained the 
connection between value creation and value capturing. In addition, Geels (2002) 
used a multi-level approach to explain how technological transitions occurred in the 
transition from sailing ships to steamships during the years 1780-1900. His 
framework consisted of phenomena at three levels; (1) a ‘micro’-level of 
technological niches, (2) a ‘meso’-level of sociotechnical regimes, and (3) a 
‘macro’-level of sociotechnical landscapes. He successfully utilized similar multi-
level approaches in proceeding consequent case studies: the transition from horse-
drawn carriages to automobiles from 1860–1930 (Geels, 2005), the transition from 
cesspools to sewer systems during 1840–1930 (Geels, 2006), the Dutch electricity 
system between 1960–2004 (Verbong and Geels, 2007), and the breakthrough of 
rock ‘n’ roll  during 1930–1970 (Geels, 2007).  
 
Figure 3: Interaction between the mechanisms 
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Indeed, since long-term change occurs in a complex multidimensional space, the 
mechanisms in a framework to analyze long-term change processes should include 
not only mechanisms between two adjacent levels, but a chain of events or a causal 
pathway (Lamberg et al., 2008) between all the selected levels of analysis. The 
representation of mechanisms depicted in Figure 3 is an illustration to elucidate the 
causal history and its effects on the macro-micro phenomenon. In the empirical 
analysis, the key assignment is to identify all the relevant events that have a causal 
impact on a particular event at the selected level in order to be able to provide a 
logically consistent explanation (Glennan, 2007; Hedström, 2005). 
2.2.5. Mechanisms behind coevolution and path dependence 
Two important evolutionary concepts – coevolution (Chandler, 1990: Nelson, 
1995b; Murmann, 2003) and path dependence (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Puffert, 
2000, 2002; Cattani, 2005, 2006) have been used as explanations of empirically 
observed evolutionary phenomena at the process level of the temporal scope of 
analysis. However, in order to get an answer to the question of how and why 
coevolution and path dependence occur, the temporal scope of analysis needs to 
focus on mechanisms. In the next section coevolution and path dependence are 
presented in the light of existing scholarly literature. Thereafter they are unpacked to 
their component parts by making use of mechanisms. 
 
Coevolution 
March and Simon (1993), in the introduction to the second edition of their seminal 
(1958) book, ‘Organizations’, stated that looking at their early work 35 years later 
they would now have taken greater account of the role of the historical context of 
organizations. They identified coevolution as a key concept for explaining change 
both within a firm and in its environment: “processes within an organization shape 
the external world even as it is being shaped by that world” (1993:17). Indeed, the 
interaction between different levels of analysis in the organizational dimension of 
existing evolutionary theories is clearly not one-way. The concept of coevolution 
therefore describes situations in which organizations and populations not only 
respond to the environmental changes but also affect their environments (Nelson 
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1995a, Aldrich, 1999).  
 
Strategy and organizational change research has evolved towards two distinct 
streams of study depending on the emphasis and presupposition of the key source of 
organization success and survival. This has resulted in an adaptation-selection 
debate (Baum, 1996). While organizational ecology theories focus on selection and 
the Variation-Selection-Retention (VSR) process, strategic management theories 
focus on firm-level adaptation. This has led to distinct levels of analysis, competing 
theoretical formulations and missing shared definitions (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). 
On the other hand, Lewin and Volberda (1999) argue that adaptation and selection 
are not wholly opposing forces, but are fundamentally interrelated and offer co-
evolutionary framework as a bridge between the two approaches to explain the 
mutation process of the existing stock of organizations and to integrate the micro- 
and macro-level evolutionary explanations. Accordingly, they emphasize that 
studies of coevolution should include multiple levels of analysis and explanation 
with multidirectional causalities, feedback loops and path dependence. As they point 
out, the multilevelness of co-evolutionary research also enables incorporating 
changes occurring at the level of different institutional systems and economic, social 
and political macroenvironment of an industry and an organization. 
 
Building on the framework presented by Lewin and Volberda (1999), Volberda and 
Lewin (2003b) identified four co-evolutionary generative mechanisms that explain 
the nuances between the changes based on pure evolutionary selection and 
managerial intentionality. A Naïve selection mechanism is active in cases with blind 
market selection, whereas a managed selection mechanism explains situations in 
which the market selection is impacted by managerial adaptation. Hierarchical 
renewal and holistic renewal mechanisms, on the other hand, explain purposeful 
change processes of organizations that are led by the management.  
 
Coevolution is widely used in the scholarly literature to (1) understand the interplay 
between institutions and industries (Ingram and Inman, 1996), and between 
technology, institutions and industries (Nelson, 1995a, 2002, 2005; Murmann, 
2003), (2) between competitors within industries (Barnett and Hansen, 1996) or (3) 
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to explain the evolution of the capabilities within a firm (Zollo and Winter, 2002). In 
the traditional definition of coevolution (Chandler, 1990: Nelson, 1995b) two items 
evolve simultaneously, each affecting the other's evolution. Abrahamson and 
Fairchild (1999) brought an important element to the definition – causality; they call 
coevolution a ‘reciprocal causation’ process. Murmann (2003) sharpened the 
definition of coevolution as follows: "two evolving populations coevolve if and only 
if they both have a significant causal impact on each other's ability to persist" 
(2003:22).  
 
Nelson (1995a) used lower level concepts such as a ‘causal arrow’ and a 
‘mechanism’ to describe how the process of coevolution works. On the other hand, 
Murmann (2003) used concepts such as ‘causal links’ and ‘mechanisms’. However, 
they both highlight two important characteristics of coevolution. First, coevolution is 
a relationship between two entities. Second, the relationship can be deconstructed to 
events with causal connection and direction of impact. These characteristics are fully 
in line with the characteristics of mechanisms presented earlier. Coevolution is a 
typical higher level abstract phenomenon, in which the outcome can be identified at 
a higher level of analysis, whereas the lower level combination of component parts 
explains exactly how the outcome was produced (Pajunen, 2008). Thus, by means of 
the mechanisms and different levels of analysis, the microfoundations of 
coevolution can be explained. This kind of ‘unpacking’ of a higher level concept 
will give more understanding of why coevolution takes place. The concept of 
coevolution can be unpacked with use of the mechanisms and the multiple levels of 
analysis. It applies both for cases in which (1) two levels of analysis or (2) two 
parallel populations are coevolving. 
 
First, coevolution is often illustrated as a feedback loop between the events at the 
different levels, thus creating a self-reinforcing process (Young, 1928). 
Consequently there is a ‘two-way causal arrow’ between the two observed 
phenomena. Accordingly, this kind of representation makes it hard for explanatory 
purposes to clarify why the coevolution occurs. However, using the concept of a 
mechanism, the two-way arrows can be unpacked to create one-way arrows and the 
event unpacked to its component parts in the temporal dimension, as illustrated in 
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Figure 4. Thus, instead of depicting coevolution as one process between two levels 
of analysis, it can be unpacked to several mediating events and detailed mechanisms 
between the events. Second, in case when two parallel populations coevolve, the 
macro-micro-link depicted in Figure 2 attains a second organizational level 
dimension with mechanisms acting between the events in different industries; as 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 4: Unpacking the concept of coevolution with mechanisms 
 
 
Figure 5: Mechanisms in coevolution of two parallel industries 
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Path dependence 
In addition to coevolution, another important phenomenon in long term change is 
path dependence. Path dependence is also a key characteristic of industry evolution 
so that “each time period bears the seeds of its condition in the following period” 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). During the process of aging, firm characteristics, or 
more specifically the assets and capabilities of a firm evolve and accumulate during 
the trajectory of a firm (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Moreover, the decisions rules are 
viewed as being descended from the history of the firm, which is a source of path 
dependence for firms (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  The accumulation of firm-specific 
capabilities makes it impossible for the system to return to earlier branch points and 
‘reconsider’ (Nelson and Winter, 2002). Under some conditions path dependence is 
seen as a constricting element compared to an optimal behavior of a particular firm 
and consequently having a negative impact on the survival of the firm. Puffert 
(2002), for example, argued that path dependence arises when either foresight (or 
information) is lacking or else externalities prevent the sorts of behavior that could 
direct an allocation process toward an optimal outcome.  
 
However, path dependence can also be seen positively. Cattani (2005:564) 
developed the notion of technological preadaptation as “the firm’s accumulation, 
without anticipation and foresight of subsequent uses, of skills and knowledge” and 
also provides empirical evidence for his theoretical statements in his research of 
fiber optics industry (Cattani, 2006). All in all, the existing research widely agrees 
that the historical paths of firms have a substantial effect on firm performance 
(Mitchell, 1991; Carrol et al., 1996). Moreover, historical paths may have significant 
impacts at the industry level. The classic example of the QWERTY typewriter 
keyboard (David, 1985) shows that the absence of a perfect future market drove the 
typewriter industry to prematurely standardize the ‘wrong system’. In addition, 
Puffert (2002) showed that early choices and the followed sequences of contingent 
events led to different standards in regional railway gauges and further to 
inefficiency in the industry. 
 
Path dependence is also a key explanatory phenomenon behind the studies of 
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industry life cycles (Klepper, 1997) and in particular incidents of an industry 
shakeout. These studies provide evidence that firms’ experiences prior to entry to an 
industry – as a result of path dependence – affect their survival and market share in 
the new market. Klepper and Simons (2000a), for example, investigated how the 
backgrounds of entrants affect their performance and the evolution of the market 
structure. In their research on the US television receiver industry they found  that 
pre-entry experience, a firm’s innovation in research and development, and the 
heterogeneity among entrants, contributed most to the industry’s shakeout and the 
evolution of an oligopolistic market structure. A contrary perspective is that put 
forward by Christensen et al. (1998) who suggested that pre-entry experience can be 
harmful for a firm committed to a technology that is rendered obsolete in the 
emergence of a dominant design. 
 
How could the microfoundations of path dependence be conceptualized? The 
definition put forward by Puffert (2002) gives a good foundation. He defined 
economic path dependence as an “economic process is one in which specific 
contingent events – and not just fundamental determinative factors like technology, 
preferences, factor endowments, and institutions – have a persistent effect on the 
subsequent course of allocation” (2000:282). That definition summarizes the key 
characteristics of path dependence: (1) it happens over time, (2) it includes a set of 
events, which (3) have an outcome. Thus, path dependence can be conceptualized as 
a result of a complex chain of causal mechanisms acting between multiple events 
and levels of analysis. In some cases the whole chain is important to discover why 
something happens – in other cases there is only one of few mechanisms that are 
essential to the outcome (Hedström, 2005), the rest build up a ‘snowball effect’ 
(Nelson, 1995b).  
2.3. Research motivation  
Based on an examination of the findings of the existing research and prevailing 
theories, as reviewed in the previous chapters, four key conclusions can be made: 
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1.  Mechanisms are useful and valuable constructs to present a fine-grained 
evolutionary explanation behind high-level change processes in order to 
provide an explanation of how and why the change happened. 
2. Causal explanations (and causal mechanisms) are required as 
complementary components to provide a full evolutionary explanation of 
long-term change.  
3. Using causal diagrams as representations of causal mechanisms is a 
practicable method to provide the causal explanation. 
4.  In order to be able to give causal explanations in evolutionary research, 
multiple levels of analysis are needed. 
 
In this research, these conclusions lead to the central research problem: “what are 
the causal and evolutionary mechanisms that explain firm survival or death in a 
regulated industry?” In order to find the answers to the research problem, I first 
build an extensive research framework which is presented in detail in the next 
chapter. I then review thoroughly the distinct components of the research framework 
based on the existing industry evolution and evolutionary economics literature. 
Based on the findings of the review I thereafter derive three research questions. On 
the basis of the research questions I then perform a detailed review of the existing 
scholarly literature of the electric power industry. This review leads to three research 
propositions, which I scrutinize in the historical analysis of the electric power 
industry in Finland between 1889 and 2005.   
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3. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Key elements of the research framework 
Figure 6 illustrates the model of the process that leads to a specific industry structure 
and to changes in the industry structure such as shakeouts and then further to 
organizational survival or death. 
 
Figure 6: Research framework 
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The key focus in evolutionary theories is the relationship between the organization 
and its environment; evolutionary processes shape the organization to fit the 
environment (Campbell, 1969), and the evolution itself happens at the population or 
industry level. Consequently, evolutionary theory is inherently a multilevel theory; it 
requires at least two levels of analysis, the level of organizations or firms that 
reproduce the differential rates, and the population or the industry level, where the 
evolutionary change is identified.  
 
Table 4: Distinct organizational levels of analysis  
Organizational 
Level of Analysis Focus  Research 
Society Society, 
world 
economy 
North (2005) 
Government (Jacobides, 2005) 
Institutions Law, 
regulation, 
rules 
Institutions as the underlying determinant of the 
long-run performance of economies (North, 1990) 
Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 
1991) 
Evolutionary economics (Nelson, 1986, 1995b, 
2005; North, 1990) 
Evolution of laws (Jennings et al. (2007) 
Regulation (Joskow, 1996) 
Knowledge, institutions and competitive 
advantage (Murmann, 2003) 
Structuration process between institutions and 
actions (Barley and Tolbert, 1997) 
Population of 
organizations 
Industry Population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) 
Industry life cycles (Klepper, 1997) 
Organization Firm Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1971) 
Firm routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) 
Resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
Microfoundations 
of firm 
Individuals New approaches in organizational learning (Felin 
and Hesterly, 2007) 
Institutions and Individuals: Interaction and 
Evolution (Hodgson, 2007) 
The role of agents (Durand and Calori, 2006) 
 
The distinct elements of the research framework represent different levels of 
analysis in the industry evolution tradition. It should be noted that the question of a 
right level of analysis in evolutionary research differs between scholars and between 
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perspectives (Aldrich, 1999)9. Table 4 summarized the distinct levels of analysis, 
their focus and key studies within the strategy and management literature. The key 
elements of the framework are (1) industry and the market, (2) institutions in the 
form of legislation, regulation, public policies and actions, (3) the available 
technology, (4) and the firm and its business model, technology and assets. The 
framework also includes the relationships with the surrounding society, competitors 
and firm specific shareholders. I explicate the conceptualization in the following 
chapters, resulting in three research questions. 
3.1.1. The industry and the market  
An industry and its related firms form the macro-micro relationship of industry 
evolution studies. The evolutionary change is identified at the level of the industry, 
whereas the explanatory factors may typically be identified at the level of the firm. 
A notably field of research that focuses on the industry is industry life cycle 
research. This field is interested in explaining the driving forces of shifts in market 
structure. The key assumption is that competitive dynamics in a market environment 
cause the market conditions to change and consequently cause the number of firms 
that enter or exit the market to change. A summary of the existing studies of industry 
life cycles – both studies of entire life cycles of industries from birth to death of an 
industry and studies of a specific episode during the life cycle of an industry is 
presented in Table 5.  
 
During a typical industry life cycle the number of firms sharply falls after a long 
period of steady growth and industries develop into oligopolies. Early studies on this 
area, such as Utterback and Abernathy (1975) and Abernathy and Utterback (1978) 
highlight the impact of technology in the form of dominant design. Their argument 
is that those firms that are not able to produce efficiently within the dominant design 
                                                 
 
9 See a thorough review in Aldrich (1999) of how six perspectives on organizations – 
population ecology, institutional theory, organizational learning theory, resource dependence, 
and transaction cost economics – deal with issues of the high level evolutionary processes, 
variation, selection, and retention. 
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that emerges in the market will exit, contributing to the shakeout. A formal model of 
industry life cycle evolution was then developed by Klepper (1997). His theory 
explains industry shakeouts in the evolution of new industries with a simple 
evolutionary model of entry and exit in four stages. In the first stage, when the 
industry emerges, several firms enter the industry because of market growth.  
 
 
Table 5: Studies of Industry Life Cycles 
Research  Issue Explanations 
Utterback and Abernathy, 
1975 
Abernathy and Utterback, 
1978 
Utterback and Suárez , 1993 
Suarez and Utterback, 1995 
 
Industry/market 
leadership 
Emergence of a dominant product design as 
a key event that notably reduces the 
probabilities of success for subsequent 
entrants. 
Clark, 1985 
Tushman and Anderson, 
1986 
Anderson and Tushman, 
1990 
Anderson and Tushman, 
2001 
Emergence of 
dominant design as a 
basis of industry 
leadership. 
Different technological skills of firms to 
explain firm survival.  
Technological breakthrough, or 
discontinuity, 
initiates an era of intense technical variation 
and selection, culminating in a single 
dominant design. 
Environmental uncertainty (e.g. change in 
demand or technological discontinuity) is 
the key environmental explanation on firm 
mortality. The greater the uncertainty the 
greater the exit raters. 
Christensen, 1993 
Christensen and 
Rosenbloom, 1995 
Christensen et al., 1998 
Firm survival and 
dominant design. 
Interaction of technological, cultural, 
managerial, and competitive forces to 
explain firm survival. 
Klepper, 1996, 1997, 2002, 
2003 
Klepper and Simons, 1997, 
2002, 2000a, 2000b, 2005 
Klepper and Thompson, 
2005 
Firm entry, exist and 
survival and industry 
shakeouts 
Technology, firm size, age, prior 
experience, and location as key factors to 
explain firm survival after the shakeout.  
Early entrants and firms with prior 
experience are more capable to innovate 
and to invest in Research and Development 
(R&D. 
Filson 2001 
 
Firm survival  Technology and technological changes as a 
reason for firm survival. 
Fein , 1998 Industry shakeout and 
firm survival 
Early entry and innovation to explain firm 
survival. 
Bergek et al. 2008 Shakeouts in mature 
industries 
Technological capability to explain survival 
in shakeouts of mature industries 
Agarwal and Gort, 1996 Firm entry, exist and Entry and exit rates depend on the stage of 
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Agarwal and Bayus, 2004 survival the industry life cycle. 
Survival rates depend both on the stage of 
the industry life cycle and on individual 
firm attributes. 
 
Cattani, 2005, 2006 
 
The impact of firm 
heterogeneity and 
technological 
innovation on 
technological 
performance 
 
Technological preadaptation – as a part of a 
firm’s prior experience that is accumulated 
without anticipation of subsequent uses – to 
explain future performance. 
Bresnahan and Greenstein 
1999 
Breshnan,  2004 
Chesbrough 2003 
Mazzucato 2002 
Causes of industry 
leadership and changes 
in the leadership  
Vertical specialization, creative destruction, 
and entry into new submarkets as basis for 
changes in industry leadership. 
Henderson and Clark 1990 
Henderson 1999 
Path dependence Age dependence: joint effects of age and 
strategy 
produced long-term trade-offs across 
different performance outcomes. 
Bonaccorsi and Giuri 2001 Evolution of vertically 
integrated industries. 
The long-term evolution of an industry 
depends on the evolution of vertically-
related, downstream industry. 
Swaminathan 1998 
Dowell and Swaminathan 
2000, 2006 
Dowell 2006 
 
Entry into maturing 
industry 
 
Though firms entering early may exhibit 
longer life spans, their advantages are 
limited to the period before the emergence 
of the dominant design. 
Overlap of production between and within 
product generations reduces firm mortality, 
as it allows firms to retain valuable routines. 
Excessive overlap, however, becomes 
harmful. 
Geels 2002, 2005, 2006, 
2007 
Geels and Raven 2006 
Verbong and Geels 2007 
Technological 
transitions  
Technological transitions, which occur as 
the outcome of linkages and interactions of 
developments at multiple levels to explain 
firm survival. 
The role of a socio-technical context and 
niches in technological transitions. 
 
 
In the second phase, when the market continues to rise and there are increasingly 
more firms in the market, the competition intensifies and the profits reduce. In the 
third phase, the shake-out phase, the early entrants with research and development 
(R&D) expenditures, which can be spread over a larger output and therefore have 
lower unit costs, outperform the later entrants and smaller firms. This leads to the 
fourth stage, where entry becomes risky because large firms serve the entire market 
thus leading to a very concentrated industry. In sum, the shakeout is endogenous to 
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the industry and it is caused by the internal dynamics of the industry. Klepper’s 
(1997) theory has been tested and shown to be valid in empirical studies of several 
industries (Klepper and Simons, 2000a; 2000b; 2005; Klepper, 2002; 2003; Klepper 
and Thompson, 2005). Klepper and Simons (2000a) used the model to explain how 
the role of technological change shapes an industry's market structure. Their 
research of the US automobile tire industry showed that technology, in addition to 
firm size, age and location was a key factor explaining firm survival after the 
shakeout. The root causes behind the exploitation of a certain technology is seen to 
originate from the ability of a firm to innovate. More recently Klepper and Simons 
(2005) proposed that industry shakeouts are part of a competitive process in which 
early entrants are more capable to innovate and thus ultimately achieve a dominant 
market position. 
 
However, the driving forces are different across industries. Klepper (2002) found 
differences between the evolution of the US automobile and tire, and the television 
and penicillin industries: prior experience conferred a much greater advantage in 
television and penicillin than in automobiles and tires. Klepper stated that this 
difference is particularly challenging to explain and leaves space for further studies 
of alternative theories of industry evolution to address these challenges. Moreover, 
in contrast to the technologically progressive manufacturing industries, Fein (1998) 
studied shakeouts in non-manufacturing industry (wholesale distribution of 
pharmaceuticals) and identified particular differences in the patterns of firms’ exits 
and the role of early entry and innovation to firm survival. In addition, Klepper and 
Simons (2000a) identified that the success of Japanese TV producers attested to the 
potential effect that government policy and market institutions can have on the 
capabilities of firms. This factor, however, was not included in their formal 
modeling. In addition, technology is at least to some extent proprietary, and public 
policies have an impact on the level of publicity of technology (Nelson, 2005). In 
certain industries, especially regulated industries such as electric power industries 
(Joskow, 1997, 1988; Larsen and Bunn, 1999; Isser, 2003), airlines (Morrison and 
Winston 1995; Morrison 2002), train and postal services, and banking (Jayaratne 
and Strahan, 1997; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2004), insurance (Barron et al., 1998), and 
in telecommunications (Burton, 1997; Fransman 2001a, 2001b, 2003), the impact of 
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institutions has proved to be significant on the structure of the industries and on 
individual firm survival.  
 
In sum, the existing research on industry life cycles provides a viable model of the 
general industry life cycle in four phases including a sharp shakeout. It also provides 
evidence that a firm’s technology, age and size have an impact on its survival, but 
leaves the effect of institutions in the background and unexplained.  
3.1.2. Institutions  
The evolution of industries is not only an endogenous process of aging. Nor can it be 
explained solely by the competition mechanisms in the market (Dimaggio and 
Powell, 1991)10 or purely by innovation and technological advance. Indeed, in order 
to fully explain long-term change, a wide set of institutions have to be involved in 
the analysis (Nelson, 1995a, 1995b; Nelson, 2005). Or to put it in another way, as 
North (1990) has stated: institutions are "the underlying determinant of the long-run 
performance of economies" (1990:107)  
 
The term ‘institutions’ has a wide set of meanings in social sciences. Traditionally, it 
has included items of ‘culture’ such as social norms, values, beliefs or standards (see 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). North (1990), representing a view of many ‘new’ 
economic institutionalists, defined institutions as ‘rules of the game’ in a society. 
Importantly, he distinguishes formal and informal institutions. According to North 
(1990), formal institutions are rules that human beings devise, such as laws. 
Informal institutions, on the other hand, are conventions and codes of behavior. Both 
certainly impact organizational evolution. Even if formal institutions are easier to 
recognize, informal institutions often form the microfoundations of formal 
institutions and thus influence firm traits. As Nelson (2006) argued, beliefs of the 
                                                 
 
10 According to institutional theories, organizations compete not just for resources and 
customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
Thus this brings a new perspective to the pure ‘market mechanisms’ within an industry.  
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values and efficacy of a particular cultural trait strongly influence whether the trait is 
adopted, retained, or abandoned. Moreover, according to Nelson detail mechanisms 
of the informal institutions such as discussion, argument, persuasion, in some cases 
coercion, may be a central part of the selection process. 
 
Overall, as Nelson (1995b) pointed out, the use of the term institution is very broad 
and might even be considered as vague in the scholarly literature. This also applies 
to the term institutionalization, which has several, albeit mostly complementary 
meanings (for a comprehensive summary see Aldrich, 1999, and a recent review in 
Nelson and Sampat, 2001). However, a common theme for institutional theorists is 
their interest in firm survival. This theme throughout the distinct branches of 
institutional theory is the influence of the environment over organizations. 
According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), organizational conformity with institutional 
myths provides them with legitimacy, which in turn has a positive impact on firm 
survival. In a similar vein, Dimaggio and Powell (1983) proposed that institutions 
make organizations more isomorphic and thus have an impact on the high-level 
evolutionary Variation-Selection-Retention (VSR) processes. They defined three 
mechanisms, coercive, normative and mimetic, through which institutional 
isomorphic change occurs. In addition, institutional theories have traditionally 
involved multiple levels of analysis and thus provide explanatory power of the 
interaction of organizations and institutions. In fact, institutions are an important 
part of a firm environment and the evolution of these institutions shape the 
industries as they evolve over time. Furthermore, organizations and industries shape 
institutions – either purposively or unintentionally- when the industries and 
institutions coevolve (Cohen and Noll, 1994; Nelson, 1995a; Lewin et al., 1999; 
Murmann, 2003; Bonardi, 2004; Bonardi et al., 2005).  
 
The theoretical research and empirical studies on institutions in the scholarly 
literature is substantial. Within this extensive volume there are three areas of 
existing research on the evolution of institutions and the impact of institutions on 
industry evolution, which are particularly interesting from the viewpoint of this 
research: (1) formal institutions as form of public policies and regulation, (2) 
institutions dedicated to the generation and spread of technological knowledge such 
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as universities and technical societies, and (3) the evolution of laws themselves. 
Each of these themes is addressed below. 
 
First, institutions in form of public policies have an effect on industry evolution, 
industry structures and individual firm survival. These institutions include both 
those that are formal, such as government decisions, legislation and regulation, as 
well as informal institutions such as a social consensus in an industry, within 
clusters or groups or within a society or country. Ingram and Inman (1996) studied 
the co-evolution of institutions in both sides of the borders of Canada and the US in 
Niagara Falls. Their important finding was that the regulation provided by 
institutions lowered the failure rates and increased the founding rates of hotels on 
both sides of the falls. Holm (1995), studied the rise and fall of a specific 
institutional form, the mandated sales organization in Norwegian fisheries. He 
showed how changes in ideology and political actions created and abolished the 
system which had a monopoly control over defined segments of the fish trade 
between 1930 and 1995. Murmann (2003) investigated the synthetic dye industry in 
Europe between 1856 and 1914, and built a coevolutionary model explaining how 
Germany moved from a laggard to a leader in that industry. He found that the 
creation of German dominance cannot be understood without properly 
understanding patent laws, science funding and tariff lobbying in the different 
countries, and built a coevolutionary theory that explained how industrial leadership 
was gained and lost through the coevolution of firms, technology, and national 
institutions. In another recent example, Lamberg and Laurila (2005) showed that the 
country of origin had an effect on the organizational forms and further on the 
competitive conditions in the paper industry. In addition, Breznitz (2005) reported 
that the institution-based science and technology industrial policy of Taiwan has 
been helping the growth of the private IT industry when there has been non-
competitive wide collaboration and coevolution between government-based research 
institutions and the private IT industry.  
 
Second, institutions dedicated to the generation and spread of technological 
knowledge such as universities and technical societies are important components of 
the public part of the system supporting technical advance in industry and thus have 
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a noteworthy impact the overall evolution of the industry (Nelson, 1986). Murmann 
(2003) for example, showed that the driving forces behind the dominance of the 
German synthetic dye industry at the beginning of the 19th century were due to 
strong academic-industry alliances.  
 
A third interesting area is the evolution of laws. In some cases there is no real 
‘market’ that sorts out proposed changes in laws. Rather there is “a set of economic 
and political interests, professional and lay beliefs about what the law should be, and 
a diverse set of mechanisms, some expressly political and some not, through which 
these interests and norms influence the evolution of the law” (Nelson, 1995b:83). 
For example, Ruostetsaari (1996, 1998, 2005) studied the evolution of the legislation 
relating to the electric power industry in Finland, and showed that industry 
associations and the firms in the industry had both a direct impact on the preparation 
of the legislation and on the content of the laws. Nelson (1995b) argued that we have 
very little understanding of how the selection environment of legislation works, and 
how it defines fitness. A recent research of evolution of laws by Jennings et al. 
(2005) is therefore particularly interesting because it does not only analyze the 
evolution of laws at a high level, but describes the mechanisms underpinning high-
level processes. Their analysis of evolution of regional water law in British 
Columbia over a 90-year period showed that the number of law sections and the text 
covered by the sections actually declines over time, through alternating phases of 
gradual expansion, followed by rapid collapse. They identified two key processes 
proliferation of legal rules in the law via new births and revision of existing rules 
that generate new related rules, and refinement of existing law sections and of the 
law as a whole. Both processes acted between the different levels of analysis; the 
level of society, the legislation level, and the level of political and economic actors 
that impacted legal rule evolution. Their findings were different from the traditional 
Weberian rationalization view of legal rule evolution as they found out that legal 
rule changes and births were intensified by surrounding institutions and 
environmental shocks such as court cases, progressive political regimes and wars, 
while they were attenuated during political transitions and times of economic 
expansion. 
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To summarize, institutions have been proved to impact industry evolution. 
Furthermore the impact is clearly a two-way stream as represented in the research 
framework. However, the impact acts on several levels of analysis and includes 
distinct mechanisms. These mechanisms have a direct impact on the firms in the 
industry, but they also act through another important component of the research 
framework, namely technology.  
3.1.3. Technology 
The third element in the research framework is technology, a key driving force for 
long-term economical development (see Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 2005). 
The existing research provides evidence, that institutions and public policies in 
particular have an impact on the utilization of a technology in organizations through 
three key notable ways: (1) support for R&D (Noble, 1984; Rosenkopf and 
Tushman, 1994; Hafner and Lyon, 1996; Nelson, 2006), (2) educational institutes 
(Nelson, 1986; Murmann, 2003), and (3) enforcement of new laws and regulation 
(Ruostetsaari, 1989, 1998; Shan et al., 1991; Murmann, 2003). This impact is either 
direct or indirect. Patent laws are a good example of direct impact; they restrict the 
utilization of a certain technology, but only for certain organizations. Government 
support for R&D in educational institutes and the consequent impact on industries 
and firms represent an indirect impact. In both cases, the borders of the nation play 
an important role in the directing of the policy actions; the policies are typically used 
to protect certain innovations and technology of the country. 
 
In addition to the impacts of institutions, the evolution of technology has its ‘closed 
circuit’ characteristics. The first studies of this area highlight the impact of 
technology in the form of dominant design (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; 
Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). The key argument of the dominant design studies 
is that it is a certain set of events that lead to one technology or technical solution to 
become dominant, which ultimately leads the others disappearing from the market. 
In a long-term change process this dominant design is seen to rule the market until a 
new technology breaks through causing a continuum of cyclical evolutionary 
processes.  The examples of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard (David, 1985) and 
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certain railway track gauges (Puffert, 2002), show the path dependence nature of 
technology: the early stages of the evolution cause a technological lock-in and thus 
have an impact on later events and decisions. Ultimately this may lead to a situation 
in which one technological solution might win over another even if the solution 
might be less efficient than the abandoned alternative (Arthur, 1985, North, 1990). 
The root causes for success are seen as originating from a firm’s ability to innovate 
(Klepper, 1997) or their internal routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). North (1990) 
made an important point regarding the evolution of technologies: the competition is 
only indirectly between technologies; the direct competition is between 
organizations embodying the competing technologies. Similarly, Nelson and Winter 
(1982) highlighted the importance of a firm’s internal routines in employing 
particular technologies. Thus the technology is a key characteristic of a firm and its 
business model, and therefore a part of the explanatory factors of a firm’s survival 
over the long run. For this reason, the focus in this research is not on the evolution 
of technology itself, but technology as part of a firm’s business model.  
3.1.4. The firm 
Firms and their characteristics act as key explanatory factors of the changes that can 
be identified at the level of the industry. The effect is two-directional: the firms 
coevolve with their environments (Lewin et al., 1999, Murmann, 2003). The other 
components of the research framework; the industry and the related competitive 
dynamics, the institutions in various forms – both formal and informal, and the 
technology all have an impact on the firm and act as an influence on its survival. 
The industry evolution scholarly tradition highlights the following key 
characteristics as sources of long-term change and explanatory factors of firm 
survival: (1) the firm’s age and size in addition to (2) the business model and 
internal capabilities of a firm including the technologies it imposes. 
 
With regard to firm age and size is argued and shown to have a positive impact on 
its survival. According to Klepper (1997), early entrants or older organizations have 
better opportunities for survival than later ones. Population ecologists (Hannan and 
Freemen, 1984) share the same view and argue that organizational death rate 
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decreases with age. When it comes to size, the theoretical rationale is that this is 
associated with market power, which enables a firm to invest in innovation as a 
basis for further survival (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Klepper, 1996 Klepper and 
Simons, 2000; Klepper and Thompson, 2006; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Hannan 
and Carroll, 1992).  
 
Second, the business model11 (Amit and Zott, 2001; Venkatraman and Henderson, 
1998; Tikkanen et al., 2005) of a firm is a useful unifying concept and unit of 
analysis that captures the change arising from multiple sources. The business model 
of a firm includes the internal routines12 (Nelson and Winter, 1982) of a firm as well 
as its resources and capabilities13. For example, innovation and related R&D in a 
firm are the key capabilities that explain the exploitation and evolution of 
technology within a firm (Schumpeter, 1934; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Klepper, 
1996). A key characteristic of firm resources and capabilities is path dependence. It 
is not only the present environment and current resources and capabilities that have 
an effect on the firm’s performance and survival (Helfat, 1994). Rather, the 
resources and capabilities of a firm have been built and accumulated (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989) over a long period of time before the identified event (Helfat and 
Liebermann 2002; Cattani, 2005, 2006) also have an influence. The concept of a 
business model is comparable to the organizational form (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984). Organizations having similar organizational forms are considered to be 
homogenous and it is not the individual firms but the organizational forms that will 
be selected (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1983, 1984; Hannan and Carrol, 1995). 
                                                 
 
11 In this study I use the concept of a business model to describe the differentiating 
capabilities of a firm as Tikkanen et al. (2005) have defined it: the business model of a firm 
include the firm’s network of relationships, operations embodied in the firm’s business 
processes and resource base, and the finance and accounting arrangements of the company.  
12 Nelson and Winter (1982) use a general term routine for all regular and predictable 
behavioral patterns of a firm. They include both technical capabilities as well as business 
strategies under the concept of a routine. The core in their theory is the regularity and 
predictability of these characteristics of a firm. 
13 The resource and capabilities are emphasized in the resource-based view (RBV) of a firm 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Amit and Schoemaker 
1993; Peteraf; 1993). 
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Moreover, the surrounding institutions have an impact on the organizational form of 
a firm: they both enable and restrict the adaptation and development of 
organizational forms (Lewin et al., 1999). In addition, related to organizational 
forms, Hannan and Freeman (1977) highlight the role of excess capacity in times of 
changes to the environment. Generalist firms typically keep more excess capacity 
than specialists, and in stable times specialists will outperform generalists. However, 
in times of change to the environment the excess capacity allows flexibility for the 
firm and can be used for adaptation to the new situation (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977). Thus, generalists have better opportunities for survival in times of major 
environmental changes compared to their specialist counterparts.  
The business model of a firm defines the width of vertical integration of the firm. 
Generalists (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) typically cover several parts of the 
industry’s value chain (Porter, 1985) or encompass operations from several 
industries. On the other hand specialists concentrate on a specific area of the value 
chain. In the early stages of an industry firms typically are vertically integrated 
generalists. As the industries evolve, vertical disintegration usually increases. The 
empirical examples of the automobile industry (Fine, 1998), computer industry 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Jacobines, 2005), and biotechnology (Arora et al., 2000) 
show that there is a constant transformation towards vertical disintegration in several 
industries, which has redefined the roles of the existing firms and brought totally 
new firms to the industry. Recently, Jacobides (2005) demonstrated how business 
model evolution changed the industry in mortgage banking. According to Jacobides 
(2005) there were three stage processes which changed the industry structure and 
caused totally new markets to emerge. The first stage is constituted from the 
emergent motivating factors for disintegration; gains from specialization and trade. 
The motivators in turn put in motion two respective enabling processes14; intrafirm 
partitioning and interfirm co-specialization. As a result of these processes the market 
                                                 
 
14 Although Jacobides (2005) uses slightly different concepts than has been used in this study, 
the principle is the same. The analogue of the concept of a ‘process’ in this study is the’ 
mechanism’. The ‘motivating factors’ and ‘necessary conditions’ are representations of events 
during the evolution of the industry. 
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emerged in which two necessary conditions, coordination simplification and 
information standardization where met. They in turn led to the emergence of new 
markets. The process that Jacobedes (2005) identified was a typical emergent causal 
chain constituted from several events and mechanisms.   
3.1.5. Surrounding society: Key events and environmental shocks  
In addition to the four central elements of the research framework, the framework 
also includes three supplementary elements: (1) the surrounding society and related 
key events, (2) the competitors of a firm and their actions, and (3) the shareholders 
of a firm and its ownership structure. In this research, the competitive dynamics is 
considered to be part of the industry and the related market process. In addition, the 
shareholders and the ownership structure are considered to be part of the business 
model of a firm. Moreover, even if the society can be considered to form another 
level of analysis above that of the institutions, it is covered within the institutional 
level of analysis in the empirical study. The society also includes other industries 
and the nation - i.e. the context in which the industry is embedded. The existing 
literature shows that the long-term change in firms and industries is strongly 
interlinked with the national settings and country of origin (Sorge 1991; Djelic 1998; 
Lewin et al., 1999; Lamberg and Laurila, 2005).   
 
In general life cycle models (Klepper, 1997) the shakeout is endogenous to the 
industry. However, in many cases there are episodes during the life cycle of an 
industry, when fundamental changes or challenges arise from outside of the 
industry. In addition to the impact of institutions, as the examples of the Oil Crisis in 
1973 (Russo, 1992; Sine and David, 2003) show, there are key events or abrupt 
changes in society or other environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982) that may change the 
direction of the industry evolution. According to Nelson and Winter (1982), firms 
are much better in self-maintenance in a constant environment than they are at major 
change. Thus an environmental shock could be considered to have a direct impact on 
the industry. Indeed, it has been shown that uncertainty is a key environmental 
dimension associated with organizational mortality: the higher the uncertainty, the 
higher the exit rates (Anderson and Tushman (2001). According to Lewin et al. 
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(1991) this is due to the changes in the selection function of the organizations 
environment. However, despite the evidence of the impact of environmental shocks 
in industries, the question of how and why they have such an impact needs greater 
enlightenment. Or to put it in the form of the research motivation: “how can 
mechanisms be used to explain the impact of environmental shocks on firm survival 
and death?” 
3.2. Research questions 
Building on the key conclusions drawn from the review of mechanisms and 
causality as part of the evolutionary explanation, the following research questions 
are drawn from the theoretical framework and will guide the literature review of the 
current research on electric power industry: 
 
1. How and why do institutions in a form of legislation, regulation, 
public policies and actions impact industry life cycle and industry 
structure? 
2. What are the salient firm characteristics and thus key selection 
criteria that explain firm survival during the life course of a regulated 
industry and why?  
3. What are the focal causal and evolutionary mechanisms that explain 
firm survival in a regulated industry? What are their key 
characteristics; how and why do they explain organization survival 
and death? 
 
To answer these research questions, I conducted a literature review of the existing 
research of the selected regulated industry – the electric power industry. This review 
led to three regulated industry specific research propositions, which are examined in 
the empirical analysis of the electric power industry in Finland between 1889 and 
2005. 
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4. ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY  
 
The electric power industry, like many other regulated industries, has remained as a 
stepchild of the research of the open market industries in the management scholarly 
literature (Russo, 1992). A review of the literature reveals two exceptions. First, the 
process of deregulation raised the interest above the industry specific journals. 
Second, but only lately, the world-wide concern of the impact of climate change and 
energy generation on the environment and sustainability in general, has increased 
the interest on the electric power industry. For example, there was a whole session in 
the recent Academy of Management annual conference 2007 on the electric power 
industry with a title ‘Shaping industry landscapes-how capabilities & politics 
determine the structure of the energy sector’.  
 
There follows a review of the electric power industry research which is organized in 
three sections according to the research questions presented in the previous chapter. 
First, the studies of institutions in the form of legislation, regulation, public policies 
and actions as well as major external shocks and their impact on the industry are 
reviewed. Second, key characteristics of electric power industry firms and the 
distinct business models are presented. Third, the manifestation of path dependence 
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in electric power industry is reviewed. At this point, specific research propositions 
are derived at the end of each section that will be scrutinized in the historical 
analysis of the electric power in industry in Finland between 1889 and 2005. The 
propositions are based on the key conclusions developed from the theoretical body 
of knowledge presented in the two previous chapters and enriched with the key 
findings of the existing scholarly literature of the electric power industry.   
4.1. Institutions and electric power industry 
4.1.1. Regulation and the electric power industry  
Regulation has at all times been a central part of the electric power industry and has 
therefore impacted the evolution of the industry (Joskow, 1997). Moreover, the 
electric power industries have interacted actively with the central and local 
governments in the respective nations. For example, Hughes (1983) described in 
detail the wide range of legal and regulatory matters that needed to be decided 
before electric power could go forward strongly, and how the particular ways that 
they were decided affected the evolution of the technology. In addition, Granovetter 
and McGuire’s (1988) analysis showed that in the US regulation promoted merger 
and rewarded urban capital-rich utilities, while disadvantaging publicly owned firms 
by locking in their geographical areas and prohibiting their operating rules. As these 
authors argued, the reason behind this was the personal impact of Samuel Insull,15 
and his network, on state regulation. Furthermore, in a recent study, Ibsen and 
Poulsen (2007) analyzed the establishment of the Danish regulatory authorities for 
the energy and telecommunications sectors. They found that a path-dependent 
sector-specific institutional process, in this case the negligible interest of the Danish 
government in the energy sector until the 1970s, formed the basis for strong energy 
companies that were capable of influencing regulation in their interest. 
                                                 
 
15 Samuel Insull was the head of Chicago Edison and in practice led the development of the 
electric power industry in U.S. through his network. (see more in Granovetter and McGuire, 
1988). 
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Hughes (1983) examined the history of the evolution of the electric power systems 
and industries in Germany, United Kingdom and United States during its formative 
years between 1880 and 1930.  According to this seminal research, of the great 
construction projects of the 19th and 20th century, none has been more influential in 
its social effects than the electric power system. Moreover, he argued that power 
systems are cultural artifacts. According to Hughes (1983), the evolution of the 
electric power systems in western societies involves consideration of technical, 
scientific, economic, political, and organizational fields of human activity. 
Furthermore, in a more recent research Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) identified a 
‘cumulative causation’ in the evolution of wind and solar power technologies in 
Germany. They argued that the processes of cumulative causation has to be created 
and supported by public policies in order to make the transformation process from 
incumbent technologies to renewable technologies self-sustained, or capable to be 
driven by its own momentum, rather than being dependent on repeated policy 
interventions. 
 
In summary, the electric power industry, like the telecommunications, postal and 
airline services and the railways, were previously considered to be part of national 
infrastructure and consequently the firms in those industries were regarded as 
natural monopolies. Thus they were subject to government regulation; prices, entry, 
investment, service quality and other aspects of firm behavior were all regulated. 
Public policies, legislation and regulation have impacted the industry, but the 
industry has also impacted on public policies through a wide set of lobbying 
mechanisms (Myllyntaus, 1991; Ruostetsaari, 1998). Thus it can be said that the 
industry and the surrounding institutions in the form of public policies, legislation 
and regulation, have coevolved. Moreover, path dependence and ownership 
structures have resulted in the dominance of certain firms is a result both ‘natural’ 
evolution of the industry and the direct causal impact of institutions. 
4.1.2. Deregulation of the electric power industry 
In addition to traditional regulation, the customary regulation of firms in any field, 
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the process of deregulation has been one of the key incidents in the history of the 
industry that has changed the ‘rules of the game’ in the industry. Starting in the 
1980s the way of thinking in many national governments changed which led to a 
series of deregulation processes all over the world. For the purpose of this research 
there are three important areas in the scholarly literature on deregulation – and 
deregulation of the electric power industry in particular: (1) the general aspirations 
of deregulation, (2) key changes and issues in the electric power industry due to 
deregulation, and (3) the impact of deregulation on industry structure and firm 
survival.  
 
With regard to the first of these themes, deregulation is a long-term process, from 
which the surrounding society posits to reap benefits (Winston, 1998). In theory an 
industry’s adjustment to deregulation will cause intensified competition and 
increased operating freedom (Joskow, 1997). This will in turn cause the industry to 
become more technologically advanced, to adopt more efficient operating and 
marketing practices, and to respond more effectively to environmental shocks 
(Winston, 1998). However, deregulation itself also creates uncertainty or can even 
be considered as an environmental shock for some firms particularly firms with a 
specific business model (Sine and David, 2003). From the regulators’ point of view 
there are five key goals of the electric power industry deregulation: efficient pricing 
of goods and service, efficient production costs, efficient levels of output and 
investment, efficient levels of service quality and product variety, and monopoly 
profit and rent extraction considerations (Joskow, 2007). 
 
Concerning the second theme found in the literature - key changes and issues in the 
electric power industry due to deregulation- deregulation does not influence all 
segments16 in the electric power industry in a similar way. In general, the retail and 
power generation segments are liberalized to foster market competitions in these 
                                                 
 
16 The distinct segments of the electric power industry are described in detail in the next 
chapter. 
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segments. On the other hand, the transmission and distribution segments are still 
considered to be part of the national or local infrastructure and thus the goal of 
deregulation is to reform the regulation of these functions, which continue to be 
viewed as natural monopolies (Joskow, 1997). A central issue in deregulation has 
been to align the incentives of the firm with a business model that still remains to be 
regulated, such as electricity transmission or distribution, in order to operate 
efficiently while also assuring a reasonable level of profit for the firm (Kleindorfer 
et al., 2001). All in all, based on the experiences around the world there are some 
generic measures for achieving a well functioning market-oriented electric power 
industry. The national industry is considered to be deregulated if one of more of the 
following steps is implemented: sector restructuring, introduction of competition in 
wholesale generation and retail supply, incentive regulation of transmission and 
distribution networks, establishing an independent regulator, and privatization of the 
firms in the industry (Jamasb, 2002; Joskow, 1998; Newbery, 2002).  
 
In the third theme in the literature, which concerns the impact of deregulation on 
industry structure and firm survival, deregulation has been seen to affect survival of 
individual organizations – positively for some, negatively for others. According to 
Winston (1998), substantial merger activity has generally occurred within a decade 
of an industry’s deregulation. The net result of entries, exits, and mergers has been 
that competition in the market becomes more intense, although the total number of 
firms in an industry nationwide may either rise or fall. But what kind of firms will 
survive in the process? Delmas and Tokat (2005) found that large firms were the 
most efficient during the process of deregulation thus indicating that economies of 
scale play an important role in predicting efficiency. Moreover, several studies 
(Kaseman and Mayo, 1991; Lee, 1995; Kwoka, 2002) show the positive impact of 
vertical integration on firm profitability during regulation. This is elaborated in 
greater detail in the next chapter.  
 
To summarize, deregulation has a clearly identifiable actor or an agent – in the form 
a regulator – with purposive goals to restructure the industry and thus impact the 
‘natural’ evolution of the industry as well as directly cause changes in some firms 
within the industry. The policy measures initiate causal mechanisms, which together 
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with the evolutionary mechanisms of the natural evolution affect the patterns of 
industry life cycle in the industry. 
4.1.3. Impact of major external shocks 
A third key element in addition to the natural industry life cycle (Klepper, 1997) and 
the impact of institutions, which may change the direction of the industry evolution 
for a while, is the impact of environmental shocks. Russo (1992) studied the impact 
of the sudden increase in regulatory actions due to the sudden and severe 
environmental shock, the Oil Crisis in 1973, on the electric power industry in US He 
found out that the Oil Crisis caused strengthened regulation, which in turn caused 
the costs associated with regulatory hearings, audits, and reviews to increase. These 
increased costs increased firm diversification and decreased vertical integration. The 
findings are fundamentally different from other forms of environmental uncertainty, 
where vertical integration is considered to reduce risks. Thus this combined causal 
chain from the environmental shock through the actions of the regulator caused a 
different outcome than would have otherwise been expected. In addition, Sine and 
David (2003) described, how the Oil Crisis started a series of events, which initiated 
a change in the electric power industry structure in US: “in the beginning of 1973, 
petroleum prices and interest rates skyrocketed, greatly increasing the cost of 
electricity generation. This resulted in an energy crisis that motivated Congress, the 
academic community, concerned citizens, and other stakeholders to search for 
alternative energy sources and organizational forms” (Sine and David, 2003:190). 
 
In summary, taking into consideration the conclusions of the existing research on 
institutions, deregulation and external shocks (research question 1), and building on 
the theoretical body of knowledge of mechanisms in industry evolution, I offer the 
following proposition to be investigated in the empirical analysis: 
Proposition 1: The general pattern of an industry life cycle is affected by 
institutions in a form of legislation, regulation and public policy measures, as 
well as by external shocks – induced by either agency identifiable or emergent 
causal mechanisms. 
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4.2. Business models of electric power industry 
The existing literature shows that it has been common in the electric power 
industries to primarily evolve through vertically integrated geographic monopolies 
that were either state-owned or privately-owned and subject to price and entry 
regulation (McGowan, 1993; Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999; Joskow, 2003a). 
Gradually, value chain specialization generated different business models. 
Simultaneously, there has been a steady process of horizontal integration and 
consequently the number of power generation firms and distribution firms has 
reduced (Vickers et al., 1991, Yarrow, 1988). Three important elements of the 
distinct business models of electric power firms are presented in the forthcoming 
sections: (1) value chain specialization as a basis for a distinct business model, (2) 
vertical integration as an opposing process to diversification and, (3) the impact of 
international expansion and different ownership structures. 
4.2.1. Electric power industry value chain 
The value chain (Porter, 1985) of the electric power industry, depicted in Figure 7, is 
composed after the deregulation of five segments: power generation, trading, 
transmission, distribution and retail (Joskow, 2003a, 2003b). With regard to the first 
of these, the power generation segment, the electricity is produced in power plants 
from the raw material using different technologies like hydropower, thermal or 
nuclear power. Key determinants for success in power generation have been the 
utilization of economies of scale in production (Christensen and Greene, 1976; 
Christensen, 2001) and the exploitation of new technologies (Hughes, 1983; Joskow 
and Rose, 1985).The second segment of the value chain, the trading segment, 
enables firms to either trade electricity in a spot market directly with a counterpart 
on the over-the-counter market or on an exchange, was non-existing prior to the 
deregulation. The establishment of a wholesale spot market for electricity, which is a 
key component of electricity market deregulation (Joskow, 2003a), has typically 
been carried out as part of the deregulation. The wholesale price of electricity was 
principally regulated prior to deregulation. After deregulation, the large industrial 
customers were able to purchase electricity freely from any provider without 
regulation of the prices. 
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Figure 7: Electricity value chain before and after deregulation 
 
The third part of the value chain concerns the electricity transmission segment’s 
responsibility to construct and maintain the transmission network and of scheduling 
and dispatching generators to distribution loads according to least-cost principles. 
This last role of the transmission operator is known in the industry as the role of 
'Grid Operator' or 'Independent System Operator' (Kleindorfer et al., 2001). The 
Fourth segment, the electricity distribution segment, consists of the building and 
maintaining of local electricity networks and the physical distribution of electricity 
in these networks. The retail of electricity to private consumers was, prior to 
deregulation, part of the distribution segment. Under deregulation it was detached 
from the distribution segment and opened up for competition. The distribution 
activity remained as a geographical monopoly under enhanced regulation 
(Kleindorfer et al., 2001; Joskow, 2003a). The distinct value chain components and 
the related segments have formed the basis for the different business models in the 
industry. A firm operates either on one segment or several segments. In the latter 
case the benefits of vertical integration between the segments is often the rationale 
behind the business model. Deregulation, as described earlier, impacted directly and 
purposively on the business models of the industry and consequently caused two 
new business models to be created: electricity trading and electricity retail. 
Simultaneously the rules of the game of the other business models were changed. 
Generation RetailTransmissionTrading Distribution
Generation Transmission Distribution
Electricity Value Chain Before Deregulation
Electricity Value Chain After Deregulation
Retail
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4.2.2. Vertical integration  
In industries with highly commoditized products, the management of the supply 
chain is a crucial factor in successful firm operations (Cox, 2001). The profits in 
these networks are often unequally distributed, with some firms exerting power over 
the rest of the supply chain (Cox, 1999). Thus, it could be considered, particularly 
during a regulated episode, that vertical integration of electricity generation and 
supply (distribution and retail) would be beneficial. Studies by Kaseman and Mayo 
(1991), Lee, (1995) and Kwoka (2002) support this view and show that there has 
been a positive impact on firm profitability of the vertical integration of the different 
parts of the value chain in the electric power industry during regulation. What is 
more, it could be argued that increased market uncertainty during the process of 
deregulation would make vertical integration even more attractive. Thus firms with 
their own power generation would be less exposed to price volatility, because they 
could internally adjust supply and demand (Yatchew, 2000; Kleit and Terrel, 2001; 
Delmas and Tokat, 2005). This view may be supported by a transaction cost 
economics (TCE) argument (Williamson, 1971, 1985) that vertical integration 
reduces the transaction costs associated with uncertain market changes, which 
deregulation undoubtedly is. On the other hand, scholars such as Hill and 
Hoskinsson (1987) have argued that in a highly uncertain environment the costs of 
implementing vertical integration can be substantial. Moreover, Hunt and 
Shuttleworth (1996) stated that the assumptions relating to the existence of vertical 
integration could no longer be sustained after deregulation in the electric power 
industry- the period when the market opens for wholesale and retail competition. 
 
Indeed, vertical integration raises the possibility that incumbents may favor their 
own divisions as sources of inputs for their own power generation, or their own 
electricity sales in the supply for their electricity distribution business due to the 
significant gains in transaction costs (Bergman et al., 1999). This process is a natural 
one in an open market system and thus there are mechanisms to drive the evolution 
of the industry towards vertical integration. In addition, vertical integration reduces 
the transaction costs associated with uncertain market changes such as deregulation, 
and therefore would be expected to be the direction towards which firms would 
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evolve after deregulation. However, the legislation of deregulation induces coercive 
mechanisms against this trend to prevent undesirable windfall benefits from vertical 
integration to regulated operations such as power transmission or distribution. What 
is more, the electric power industry has been characterized by strategic centrality, 
high capital investment requirements and term planning horizons (McGowan, 1993). 
Thus, in addition to vertical integration or economies of scope, the benefits from 
economies of scale have been substantial, particularly in power production 
(Christensen and Greene, 1976; Christensen, 2001) and in electricity distribution 
(Yatchew, 2000).  Accordingly, the larger the firm the better opportunities it has to 
survive. 
4.2.3. International expansion and ownership structures 
Initially, electric power industries were national. During the regulated episode 
regulation prohibited international entrants to enter the national market. As a 
principle, deregulation opened the market for international entrants. According to 
the international business literature, global strategies are likely to be efficient in 
sectors with large economies of scale and scope (e.g. vertical integration) and also in 
many deregulated industries (Victor, 1994). The traditional ‘monopoly rent-
maximizing’ logic supports this view: the former monopolies try to maximize their 
monopoly rent at home, while expanding abroad to profit from opportunities created 
by deregulation. This phenomenon has also identified in the electric power 
industries in severel countries:  the entrants to the liberalized or deregulated markets 
where the former national incumbents from other countries. According to Bonardi 
(2004) a notable aspect of their behavior was that it was ‘asymmetric’. By 
asymmetric he means that firms take divergent stances on deregulation: they oppose 
them in their home markets, but wish to profit from them and push them forward in 
foreign markets. Bonardi (2004) took as an example EDF (Électricité de France) 
which tried to expand aggressively in international markets while lobbying for 
protectionism in France. In Europe, local and central government ownership was the 
characteristic form of electric power industry both before and after deregulation 
(McGowan, 1993, 2002; Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999). Thus the government 
acted in a double role; both as a public policy architect and as an owner of some 
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firms in the industry – most often as an owner of the large incumbents. Bergman 
(2002) argued that this kind of ownership was used against foreign competition. 
According to Bergman, the national electricity markets in the Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), like in most European countries, used to 
be protected from foreign competition, tightly regulated and dominated by vertically 
integrated publicly-owned power firms. 
 
As can be seen from the examples above, there were several parallel mechanisms 
related to international expansion that were active during the process of deregulation 
and that impacted the evolution of the industry. Some of the mechanisms were 
evolutionary, others causal. Moreover, institutions and public policies played an 
important role in the process. Based on the findings of the existing literature on the 
electric power industry, on the distinct business models and business model 
evolution, I offer the following proposition which will be investigated in the 
empirical analysis: 
 
Proposition 2: The formation of a business model, a key evolutionary selection 
criterion, is an emergent result of a combined effect of both evolutionary and 
causal mechanisms. 
 
The major idea behind the proposition lies in the ‘both-and’ and ‘emergent’ 
statements. Natural evolution and its related mechanisms push evolution towards 
business models that fit best to the environment. The purposive activity of 
regulation, on the other hand, strives towards business models which are desirable to 
achieve the goals of regulation or deregulation. The result is emergent; it cannot be 
fully controlled by the regulator due to the impact of the underlying evolutionary 
mechanisms. Thus, there is sometimes a need to ‘correct’ the combined outcome of 
evolutionary and causal mechanisms by new legislation and regulation. Examples of 
such outcome are the windfall profits (Verbruggen, 2008) for electric power firms. 
For example, Kara et al. (2008) reported that large windfall profits were expected to 
be incurred by electricity producers in the Nordic electricity market due to the EU 
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emission trade regulation. The electric power firms would benefit from price 
increases, which would primarily have to be paid by the private customer and by the 
metals industries. The Finnish Minister of Trade and Industry commissioned a 
study, which included the identification of possible counter-measures against the 
foreseeable negative side-impacts of the price increases such as the reduced 
competitiveness of industry and increasing costs for all electricity consumer groups, 
the possible negative impacts on competition at the electricity market, and national 
energy supply security issues. 
4.3. Path dependence in the electric power industry  
4.3.1. Path dependence and firm survival 
There are several examples in the scholarly literature of mechanisms that create path 
dependence in the electric power industry. For example, in his seminal study of the 
establishment and evolution of power networks in Germany, UK and in US, Hughes 
(1983) identified that coordination economies caused a lock-in advantage for the 
early established power networks that could not be overcome by the later 
competitors. Path dependence and related mechanisms can act either as benefits or 
(obstacles to the firms in the industry and thus either strengthen or dilute their 
survival.  
 
With regard to benefits, in power generation, the time span for planning, 
constructing and operating a power generation plant is tens of years. The capital 
investment is often substantial compared to the yearly turnover of the firm, and the 
profitability of the investment is based on a long life span and relatively good input-
output efficiency of the production plant (McGowan, 1993). In addition, in many 
countries different power production technologies need a license in order to obtain 
property rights from the regulative authority (Joskow, 1996). For example, as 
Myllyntaus (1991) showed, not all firms were able to build examples of nuclear 
power plants or obtain the water rights to build hydropower plants in Finland. The 
nature of a regulated industry and the related path dependence causes a ‘natural 
monopoly problem’ (Joskow, 2007), in which the general models of the barriers to 
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entry - entry deterrence and oligopoly behavior - are linked together. In the natural 
monopoly problem the high level of investments and the related ‘sunk’ capacity 
costs (Kahn, 1970) create an asymmetry between firms which are already in the 
market and the potential entrants.  This asymmetry can act as a barrier to entry by 
giving first mover advantage to the firm that is the first to enter the market (Sutton, 
1991, Joskow, 2007). After deregulation this first mover, the former incumbent and 
often government-owned monopoly, has significant benefit over the other 
competitors.  
 
In terms of path dependence and related mechanisms acting as an obstacle, in his 
research Hirsh (1989) provided an explanation of technological stagnation and its 
contribution to industrial decline. He analyzed technological development, the 
culture and leadership of the organizations and the impact of the surrounding 
stakeholders such as customer, investors and regulators on the evolution of the US 
electric power industry in the 20th century. After improving steadily for decades, the 
productivity gains from the existing technology developed beliefs held by the 
industry managers of future improvements and growth, but in fact caused the 
industry to stall. Facing the boundaries of efficiency gains of the late 1960s and 
1970s, the firms could not mitigate the economic and regulatory assaults of the 
1970s and as a result in the 1980s the industry found itself in the middle of 
deregulation and restructuring. Hirsh’s (1989) research is interesting because the 
technological stagnation, and the resulted industry decline and restructuring, that he 
identified is different from the predominant views on dominant designs, which lead 
to a mature industry until a new dominant design breaks through. Hirsh (1989) 
provides a ‘sociotechnical’ explanation for this. Triggered by the Oil Crisis in 1973, 
but evolved over a period of decades, the firms in the industry could not respond to 
the shock to their business environment. Consumers and regulators irritated by the 
first-ever experiences of increases in electricity prices, a new ‘environmental 
consciousness’ led to recrimination against the industry, and investors, who lost 
their trust to the traditional safety of the electric power industry sought better 
opportunities and returns for their investments. However, the industry decline 
remained a US phenomenon. Hirsh (1989) identified two key reasons for this. First, 
the US constituted the world’s largest market for electricity and thus needed and had 
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the greatest capacity. If practical limits in technological advance were to be 
encountered they would show up first in the US Second, the country had a 
decentralized electric power industry with hundreds of firms (compared to other 
large countries such as UK or Germany (see Hughes, 1987)), largely financed 
through free-market mechanisms and governed only loosely by the regulatory 
bodies. 
4.3.2. Path dependence and technology lock-in 
The substantial levels of investments required for power generation, and the lock-in 
to the selected technology due to asset mass inefficiencies, may change the fitness of 
a firm and consequently impact its survival when key factors in the environment, 
which define the fit, suddenly change. These changes in environmental factors 
impact the overall viability of certain technologies, and amplify the impact of the 
path dependent mechanisms both directly and through regulative institutions. The 
following examples provide enlightenment on this process. 
 
The first example is that of the Oil Crisis in 1973 which caused the oil price to 
escalate, which in turn deteriorated the profitability of thermal power plants using 
oil as a raw material. A second example is that of Cowan’s (1990), empirical study 
of the electric power industry which showed the impact of public measures on 
technological evolution. He showed that the adoption and heavy development of the 
light water nuclear power reactor technology by the US Navy in addition to the US 
government subsidies caused a technological lock-in to that specific technology not 
only in US but also in Europe.  A third example concerns institutions such as the 
environmental movement that caused a ‘nuclear power trauma’ in Sweden 
(Jacobsson and Berkek, 2004) and in Germany, and ultimately caused political 
decisions in Germany and Sweden to stepwise abandon nuclear power. The fourth 
example concerns the ongoing discussion of climate change. The notion that climate 
change has been caused by CO2 emissions has led to coal based thermal power 
plants becoming not only unfavorable, but due to emission trading regulation in the 
European Union also unprofitable. This has therefore further impacted the electric 
power industries profitability and survival. At the same time other technologies, 
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such as wind or solar energy have become more viable. However, as Christensen 
(2002) indicated, public policies and measures are needed to support these new 
technologies. Christensen studied the linkages between public policies and new 
renewable energy sources and technologies within the context of energy and climate 
change policies in Norway. The primary conclusion of his research was that in spite 
of long-lasting public efforts, new renewable energy sources represented only a very 
small fraction of the energy produced in Norway. This was due to path dependence 
which created a strong position for the prevailing technologies, leading to low 
electricity prices, and to fluctuating patterns in public priorities. For this reason 
Christensen (2002) suggested that in order to promote new technologies and 
innovation, public policies should be based on long-term commitments to guard 
against path dependence. 
 
Finally, taking into consideration the theoretical body of knowledge in industry 
evolution research enriched with the theories of causality and drawing on the 
existing literature of the electric power industry (research question 3) I offer the 
following proposition which will be investigated in the empirical analysis: 
 
Proposition 3: The cumulative causal mechanisms during the evolution of a 
industry cause path dependence in the form of asset constraints and a business 
model lock-in that have an impact on industry structure and firm survival. 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Research site 
The electric power industry is an interesting empirical environment to study the 
interplay of institutions, technology and the market and their impact on the industry 
structure and on individual firms. First, in most countries electric power industries 
have evolved from an industry with private or government owned monopolies, 
subject to price and entry regulation and extensive asset regulation, such as 
electricity network and power plant licensing (Hughes, 1983; Joskow, 1997) into a 
semi-deregulated industry with partial market-based competition and subject to the 
great impact of government policies (Ruostetsaari, 1989, 1998). Thus, the 
fundamental 'rules of the game' of the industry has been determined by regulation. 
Second, the evolution of power generation technologies has played a great role in 
the evolution of the industry all over the world (Hirsh, 1989, Joskow and Rose, 
1985; Myllyntaus, 1991, Hargadon and Douglas, 2001). Third, the characteristics of 
the firms in the industry have evolved with specialization to certain parts of the 
value chain (see Kaseman and Mayo, 1991; Lee, 1995; Kwoka, 2002; Christensen 
and Greene, 1976; Christensen, 2001) leading to distinct business models.  
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This research is based on a longitudinal analysis of the Finnish electric power 
industry between 1889 and 2005. The research covers the whole lifetime of the 
industry from the birth of the firms until the recent years. The electric power 
industry in Finland was highly regulated until the mid 1990s. After that it was 
among the first electric power industries in the world to undergo a major 
deregulation process. The Finnish society has evolved during this time period from a 
highly agricultural society to one of the leading industrialized societies in the world. 
Moreover, this period contains major transformations and environmental shocks of 
the Finnish society such as the process of industrialization, the Second World War, 
the Oil Crisis, two major recession periods and the accession of Finland to the 
European Union. During this period, the government policies, institutional 
organizations, and key firms of the electric power industry and other major 
industrial firms have impacted significantly on the evolution of the electric power 
industry as Myllyntaus (1991) and Ruostetsaari (1989; 1998) have documented in 
their studies. The Finnish case is also interesting, since the electricity market reform 
in the country is unique compared to many other countries in the sense that even 
before the official market deregulation in 1995, the market was already very open 
compared to most of the other European countries, as Pineau and Hämäläinen 
(2000) have pointed out.  The changes were made gradually, not radically, like in 
UK, in which on main utility firm was broken down and privatized in one go 
(Newbury, 1997; 2002).  
5.2. Research design 
There are different ontological views among organizational scholars whether 
organizations consist of things or processes (Rescher, 1996; Tsoukas and Chia, 
2002). Consequently, these two views lead to different epistemologies about 
variance or process methods for conducting research (Mohr, 1982; Van de Ven and 
Poole, 2005). Furthermore, the different ontological views and epistemologies lead 
to two distinct definitions of change. Long term changes is either seen as an 
observed difference over time in an organizational entity on selected dimensions 
with a focus is on variable changing over time (Nelson, 1995b), or a narrative 
describing a sequence of events on how development and change unfold (Poole et al. 
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2000). The tradition in industry evolution research includes a rich set of 
methodological solutions ranging from pure variance methods with theorizing 
leading to mathematical models (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Carrol, 
1992) to historical narratives (Hughes, 1983; Hirsh, 1989; Myllyntaus, 1991). 
Traditionally, the goal of historical analysis is to develop accurate descriptions of 
social phenomena on the basis of careful consideration of all relevant and available 
data (Golder, 2000). In this method one should strive to understand events in their 
full context, seek generalizations and admit exceptions, try to understand the causes 
of events and to assess their relative importance, and look beyond immediate causes 
in order to also determine underlying explanations (Smith and Lux, 1993; Golder, 
2000). Nevertheless, narratives also need systematic data to discover the phenomena 
behind the change (Murmann, 2003). However, theory building needs rich 
description, and the richness comes from the anecdotal data. Consequently, the 
phenomena are uncovered using the ‘hard’ data, but the ‘soft’ data is used to explain 
many of the causal relationships (Mintzberg, 1979). Thus, combining the pluralistic 
insights from the different approaches – variance and process methods – provides a 
richer understanding of organization change than any one approach provides by 
itself (Van de Ven and Poole, 2005).  
 
In this research, I am following a tradition, which has recently become increasingly 
employed (see Murmann, 2003; Geels, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007; Geels and Raven, 
2006; Lamberg and Laurila, 2005; Lamberg and Tikkanen, 2006, Lamberg et al., 
2008). These studies combine systematic descriptive analysis with historical 
narrative analysis. Indeed, in order to be able to draw conclusions on causal 
inferences, the combination of historical narratives and descriptive or quantitative 
analysis is needed. Causal analysis is a synthesis of these two. Accordingly, the 
research process of this research consists of three phases as depicted in Figure 8. 
Moreover, I utilized several research strategies (Langley, 1999) during the phases. A 
summary of the research strategies in presented in Table 6.  
 
First, I started with a detailed historical narrative analysis of the life cycle of the 
Finnish electric power industry covering the entire lifetime of the industry: a period 
that extends over more than a century. Following the research framework, I divided 
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the analysis into subsequent sections: the overall industry history, the evolution of 
institutions in the form of public policies, the evolution of electricity consumption 
and power generation technologies, and the evolution of distinct business models.  
• Industry history
• Evolution of institutions in 
the form of public policies
• Electricity consumption 
and power generation 
technology evolution
• Evolution of business 
models
Phase 1.
Historical narrative 
analysis
Phase 2.
Descriptive
analysis
• Descriptive numeric 
analysis of firm entries and 
exists from the industry by 
business model
Phase 3.
Causal
analysis
• Key events during the 
selected episodes
• Identification of causal 
connections and active 
mechanisms between the 
events
Content 
Goals • Identify patterns of 
industry life cycle
• Identify key events and 
causal linkages during the 
industry life cycle
• Provide evidence of 
distinct types of firm 
mortality and survival 
during selected episodes 
• Explain the causal connections 
between the events and 
identify the key mechanisms 
by combining the historical 
narratives and descriptive 
numeric evidences
  
Figure 8: Research process 
 
From the above and as illustrated in the research framework, I started from the 
highest level of analysis – the entire lifecycle of an industry and then drilled down to 
the distinct components which have, according to the existing literature, an impact 
on the overall industry structure and individual firm survival. In Phase 1 of the 
research process I utilized narrative strategy. At the heart of narrative strategy lies a 
historical narrative (Abrams, 1982; Sayer, 1992; Griffin, 1993; Mahoney, 1999). 
However, the goal of the narrative strategy not to tell a story with sequences of 
events; it aims to present analytical chronologies in order to  “get on top of the data, 
to clarify sequences across levels of analysis, suggest causal linkages between 
levels, and establish early analytical themes” (Pettigrew, 1990:280). Thus the goal of 
the Phase 1 historical narrative analysis was to identify the patterns of industry life 
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cycle, the key events and causal linkages during the industry life cycle. Accordingly, 
the historical narrative can be considered as an analytical construct of sequential 
accounts that organize events and actions into chronological order (Sayer, 1992; 
Pajunen, 2004), which in turn form the basis for the causal analysis carried out in 
Phase 3. 
 
Table 6: Research strategies 
Research 
Strategy 
Key Anchor 
Points 
Level of 
Simplicity Method 
Narrative 
strategy 
Time Low Construction of a detailed qualitative 
analysis  from the raw data 
Temporal 
bracketing 
strategy 
Phases, 
Episodes 
Low Decomposing the data in periods, where 
there is certain continuity in the 
activities within each period and certain 
discontinuities at its frontiers. 
Visual 
mapping 
strategy 
Events, 
orderings, 
causality 
Moderate Visual graphical presentation of event 
history chronology and the causal 
connections between the events; causal 
diagrams 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Firm entries 
and exits  
High Descriptive analysis of selected 
measures 
 
 
In Phase 2 I performed a descriptive analysis of firm entries and exits from the 
industry in order to understand and explain the overall pattern of the industry’s life 
cycle and more particularly to identify possible industry shakeouts. I then continued 
the descriptive analysis of firm exits and entries according to the firm business 
model to provide evidence of distinct types of firm mortality and survival during the 
shakeout episodes.  
 
The descriptive analysis together with the narrative analysis performed in Phase 1 
built the basis for identifying the explanandum or, the stage of the evolution that 
described the result of the phenomenon (Mayntz, 2004). 
 
Building on the two first phases of analysis, I utilized temporal bracketing strategy 
to deconstruct the data – in my case the life cycle of the electric power industry in 
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Finland – into “successive adjacent periods enabling examination of how actions of 
one period lead to changes in the context that will affect action in subsequent 
periods” (Langley, 1999:703). Accordingly, I split the analysis into stages or cycles 
(Van de Ven and Poole, 2005) of change and specified the two key episodes (Tilly, 
2001) which had the most fundamental impact on the structure of the industry.  
 
In Phase 3 I performed causal analysis of the key events during the two selected 
shakeout episodes in order to explain the causal connections between the events. 
This methodology is similar to the 'counterfactual history' methodology presented by 
Durand and Vaara (2009)17. As Mayntz (2004) states, "explanation means causal 
reconstruction, a retrospective process-tracing that ends with the identification of 
crucial initial conditions” (2004:244). Accordingly, I first identified the explanans – 
the initial causes of the explanandum by combining the findings of the historical 
narrative analysis and descriptive numeric evidence.  
 
In this phase I used a method similar to the 'process tracing' (Steel 200418; George 
and Bennett, 2005). For the process tracing I employed a visual mapping strategy 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, Langley and Truax 1994; Mintzberg et al., 1976) in 
order to discover how the events were linked together: I used causal diagrams (Pearl, 
2000) to visualize the causal connections between the key events.  
 
After visualizing I proceeded to identify the generative mechanisms. The challenge 
of identifying mechanisms is that they are typically unobservable and therefore their 
description is bound to contain concepts that do not occur in empirical data (Bunge, 
                                                 
 
17 Durand and Vaara (2009) offered a 'counterfactual history' methodology, which consists of 
three steps: (1) identifying of critical events through a careful mapping of events and a 
thorough analysis of how these events relate to the more general facts, (2) causal process and 
mechanism specification based on the events models and existing body of of knowledge, and 
(3) the use of counterfactuals to establish causations.  
18 Process tracing (Steel, 2004) "consists in presenting evidence for the existence of several 
prevailing social practices that, when linked together, produce a chain of causation from one 
variable to another. A successful instance in process tracing, then, demonstrates the existence 
of a social mechanism connecting the variables of interest". 
78       METHODOLOGY  
  
 
2004). Thus, in order to identify the mechanism, I proceeded to describe the 
behavior of the mechanism and its key characteristics. At this stage I used additional 
empirical evidence from archive data of the relevant legislation and institutional 
committee reports and memorandums. 
 
Forms of graphical analysis and presentations are a useful extension to the 
prevailing methods of evolutionary research. They are particularly functional for the 
kind of research framework that I employ in this research. They allow simultaneous 
representation of large number of dimensions together with parallel processes and 
mechanisms (Langley, 1999) and also permit description of causality between 
events and thus reveal the impact of causal mechanisms in addition to those that are 
evolutionary. 
5.3. Data sources 
I collected archival and statistical data and studied several existing studies of the 
electric power industry in Finland to conduct the research in three phases as 
described in the previous section. In order to conduct the in-depth historical analysis 
and to identify the key events during the lifecycle of the industry I relied on four 
types of historical accounts and archival sources.  
 
I examined annual reports of the key firms in the industry (Imatran Voima, Fortum, 
Vattenfall, E.ON Finland, Länsivoima, Helsingin Energia, Pohjolan Voima) and 
firm and industry association histories (Imatran Voima, Länsi-Suomen Sähkö, 
Jyllinkosken Sähkö, Vaasan Sähkö, Savon Voima, Finnish Electricity Utilities 
(Suomen sähkölaitokset) 1984, 1989, The Finnish Electricity Association). In 
addition, I collected public documents from market organizations and regulators 
such as the Finnish Electricity Association SENER, Finnish Energy Industries and 
the Energy Market Authority of Finland. I studied thoroughly the relevant legislation 
and their debate in parliament committees, as well as the industry committee reports 
and memorandums as referred in the analysis. 
 
I also examined the electricity related publications of the Ministry of Trade and 
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Industry and the meeting minutes of the most important government appointed 
committees during the period of analysis. Finally, I examined several earlier studies 
of the electric power industry in Finland as referred to in the analysis. These two 
earlier studies of the Finnish electric power industry carried out by Ruostetsaari 
(1986, 1998) provided particularly useful detailed support information and evidence 
for the inference of causal and evolutionary effects between specific events. In order 
to carry out the descriptive numerical analysis, I collected a comprehensive data set 
of Finnish energy statistics for the years 1930-2005 as described in Table 7. The 
Electricity Law of 1928 stipulated that statistics should be collated from the industry 
and these were compiled from 1930 onwards in five year intervals, and from 1974 
onwards as annual records.  
Table 7: Archival statistics data 
Publisher Source of Statistics 
The Electrical Inspectorate of 
Finland (Sähkötarkastuslaitos) 
Electricity Statistics for Finland (Sähkölaitostilasto) 
1930, 1935, 1940, 1946,  1950, 1955,  1960, 1965  
Imatran Voima Oy Electricity Statistics for Finland  (Sähkölaitostilasto) 
1951-1955, 1956-1960, 1961-1969 
The Finnish Electricity 
Association 
(Suomen sähkölaitosyhdistys ) 
Electricity Statistics for Finland (Sähkötilasto)  1970, 
1974 
Electrical Inspectorate of Finland 
(Sähkötarkastuskeskus) 
Electricity statistics for Finland 1975-1997 
Adato Energia Oy Electricity and district heating 1998-2004 
Excel worksheets of electricity statistics from the 
years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 
Finnish Energy Industries 
 (www.energia.fi) 
Energy Statistics, 1990-2005 
Energy Market Authority  Excel worksheets of  electricity statistics of 
electricity sales and distribution firms 1996-2005 
Database of electricity prices 1992-2004 
Statistics Finland  Excel worksheets of  electricity statistics 1970-2005 
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For the years in which there were no statistical data available, I linearly interpolated 
the observation values as an average between the two closest available years19. The 
oldest data if from statistics publications, but for the periods since 1990 I also 
obtained Excel worksheets from Adato Energia Oy and from the Energy Market 
Authority.  
Table 8: Variable and events in the three levels of empirical analysis of the research 
Level of 
Analysis 
Variables in the descriptive 
analysis Events in the causal analysis 
Institutio-
nal level  
No descriptive analysis performed • Laws and regulations 
• Key government actions 
• Key environmental shocks in the 
society (wars, EU membership etc.) 
Industry 
level 
• Portfolio of business models 
(number of firms, entries, exits; 
production; consumption) by 
year 
• Number of end users by group 
• Electricity consumption per 
group 
• Power generation per 
technology 
• Business model profitability 
(partly before deregulation, 
fully after deregulation) 
• Laws and regulations 
• Changes in the portfolio of business 
models (e.g. new business models) 
• Technological events 
• Key change events (e.g. 
international entrants) 
• Institutional events (industry 
associations and other supporting 
institutions) 
• Market changes 
• Firm number changes 
Firm level • Firm entry and exit dates to the 
industry 
• Business model  
• Production technology 
• Vertical integration (e.g. own 
power generation or not) 
• Power generation capacity 
• Number of end customers 
• Total electricity sales and the 
share of own production 
• Ownership structure 
• Country of origin 
• Firm entry and exits 
• Mergers and acquisitions 
• Technology selections 
• Key firm level events (e.g. changes 
in profitability) 
                                                 
 
19 The number of firms has been interpolated for 1932, 1934, 1936, 1938, 1939, 1941-1945, 
1947-1949, 1951-1954, 1956-1959, 1961-1969, 1972, and 1973. Consumption has been 
interpolated for the years 1932-1934, 1936-1938, 1941-1944, 1956-1959, 1961-1964, and 
1971-1973.  
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I used the energy statistics to compile a database, which contains both industry and 
firm-level data. I compiled from the archival data sources a database with data on 
three levels of analysis; institutional level, industry level and firm level. 
 
The summary of the three levels of analysis and the variables used in the descriptive 
analysis as well as the events used in the causal analysis is described in Table 8. 
First, in the institutional level I collected the key laws and regulations and other 
public policy actions as well as key environmental shocks in the society. Second, the 
industry level includes variables such as the portfolio of business models during 
each episode, the yearly total number of firms and the variation of the number of 
firms in the industry by business model, number of end users and total consumption 
of electricity, power generation per technology. At the level of the industry, the 
analysis based on the variables gave me an overview of the life cycle of the industry. 
In particular, it helped to identify the two major shakeout episodes in the industry.  I 
also collected the key events, such as technological and market changes, of the 
industry level. Third, at the firm level, I collected information in five year intervals. 
The database includes information on the volumes of electricity production and 
supply, production technologies, number of customers, business models and 
ownership structures. Furthermore, the data from the deregulated episode during 
1996-2005, collected from the annual statistics of the Energy Market Authority, 
includes detailed firm-level financial information such as firm turnover and profits. 
This firm-level data enabled me to analyze the differences between different types of 
firms and provided a basis to investigate which kinds of firms survived the 
shakeouts. 
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6. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
I have divided the analysis of data in to six sections. The analysis starts from the 
highest level of hierarchy of the temporal dimension of analysis – the entire lifetime 
of the industry. I then drill down into the hierarchy to key episodes and finally to the 
mechanisms that made the changes happen at the different levels of analysis. In the 
analysis I follow the structure of the research framework of the research and employ 
a variety of relevant research strategies throughout the analysis.  
 
In the first section, utilizing the historical narrative strategy, I describe the evolution 
of the Finnish electric power industry between 1889 and 2005. I highlight the key 
events in the different levels of analysis. Based on the descriptive analysis and the 
supporting descriptive measures of firm entries and exits I divided, according to the 
temporal bracketing strategy, the lifetime of the industry into four periods, reflecting 
certain continuity in the activities within each period and certain discontinuities at its 
frontiers (Langley, 1999). I then explored these periods as a grouping of the 
historical analysis. In the second section, in accord with the research framework, the 
evolution of the formal institutions – public policies – and their impact on the 
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overall industry evolution is analyzed. Thereafter, I elaborate the evolution of two 
key characteristics in the environmental settings of the industry and the firms: 
market growth (and decline) in terms of changing customer needs and increase of 
demand and consumption, and the evolution of the core technology in power 
generation. The fourth section concentrates on the evolution of the industry structure 
in the form of the emergence of distinct business models through diversification of 
the value chain. In addition, the dominant firms in the industry and their business 
models, and the association between the business model and market dominance is 
analyzed in this section. In the fifth section I scrutinize the two shakeout episodes of 
the industry in order to be finalized for a causal evolutionary analysis. This is carried 
out by combining the descriptive analyses of firm exits during the shakeouts with a 
visual mapping of the key events identified in the previous analyses and their causal 
connections in the form of causal diagrams. 
6.1. The history of the industry: Four periods of evolution  
A summary of the four phases of evolution of the Finnish electric power industry 
between 1889 and 2005 is presented in Table 9. The distinct periods are also 
depicted in Figure 9; a chart that describes the evolution of the total number of firms 
in the industry and the development of electricity consumption in the country during 
the period of evaluation. I label the first period ‘Utility Start-up’. It commences with 
the birth of the industry and continues as an initial growth period. The key incident 
between period one and two was the Second World War. The second period, which I 
label 'Institutionalization', continued as a notable growth period taking into 
consideration the number of firms in the industry. However, the number of firms 
started to decrease from 1971 onwards, which initiated the third period. 
Simultaneously, the electricity consumption increased significantly during this 
period and therefore I label it 'Increasing Demand'. Finally, the new Electricity 
Market Act in 1995 turned the evolution of the industry to period number four, 
'Deregulation'.  
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Figure 9: Total number of firms and electricity Consumption in Finland 1889-2005. Left 
axis: number of firms, right axis, electricity consumption, GWh. Source: Finnish 
electricity statistics 1930-2005. 
 
6.1.1. Period 1: Utility start-up 1889-1938 
In 1877, electric lighting using a steam-driven dynamo was experimented with for 
the first time in Finland. The history of the utilization of electric power in Finland 
started from these experiments, and from the subsequent public demonstrations of 
electric lighting in Helsinki. The electricity industry is seen to have started in 
Finland on the 15th of March, 1882, when the first notable electricity lightning 
system was taken into use at the Finnlayson textile factory in city of Tampere 
(Kunnas, 1985).  
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Table 9: Summary of the four phases in the evolution of the Finnish electric power 
industry 1889-2005 
 
Period  1. Utility Start-up 2. Institutionalization 3. Increasing Demand  4. Deregulation 
Time period 1889-1938 1939-1970 1971-1994 1995-2005 
Society  Regulated 
environment 
 Rural population 
 Industrialization 
starting 
 Regulated 
environment 
 Rural population 
 Industrialization 
starting 
 Bilateral trading 
with the Soviet 
Union  
 High government 
ownership in forest 
and energy 
industries  
 Deregulation 
starting in some 
industries 
 Urbanization 
increasing   
 Forest industry 
growth and 
consolidation 
starting 
 Oil Crisis 1973 
 Deregulation and 
market opening in 
many industries  
 Urban and 
economically 
wealthy population 
 Growing 
investments to 
energy heavy 
industries (forest, 
metal) 
Electricity 
consumption 
 Very low  Starting to grow  Major growth  Increased demand 
Key new 
technological 
innovations 
 Hydro  
 Thermal 
 Thermal (Oil, Coal)  Nuclear power 
 Natural Gas 
 
 Wind 
Industry 
evolution 
 Number of entries 
high, very few exits 
 Number of firm 
entry increasing, but 
slightly more 
moderately than in 
the previous phase 
 Consolidation 
starting, number of 
exits increasing  
 Consolidation 
continuing, but still 
moderate 
 International firms 
entering markets 
Electricity 
firm 
characteris-
tics 
 Public electricity 
infrastructure 
development 
 Multiple, isolated 
electricity firm 
entities 
 Vertically integrated 
firms 
 Fulfillment of the 
public sector duties 
and industry needs 
 Multiple, isolated 
electricity firm 
entities 
 Mostly vertical 
integrated firms 
 Economies of scale 
driving 
specialization 
(vertical 
disintegration) 
 First nuclear power 
plants starting 
 Specialization 
(vertical 
disintegration) 
continues 
 Electricity sales 
firms starting after 
deregulation  
Key 
Legislation 
 Electricity Laws 
1901, 1928 
 Water Acts 
 Two countryside 
electrification 
committees after 
World War II 
 Electricity Law 
1979 
 Electricity Market 
Act 1995 
Market 
dominance 
 Local, municipality 
owned electricity 
firms, state owned 
IVO and industries 
own electricity 
firms 
 Local, municipality 
owned electricity 
firms, state owned 
IVO and industry-
specific electricity 
firms 
 Production: Fortum, 
Pohjolan Voima, 
Teollisuuden 
Voima, Helsingin 
Energia 
 Distribution and 
Sales: Helsinki, 
Tampere, Turku 
 Production: Fortum, 
Pohjolan Voima, 
Teollisuuden 
Voima, Helsingin 
Energia 
 Distribution and 
Sales: Fortum, 
Vattenfall, 
Helsingin Energia, 
E.ON 
Key dates 
and firm 
entries 
 1907 Helsingin 
kaupungin 
sähkölaitos 
(Helsingin Energia) 
founded 
 1922, Imatran 
Voima  Oy (IVO) 
founded 
 1943, Pohjolan 
Voima founded 
 1969, Teollisuuden 
voima founded 
 
 Loviisa nuclear 
power plant starting 
(1977,1981) 
 Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant starting 
(1978,1980) 
 1994, Vattenfall Oy 
founded 
 1997, Finnish 
Power Grid Oy 
(Fingrid Oy) 
founded 
 1998, Nord Pool, 
starts operation in 
Finland 
 2001, E.ON 
acquired Espoon 
Sähkö  
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Gradually, as Myllyntaus (1991) described in his detailed research ‘Electrifying 
Finland’,20the use of electricity for different purposes spread all over the country. 
Experiments with the commercial use of electricity for different purposes continued 
during the rest of the 1800s. Even if industrialization started gradually in Finnish 
society during this period, the era was characterized by the importance and relatively 
high ratio of agriculture to the gross national product of the country21. The demand 
for electricity in agriculture was very low and the role of agriculture in political 
decision making was important. Thus it was logical that it was the municipalities 
that took a major role in establishing and building the electric utilities. On the other 
hand, looking at the share of the industries total production in Finland, the rise of 
forest industry had already started during this period (Hjerppe, 1989).  
 
Electric power as a public utility industry started in Finland in City of Tampere on 
November 15th, 1888. The first power firms, some of them private enterprises and 
some public utilities22, were established from the 1880s onwards for different 
purposes. The primary uses of electricity were for lightning both in cities and in 
factories (see Figure 10). However, the use of electricity for manufacturing, using 
electric motors as source of power, also started to increase gradually, although it was 
not yet significant during this period (Jaakkola, 1982; Myllyntaus, 1991). According 
to the Finnish electricity statistics, the first registered electricity firms were founded 
in 1889, which is also the starting point of the observation period for this research. 
In addition to the Electricity Utility for the City of Tampere, the first electricity 
firms mentioned in the statistics were the Electricity Utility for the City of Rauma 
                                                 
 
20 Myllyntaus’ (1991) aim was to investigate the adoption process of new technology in a 
latecomer technology. Although his main focus is on technology adoption his research can be 
considered as the first detailed analysis of the history of electricity in Finland. It also includes 
detailed information about the utilities and legislation between 1877 and 1977, which has 
been very valuable for the present research. 
21 According to Hjerppe (1989), the percentage of agriculture of Finland's GNP was 38 
percent in 1889, 30 percent in 1909, 38 percent in 1919 and still remained as high as 18 
percent in 1939. 
22For clarity purposes, from now I will refer in the general text to both private enterprises and 
public utilities with the word ‘firm’. However, when appropriate for analysis purposes, I will 
make distinction between the ownership and corporate structure. 
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and the Electricity firm of Alko Oy Rajamamäki Works, the government owned 
monopoly of alcohol production, both of which were founded in 1889. 
 
 
Figure 10: Electric light was first used in Finland in Finnlayson’s textile factories in 
Tampere. Photograph from the Finnlayson factory floor at year 1900. Source: Vapriikki 
Museum, City of Tampere. 
 
The first entry episode of the industry, depicted in Figure 11, commenced with the 
establishment of the industry at the end of 1800s and was at its strongest between 
1918 and 1931. This period follows the country’s declaration of independence at the 
end of 1917. The first entry episode was ended by the Great Depression, which had 
already started in Finland in 1931. As a result of the Great Depression, the gross 
domestic product in Finland fell by more than 4 percent between 1929 and 1932 
(Hjerppe, 1989), which also affected to the electric power industry of the country. It 
was common for these first firms in the industry to be vertically integrated. Thus 
they covered the whole value chain from electricity generation to distribution and 
retail. 
88       ANALYSIS OF DATA  
  
 
 
Figure 11: Number of new electric power firms by year, 1889-1931. Source: Finnish 
electricity statistics 1930-2005. 
 
However, the diversification of the electricity business already started on a small 
scale at the beginning of the 1900s. Some firms specialized in power generation for 
industrial usage and were often owned by these industries, whereas others 
concentrated on power distribution and sales to consumers. There was a lively 
debate about private and municipal electric firms in Britain and on the European 
continent at the turn of the century. In Finland, as in the other Nordic countries, 
municipal electric utilities were regarded as a part of the local infrastructure; 
moreover, they were seen as vehicles to attract new firms to the town. These 
municipal owned firms concentrated on building local distribution networks: urban 
areas and nearly half of the rural households in Finland were wired to an electricity 
network by 1940 (Myllyntaus, 1991). On the other hand, industrial customers were 
often outside the distribution network of the cities and as there was no nationwide 
transmission network connecting the power generation plants and the end users; 
there was no real market for electricity during the beginning of the period.  For this 
reason the newly established industrial firms had to build and invest in their own 
power generation plant and distribution network in and around their industrial 
plants. Right from the beginning of the history of the industry these investments 
were made by establishing private electricity firms, often owned by the industrial 
'customer'. These two early trends – urbanization and industrialization – and the 
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related constraints of market establishment, built a strong basis towards municipal 
and industrial ownership of electric firms. 
 
The main technology for power generation at the beginning of this period was 
thermal power. However, harnessing Finnish rivers for hydroelectric power started 
to grow at this phase. The water law of 1902 gave, to the owner of the water rights, 
the right to build hydropower plants. This meant a major change in the ownership of 
the electric utilities as many of the major rivers, their rapids, and the surrounding 
land areas were owned by the government. Following the water law legislation the 
Finnish Parliament decided in 1921 to build a hydropower plant on the river Vuoksi 
in Imatra (see Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 12: Imatra hydropower plant was brought into use in 1929. It more than doubled 
Finland’s existing electricity production capacity. Source: Fortum. 
 
This power plant led to a radical change in Finnish electricity supply, more than 
doubling the country’s existing production capacity. To fully utilize the new 
production potential, it was necessary to construct some 400-600 kilometers of 
transmission lines across the country (Myllyntaus, 1991). Building the Imatra power 
plant and the affiliated transmission lines changed the ownership structure of the 
electric utilities because the Finnish government was introduced to the industry as a 
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major owner of electric power firms. This built the basis of the largest firm in the 
industry at the end of the observation period, Fortum. The firm has its origin in this 
phase, when Imatran Voima Oy (IVO) became a limited company in 1923. At this 
phase IVO also had the responsibility for building the Imatra power plant and the 
affiliated long-distance high-voltage transmission lines in Finland.  
 
At the institutional level of the society the key events were the declaration of 
independence in 1917 and the subsequent civil war in 1918. Finland made its first 
law for the electric power industry at the beginning of this period. According to the 
Electricity Law of 1901, the electricity business was made subject to license and to 
be under supervision. The other key events in the other legislation between 1889 and 
1939 were mainly associated with the Water Laws and the rights of using water 
areas such as rivers and watercourses for hydropower generation. 
 
In sum, the key characteristics of the first period in the life course industry were (1) 
the high number of firm entries and the (2) coevolution with Finnish society, 
especially with the municipalities and the gradually emerging new industrial 
economy. Moreover, the seeds of path dependence were sown during this period in 
the form of ownership structures, utilization of technology, especially hydropower, 
and the related property rights. 
6.1.2. Period 2: Institutionalization 1939-1970 
The continuity of the events and activities during the first period – characterized by 
positive development, firm entries and gradual increase in electricity consumption 
and utilization in society – ended abruptly at the Second World War. The war was a 
clear environmental shock not only to the electric power industry but to the whole of 
Finnish society and started a new period in the history of the industry. This can also 
be seen in the number of electricity. The Second World War hit the electric power 
industry massively, more than any other industry in Finland. In the electric power 
industry, 17 percent of the electricity production capacity was in the areas ceded to 
the Soviet Union in a truce agreement by the end of 1939. In addition German troops 
destroyed three medium sized hydroelectric power plants in Lapland between 1944 
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and 1945, and numerous distribution networks were bombed during the war. 
Moreover, there was an overall decrease in the consumption of electricity during the 
war (Myllyntaus, 1991).  
 
Although the development of Finnish society accelerated after the war, the share of 
agriculture remained high for two decades. During 1950, the share of agriculture of 
the total labor force in Finland was 40 percent accounting for 16 percent of the GNP 
(Hjerppe, 1989). This was partly due to the massive support from the government to 
carry out electrification of the rural areas in order to improve the life conditions and 
productivity in the countryside after the war. The electrification was based on the 
guidelines of the two Countryside Electrification Committees in 1947 and 1965 
(Pylkkänen, 1982). The consequence of the countryside electrification was that there 
was a high number of rural distribution electricity firms established in the country. 
However, simultaneously industrial production continued to increase, mostly 
concentrated around the forest industry (Hjerppe, 1979). There was a clear 
dominance of forest industry firms among the largest industrial firms in Finland. 
Furthermore, the early large forest industry entrants firms still existed in 1979, either 
independently or as part of larger forest industry enterprises (Hjerppe, 1979). 
Compared to agriculture, the forest industry had a high demand for electricity as did 
the other growing industries. For example in 1950, forest industries possessed 53 
percent of the total installed industrial power. As a consequence of countryside 
electrification and the increased need of electricity in the industry – and in the forest 
industry in particular – electricity consumption continuously increased during the 
period. Moreover, the regulation of electricity prices kept the price of electricity low 
compared to other energy sources (Kuusisto, 1973). 
 
The data show that at the beginning there was a trend that those industrial firms, 
which needed a significant amount of electricity for their production, built their own 
power plants close to their production plants in order to satisfy the plant's need for 
electricity. Thus many of the new firms in the industry were those that can be called 
industry specific. On the other hand, new firms with several industrial owners were 
also introduced. Two major firms, Pohjolan Voima (PVO) and Teollisuuden Voima 
(TVO), were established during this period. PVO was established at the beginning of 
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the period, in 1943, and TVO at the end, in 1969, building a basis to satisfy the 
forthcoming increasing demand in the next phase. PVO's founder shareholders were 
seven Finnish forest industry firms. The major shareholders of PVO have remained 
the same: in 2005 these major shareholders were the largest Finnish forest industry 
firms, UPM-Kymmene (43% of shares) and Stora Enso (16%). The rationale behind 
establishing PVO was demand-based scale economies; therefore it was an important 
structural milestone in the evolution of the market: increasing demand from 
industrial users demanded new larger entities to be built for the first time. A third 
interesting phenomenon during this period was that the Finnish government 
continued to establish new firms in the electric power industry by concentrating on 
harnessing the rest of the Finnish rivers through the building of hydropower plants. 
Among the largest government owned firms were Oulujoki Oy, established in 1941 
and Kemijoki Oy, established in 1953. 
 
In summary, the key characteristics and events of the second period during the 
evolution of the Finnish electric power industry were (1) the coevolution of the 
industry with the forest industry and the consequent establishment of two major 
power generation firms PVO and TVO owned by the forest industry, (2) the 
government support for countryside electrification and the subsequent increase in 
the number of rural distribution electricity firms. 
6.1.3. Period 3: Increasing demand 1971-1994 
The total number of firms continued to increase during the previous period until 
1970 by which there were a total of 557 firms in the industry. However, during 1971 
and throughout the subsequent years the total number of firms started to decrease for 
the first time since the Second World War. These events started a new period in the 
industry. The greatest fall in firm numbers was between 1970 and 1975: the number 
of firms decreased by 25 percent, from 557 to 417, over that five years period. The 
industry had never before seen such a high level of consolidation. A notable event in 
Finnish society during this period was the countrywide recession between 1974 and 
1979 which was a consequence of the worldwide Oil Crisis, which started in 1973. 
At the same time as the significant decrease in firm numbers the demand for 
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electricity continued to accelerate, with an exception of 1971 when there was a 
major strike, even though this included the years of overall economic recession. The 
major reasons for the increased consumption were the increased demand for 
electricity heating in houses and the overall economic boom in Finland before and 
after the years of recession. Moreover, the regulation of electricity prices continued 
to keep the price of electricity low compared to other energy sources. The analysis 
of the data shows what happened through mergers and acquisitions. Thus the assets 
of the firms, the power generation plants and distribution networks remained in the 
industry. The reasons behind the mergers and acquisitions were twofold.  
 
First, as the result of increasing demand there was a major need for investments in 
all parts of the value chain from power generation to distribution. Firms with a 
larger asset base and wider ownership base (either municipalities or other industries) 
had better financial opportunities to engage in the needed new investments. 
Moreover, the investments required new technology and political will. Thus the 
established firms and particularly those having close relationship with the major 
industries or local and central government had a clear advantage during this phase. 
The call for new production capacity, which had already started at the end of the 
previous period or in the 1960s, was covered by thermal power mainly using oil as a 
raw material. Consequently, the share of oil in all energy consumption in Finland 
had grown from 35 percent in 1963 to 62 percent by 1973 (Numminen, 1984). As 
the path of harnessing the rivers for hydropower had in practice come to an end, and 
the Oil Crisis in 1973 had massively raised the cost of oil as the raw material for 
electricity, the industry had to find new energy sources to fit the increasing 
requirements of industry and society. Nuclear power was a tempting alternative. 
However, building nuclear power required both a political decision and also 
substantial investments. The firms having both these capabilities were IVO and the 
newly established TVO. The latter included PVO and IVO - and through them the 
Finnish government and the forest industry - as major shareholders. Eventually, four 
nuclear power reactors were commissioned and built and they were taken into 
service between 1977 and 1981. IVO built the first nuclear power plant in Finland, 
Loviisa I, which commenced operation in 1977, and finished the second reactor, 
Loviisa II in 1980 (see Figure 13). TVO completed its nuclear power plants at 1978 
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and 1980. Nuclear power rapidly became one of the major energy sources in 
Finland, with a 34 percent share of gross production in 1990 and 25 percent in 2004. 
Most of the requirements of oil as an energy source for power generation before the 
Oil Crisis was covered by nuclear power, so that the share of oil in all energy 
consumption in Finland had decreased to 47 percent by the end of 1983 (Numminen, 
1984).  
 
The second explanation for the mergers and acquisitions was that numerous small 
electricity distribution firms that were established during the previous high entry 
period due to the government supported countryside electrification ran into financial 
difficulties squeezed between government regulated electricity price freezing and the 
increased price of oil as production raw material for their oil based thermal power 
plants. Moreover, based on the recommendations of the Countryside Electrification 
Committee, the Finnish government gave subsidies for rural distribution firm 
mergers in order to increase the security of supply by forming larger and more stable 
asset bases.  
 
 
Figure 13: Loviisa nuclear power plant represented the first use of nuclear power 
technology in Finland. Source: Fortum. 
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The high involvement of the Finnish government and the forest industry in the 
electric power industry strengthened during this phase through their ownership 
arrangements. At the end of the 1970s the largest firms owned by the Finnish 
government were Rautaruukki, Enso-Gutzeit, Kemijoki, IVO and Veitsiluoto 
(Hjerppe, 1979). Two of these – Enso-Gutzeit and Veitsiluoto – were forest industry 
firms, IVO and Kemijoki were electricity firms, and Rautaruukki represented the 
metals industry – which also demands high requirements for electricity. Thus the 
role of government for the electric power industry was threefold. First, it exercised 
power over the industry through formal institutions: legislation and regulation. 
Second, it acted as a major player and investor in the industry with dominant firms 
under its ownership. These government owned firms thus made use or their status 
and capabilities – financial strength, property rights and political support – to gain 
dominance in the market by utilizing two key technologies in the industry; 
hydropower and nuclear power. Third, the Finnish government had a secondary role 
– as a major owner of forest and other major industry firms – in the coevolution of 
the electric power industry and the other key industries in the country. 
6.1.4. Period 4: Deregulation 1995-2004 
Although there had been different ownership models for electric power utilities not 
only in Finland but all over Europe, the telephone, post, railways and electricity 
industries among others, were widely considered as municipal or government 
infrastructures. However, in many European countries the perspectives towards the 
ownership of these industries changed from the mid 1980s onwards. The EU 
Commission affected this development via the 1990 Transit Directive. This led to 
gradual electricity industry deregulation throughout Europe. The deregulation 
started in 1990 when the UK electricity market was liberalized through 
denationalization. The process continued in the Nordic countries during the 1990s: 
in Norway deregulation started in 1991, in Sweden in 1996 and in Finland from 
1995 to 1998. In Denmark the market has remained strongly regulated.  
 
In Finland, the Electricity Market Act, which entered into force in 1995, opened the 
Finnish electricity market to competition. In the initial stage, only the major 
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electricity users were allowed to invite tenders from electricity suppliers. During the 
next three years the market was gradually liberalized so that by the beginning of 
September 1998households were also able to choose between competing electricity 
suppliers. Thus the year 1995 started a new period in the electric power industry in 
Finland. The electricity market reform removed obstacles to competition and 
unnecessary regulation in the sectors of the market where competition was possible, 
i.e. generation, sales and foreign trade. On the other hand, clear rules of the game 
were established for electrical power networks that operate as a natural monopoly 
(Sener, 2000). The deregulation also changed the structure of the industry. As the 
sale of electricity was liberated, new firms concentrating solely on electricity sales 
entered the market. The deregulation also opened the market to international 
entrants. The major international entrants were the government owned Swedish 
market leader Vattenfall, and E.ON from Germany, which also had historically been 
a monopoly in Germany and owned by the German government. The characteristics 
of these entrants were that they did not primarily enter into the retail market 
targeting organic growth. Nor did they start investing to power generation. Rather, 
what they did was that they acquired existing firms thus providing them with the 
existing infrastructure of the Finnish market.  
 
The exit period that had already started during the former period continued during 
this period. Within two years after the start of deregulation, between 1995 and 1997, 
the number of firms decreased by 16 percent from 328 to 27623. According to 
Gunther (2002), 49 acquisitions were carried out in Finland during 1999-2001. 
                                                 
 
23 Jyllinkosken sähkö is an illustrative example of rural electricity distribution firm 
acquisitions. The firm was established in 1921. The operation started with the building of a 
hydropower plant in the Jyllinkoski rapid. Initially the electricity was distributed to only two 
municipalities, but this was extended to cover 18 municipalities by the end of the 1980s. The 
majority owners were the municipalities of the north-western coast of Finland. The firm 
participated in market consolidation starting from the 1960s by acquiring a total of 116 
electricity co-operatives and distribution firms between 1960-1989. Lounais-Suomen sähkö 
acquired 54 of the shares of Jyllinkosken sähkö 25th of April, 1995, just before the Electricity 
Market Act came into force. The firm was finally merged to form Lounais-Suomen sähkö 
during 1996. Länsivoima (former Lounais-Suomen sähkö) was further acquired by Fortum in 
1996. A picture of the share certificate of Jyllinkosken sähkö is in Figure 14. 
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Assets worth more than 4.5 billion euros were restructured while foreign firms were 
involved in 8 of the 15 largest transactions. At the same time 88 percent of all 
municipal electricity firms were converted to limited companies. However, 
compared to the previous period, during which the decreases mainly happened due 
to firm exits as a result of mergers and acquisitions, this period was also 
characterized by numerous firm entries. This changed the structure of the market: 
new firms entered the market, and former utilities were changed to limited firms, 
with some becoming specialized local monopolies of electricity distribution, and 
others concentrating on electricity sales in the new competitive market. Illustrative 
 
 
Figure 14: Share certificate of Jyllinkosken sähkö.  Source: Pörssitieto Ky. 
 
Another interesting new phenomenon in the Finnish electric power market was the 
change of the boundaries of the market. In wholesale, the country-limited 
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boundaries had in practice gone and the market had grown into a Nordic market. 
This was enabled by the development of spot markets24 for electricity, where 
producers, distributors and large end-users could trade electricity, for example on a 
day-ahead basis.   
 
Deregulation started another entry episode in the history of the electric power 
industry in Finland in terms of number of firms. The key statistics described in 
Table 10. However, the number of new firms reflected the changes in the legislation 
leading to industry restructuring rather than a flow of totally new entrants to the 
industry. The electricity distribution, retail, and power generation operations were 
divided according to the law as separate legal entities as will be discussed in detail 
later. The result was that total 23 new power generation firms and 16 new electricity 
retail firms were established between 1995 and 2005. However, a notable new 
development was the establishment of the first wind energy generation firms in 
Finland during this episode:  eight new wind energy firms were established between 
1995 and 2005. Even though the volume of electricity produced with this new 
technology was extremely low compared to the existing technologies, it represented 
an interesting new technology that was to be introduced to the industry. 
 
As the history of the electric power industry in Finland indicates, the overall 
industry evolution- industry structure, competitive dynamics and individual firms - 
were impacted by the surrounding society and by embedded institutions, the 
available power generation technology and the firms in the industry.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
24 The Nordic wholesale spot markets are run by NordPool, the Nordic power exchange, 
which was established in 1993 and now serves all of the Nordic countries. NordPool was 
created with the key firms and with the backing of the Nordic governments and their relevant 
authorities. 
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Table 10: Number of new firms by business model 1995-2000. Source: Finnish electricity 
statistics 1995-2005, Adato Energia and Finnish Electricity Market Authority. 
 
Segment 1995-2000 2000-2005 Total 1995-2005 
Distribution 5* 4 9 
Power Generation 8 15 23 
Power Generation (Wind) 7 1 8 
Forest Industry 4 1 5 
Other Manufacturing 3 1 4 
Other Industry 1 1 2 
Electricity Retail 10 6 16 
All Sectors 38 29 67 
    
* Regional Distribution     
 
 
Thus, following the research framework (Figure 6), the evolution of formal 
institutions – public policies – and their impact on the industry evolution and on 
power generation technology and firm business models in particular, will be 
elaborated in the next section. Thereafter, the evolution of power generation 
technology and firm business models will be analyzed. These detailed analyses are 
essential in order to identify the key events in the different levels of analyses and 
their proximate causes during the evolution of the industry. Thus the following 
sections build a basis for the final causal event analysis of the industry. 
6.2. Evolution of public policies 
The impact of Finnish public policies on the electric power industry in Finland and 
on the electric power firms can be categorized into three areas of impact: direct 
electricity market legislation, legislation of ownership rights, and legislation of 
prices. The analysis of the legislation shows that the regulation and legislation was 
powerfully used in Finland throughout the period of evaluation to direct the electric 
power industry according to objectives of the surrounding political institutions of the 
state. A summary of the main events in the evolution of legislation in Finland that 
affected the electric power industry during the period of review is presented in Table 
11. Following the periodical division introduced in the historical analysis of the 
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industry of the previous chapter, I have divided the detailed analysis of the 
legislation into three groups, the first one covering the first period of the life course 
of the electric power industry, the second covering the following two periods, and 
the last covering the fourth period after the market deregulation in 1995. 
6.2.1. Electricity Laws 1901 and 1928 and other key events 1889-1939 
The first electricity law was passed as early as 1901. According to the law electricity 
business was made subject to license and under supervision. The evolution of the 
legislation between 1889 and 1939 was mainly associated with the right to use water 
areas such as rivers and watercourses for hydropower generation. The fundamentals 
for these rights were laid out in the Water Act in 1902. Building hydropower plants 
was made subject to license to be appealed for from the Water Rights Court. In 1919 
a law to prevent transmitting of electricity over Finnish borders was passed in order 
to prevent foreign investors from utilizing Finnish hydropower resources in order to 
generate electricity to be further transmitted to other countries. In this regard Finland 
had become an independent state at the end of 1917 after having being an 
autonomous Russian Grand Duchy. As Myllyntaus (1991) stated, this new law was 
passed to prevent transmission of electricity to Russia from the power plants that 
were still under Russian ownership. This kind of lawmaking indicates that the 
hydropower resources of the country and the related power generation were 
considered as important national resources. These early trends built a basis for a 
view that the electric power industry is to be a national business with national 
ownership. This way of thinking only changed in the 1990s concurrent with the 
overall changes in mindset regarding what counts as national borders because 
Finland was planning to join the EU. In the legislation the constraints of foreign 
ownership was finally liberated in the Electricity Market Act in 1995. 
 
The second electricity law was passed on May 11th, 1928. The main new content of 
the law was regulation of electrical safety. However, from the point of view of the 
evolution of the electric power industry’s ownership structure there was one notable 
section in the law: the law gave the municipal councils a right to refuse the building 
of electricity distribution networks within the boundaries of the municipality.  
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Table 11: Main events in electricity legislation during 1889-2005 
                                                 
 
25 ”Laki sähkölaitoksista valon synnyttämistä tahi voiman siirtoa varten, (1901)” 
26 ”Koskivoimatoimikunta (1917)” 
27 ”Laki sähkövoiman siirtämisestä maan rajojen ulkopuolelle, (19/1919)” 
28 ”Laki eräiden vesioikeusasiain poikkeuksellisesta käsittelystä, (383/1940)” 
29 ”Laki toimenpiteistä vesivoiman käyttöön ottamisen helpottamiseksi. (196/1941)” 
30 " Päätös hyödykkeiden hintasäännöstelystä (196/1968)" 
 
Period Year  Law or other event Main implication to electricity firms 
1. 1901 Electricity Law25 Electricity business was made subject to license and 
under supervision. 
1902 Water Act Definition of the rights of ownership of water areas. 
1917 The Commission for 
Hydropower26 
Planning of the construction of government owned 
hydroelectric power plants. Built a basis for the 
government owned firms. 
1919 Law of transmitting 
electricity over Finnish 
borders27 
No one is permitted to transmit electricity generated with 
indigenous energy sources over the Finnish border. 
1928  Electricity Law Definitions of electricity security. 
2. 1940 Act of  temporary 
licenses28 
Temporary licenses could be granted for regulations 
watercourses before the final permits were granted. 
1941 Emergency Act for 
power plant 
construction29 
A power firm, which possessed a building site and at least 
two-thirds of the hydro potential of the rapids could be 
granted temporary license to build a power plant before 
the final decision. 
1947-
1950 
Countryside 
Electrification 
Committee  
A plan to electrify the countryside or the rural areas of 
Finland. Price regulation and government subsidy to build 
electricity networks and power plants. 
1950 Power Law Electricity price freezing 
1961 Water  Act Definitions of who was entitled to build a hydropower 
plant and on what conditions. 
1965-
1966 
Countryside 
Electrification 
Committee 
Price regulation and government subsidy to build 
electricity networks and power plants. Government 
subsidy to facilitate small rural distribution firm mergers. 
1968 Power Law30 Electricity price freezing 
3. 1973-
1974 
Electricity Distribution 
Organization 
Committee 
Proposal that small electricity distribution firms should be 
merged with each other or with the larges ones. 
Proposal of an electricity distribution planning system. 
 1979 Electricity Law Set up of an electricity production and distribution 
planning and control system. 
4. 1995 Electricity Market Act  All users with a power demand exceeding 500 kW come 
within the scope of competition 
1998  Electricity Exchange The Nordic electricity exchange, NordPool, starts 
operation in Finland. 
 1998 Load profile method in 
balance clearing 
All small-scale users (with a main fuse max 3x63 A and a 
power demand of max 45 kW) are allowed to benefit 
from competition without the obligation to use hourly 
metering 
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This caused a trend that, particularly in the cities, the electricity distribution was 
owned by the municipalities and thus many privately owned firms made an exit 
from the market (Karjalainen, 1989). According to Myllyntaus (1991), the Finnish 
laws and their tightly national interpretation were used to slow down and even 
prohibit direct foreign investment in the hydroelectric plants and in the distribution 
utilities prior to the year 1940. In addition, the legislation postponed the 
hydroelectric projects before the Emergency Act in 1941. 
 
Two key acts, the Act for Temporary Licenses for Building Hydropower Plants 
(1940) and the Emergency Act for power plant construction (1941) were passed to 
enable and catalyze the reconstruction of the distribution networks and to build new 
capacity to cover the losses in the county’s overall power capacity that occurred due 
to the loss of  ower plants that had been ceded to the Soviet Union during the 
Second World War.  
 
The collaboration between the authorities and industrial life already produced 
institutionalized forms after the First World War, when the regulation of the 
country’s economy became unavoidable. Accordingly, the Senate of Finland 
established a Trade and Industry Commission in 1918, which received the authority 
to regulate the economy: “…because the Commission has to interfere quite much the 
rights to be engaged to a trade, the goal was to get the industries as much as possible 
involved to the organization and management of the Committee for them to be 
disposed to it with trust (Ruostetsaari, 1989:208).”  
 
In summary, public policies already impacted on the evolution of the electric power 
industry during the first years of the life course of the industry. Direct legislation, 
such as electricity business licensing and secondary policies, for example water 
rights, defined or directed the evolution of the industry; exploitation of technology, 
and firm business models and ownership structures. The reciprocal relationship 
between the public policy makers and the industry – or in other terms the 
coevolution between the public policies and the electric power industry had already 
started at this phase. Moreover, the early legislation had far-reaching efforts due to 
their combined impact with firm-level evolutionary path dependence, as will be 
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shown later in the analysis.   
6.2.2. Electricity Law 1979 and other key events 1940-1995 
The early trend of collaboration between the authorities and the major industries 
after the First World War was followed by the collaborative actions of the controlled 
economy31 during the Second World War (Ruostetsaari, 1989). Accordingly, as the 
Electricity Law (1928) became partly obsolete during the following decades, it was 
particularly the regulations of licensing which could not be fully complied with. 
There were already attempts to create new electricity law in the 1950s, but this did 
not lead to new electricity legislation. However, flexibility between the authorities 
and the electricity firms enabled a positive development of the industry (Kunnas, 
1982). The institutionalized forms of collaboration were left in the background after 
the Second World war; the growth of the economy turned relations between the 
government and the electric power industries to more competitive status, which were 
seen as 'rapid wars', and competition of nuclear power rights between the private 
owned power generation firm (mainly TVO and PVO) and the government owned 
firms (IVO, Kemijoki and others) (Ruostetsaari, 1986). However, after the Oil Crisis 
and the related overcapacity, the threat of increased government regulation led to a 
revival of the close collaboration between the government and the private and 
government owned electric power firms32 (Ruostetsaari, 1989). All in all, there are 
three notable examples of the coevolution of public policies and the electric power 
industry 
 
The collaboration to provide the war indemnities33 after the Second World War, 
                                                 
 
31 A Ministry of National Welfare (kansanhuoltoministeriö) with representatives from the key 
industries was established in Finland, when the Second World War was seen as very probable 
(Ruostetsaari, 1989). This kind of collaboration trends were prevailing also in many other 
countries (Victor, 1984). 
32 This collaboration got institutionalized forms, when the Power Producder’s Co-operation 
Delegation (Sähköntuottajien Yhteistyövaltuuskunta) was established in year 1975. 
33 A Delegation of War Indemnity Industries (Sotakorvausteollisuuden valtuuskunta, Soteva) 
was established after the Second World War to co-ordinate the war indemnities to Soviet 
Union. The delegation got wide authorities and autonomous authorities (Ruostetsaari, 1989). 
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brought institutionalized forms during the evolution of the Finnish economy in the 
1900s and thus built a basis for a close and institutionalized collaboration between 
the government and industrial life. After the Second World War, the settlement of 
the inhabitants from the ceded areas, war indemnities, and the reconstruction of the 
country after the conflict caused all the resources of the country to be mobilized. In 
addition life conditions for the people in the rural areas had to be improved 
(Pylkkänen, 1982). Electrification was one of the means to improve the life 
conditions and productivity in the countryside. As a consequence, the first 
Countryside Electrification Committee34 was appointed by the government of 
Finland on January 30th, 1947 to develop a plan to carry out electrification of the 
countryside and rural areas of Finland. The Committee made recommendations 
regarding price regulation and government subsidy to build electricity networks and 
power plants. Based on the recommendations, the electricity connection and basic 
fees were according to the possibilities of using electricity; for example it was based 
on the number of rooms in houses and on the arable area of the farm (Pylkkänen, 
1982).  
 
As a result of countryside electrification 260,000 new retail electricity customers 
entered the market between 1947 and 1960. A substantial number of electricity 
distribution networks had to be built to connect these new customers to the national 
electricity transmission network. New power generation capacity had to be built to 
fulfill the latest demand. Within the electric power industry there were two major 
consequences of this public policy action.  The first of these consequences was that 
numerous new urban electricity distribution firms were established. Government did 
not participate to their ownership. The new firms were either private co-operatives 
or owned by the local municipalities. The second consequence of the public policy 
action was that thermal technology was mainly used to fulfill the new electricity 
demand and consumption. The reason for this was that thermal technology was 
widely available and the raw material costs were reasonable. In addition, the former 
                                                 
 
34 "Maaseudun sähköistyskomitea" 
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water rights restricted the use of hydropower technology. 
 
The Power Laws and subsequent electricity price regulation in 1950 and 1968 is the 
second example of how coevolution of public policies had a notable impact on the 
evolution of the electric power industry. The first Power Law35 in 1950 impacted the 
electric power industry through price regulation, which in turn had an impact on the 
profitability of the electricity firms. The Power Law and price regulation were struck 
down in 1955, which led to significant price increases and to a general strike in 
1956. After that, a second Countryside Electrification Committee36 was appointed 
by the government on January 28th, 1965. It proposed price regulation in order to 
subsidize the building of rural electricity networks. The synergetic impact of initial 
investment burden and the price regulation caused financial and operational 
challenges to the newly established firms, which was also reflected in their service 
level towards customers. Thus the service reliability of the electricity distribution 
firms established as a consequence of the first Countryside Electrification 
Committee was recognized to have not fulfilled the customers’ needs. For this 
reason the second Electrification Committee recommended that the ownership of the 
distribution firms should be broad-based. The committee also proposed a 
government subsidy to facilitate the mergers of small rural distribution firms.  
 
Although the government did not pass a law of electricity subsides, as proposed by 
the Committee (Pylkkänen, 1982), it agreed with the propositions and made 
provision for de facto government subsidies for the coming years. Moreover, in 
1972, an Electricity Distribution Organization Committee37 was set up “because the 
importance of electricity has increased substantially in all branches and the 
consumption of electricity has largely increased also in private households. Thus it 
is considered to be justified to start to investigate, whether an improved service level 
for the private consumers could be gained through centralization of electricity 
                                                 
 
35 Valtalaki 
36 "Maaseudun sähkökomitea" 
37 “Sähkönjakelun organisaatiotoimikunta” 
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distribution activities into larger entities all over the country.” After the investigation 
the committee argued that “the impact of small electricity distribution firms that 
operate in a small-scale is harmful to the national ensemble of electricity 
distribution” and that “a larger size of electricity distribution firms should be 
targeted”.  As a consequence, and as stated in the editorial of the annual report of 
year 1972 of the Electricity Utility Association there was “ongoing voluntary branch 
rationalization in a form of mergers of small electric distribution firms either to 
larger ones or among each other”. 
 
The third notable example or coevolution of public policies and the electric power 
industry concerns the further Power Law of 1968, according to which the prices of 
electricity could be revised only by to the decision of the price authority (Nurmo, 
1973). This led to electricity price freezing between 1968 and 1972.  Without some 
exceptions the price of electricity remained the same during the period (Simonen, 
1974). An Electricity Price Commission38 proposed in November that either the 
distribution tariffs should be abolished or the profitability of the electricity 
distribution firms should be guaranteed in some other way. The result was that the 
distribution electricity prices were not fully abolished, but rather were increased by 
close to six percent from the beginning of 1973 (Kuusisto, 1973). However, during 
the same time period the price of raw material, mainly oil and coal had increased 
substantially. An Electricity and Heat Tariff Committee39 calculated that the need to 
increase electricity prices in 1974 from the 1973 level due to the real increased 
production costs was 70 percent (an average consumer price increase from 13,6 
p/kWh to 23-24p/kWh). The declaration of several stakeholders concerning the 
Committees’ proposal highlighted that the simultaneous production cost increase 
and the price regulation had caused severe financial and operational challenges for 
the electricity firms, particularly for electricity distribution firms and firms 
exploiting thermal power generation technology. As a consequence, the government 
increased the price of electricity for consumers by 51 percent (7 p/kWh) starting 
                                                 
 
38 Sähkönhintatoimikunta 
39 Sähkö- ja lämötariffitoimikunta 
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from May 1st, 1974. 
 
The increases of electricity productions cost as a result of the Oil Crisis started a 
process that impacted electricity legislation. According to Ruostetsaari (1998:28) the 
shocking Oil Crisis “can even be seen as a catalyst, which initiated, when analyzed 
retrospectively, the deregulation of electricity markets in many countries”. He 
argued that the crisis brought energy to the political agenda and motivated political 
decision makers and authorities to interfere with the electricity industry through 
legislation and regulation in order to ensure the undisturbed delivery of energy. 
Consequently, increased political interest and government actions augmented the co-
operation of the actors in the electric power industry.  Although there had been an 
intensively increasing demand for electricity in the market there had not been much 
co-operation between the government owned power generation firms and the 
electricity firms owned by the privately owned industrial firms during the second 
period. This was seen as 'rapid wars' and competition of rights to build nuclear 
power. The reason for this was that the privately owned firms wanted to keep the 
price of electricity suppressed and were afraid of the dominance of the government 
owned firms whose wish was to lead increases in prices. However, co-operation 
started after the Oil Crisis. In 1975, A Co-operation Delegation for Electricity 
Producers40  was set up. The goal of this body was to co-ordinate electricity 
production and distribution before the government would take its own action 
(Ruostetsaari; 1998, 2005).  
 
Consequently, the third electricity law in Finland was passed on March 16th, 1978 
and came into effect from the beginning of 1979. The new law had four key 
changes. First, its purpose was to intensify the planning of electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution both at the national and regional level. An electricity 
supply planning and control system was set up for both national and regional levels. 
Second, it improved the possibilities for government and the municipalities to 
                                                 
 
40 Sähköntuottajien Yhteistyövaltuuskunta, STYV 
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develop the planning organization. Third, it made electricity firms and utilities 
subject to license. Fourth, it gave the power of decision to build power plants or 
electricity networks for the government. The electricity generators opposed the new 
law, but it was viewed as the price to prevent the whole industry to be nationalized, 
as proposed by the Industrial Committee in 1974, and as in was the case in many 
other western countries (Ruostetsaari, 2005). However, as Ruostetsaari (1998) 
argued, although the new electricity law included several new regulations, it did not 
indicate a start of an era of new control and regulation, but rather it indicated a last 
feat of strength of the long-lasting institutionalized control ideology.  
 
Until 1988, when the legislation on restrictive business practices was effective, there 
was a price supervision procedure: there was an obligation to disclose price 
increases to the government. Price increases were possible, it the government 
permitted them. In the years 1988-1995 the intervention to the prices was removed 
from the government. However, the new Office of Free Competition was given 
rights to engage in electricity pricing when appropriate. The energy legislation and 
regulation was the result of the overall governmental energy policy41 in Finland. 
Ruostetsaari (1989) studied the determination of Finland’s energy policy in the light 
of distribution of influence over energy policy in the 1980s.  He found that there was 
a top elite that had stipulated the energy policy in the country during this time, and 
indeed had been ruling it for a longer period. The four top influential actors were the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, IVO, Neste (a state owned oil and gas firm, which 
was merged with IVO in the late 1990s), and the Central Association of Finnish 
Industry. According to Ruostetsaari (1989) the energy industry and the other major 
industries had a considerable influence over Finland’s energy policy – which was 
even stronger during the decades before 1980s. He found five reasons for the 
domination of the elite. The first reason was that energy research was largely 
concentrated in the energy production firms. Therefore, energy research tended to 
reinforce those with the resources to engage in research and who could take 
                                                 
 
41 Energy policy is seen here to include all the public policies from basic underlying 
principles to formal policies, such as legislation and electricity tariffs.  
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advantage of the results. Second, the mass media did not form a distinct opposition 
to the energy elite. The third reason was that the political parties’ positions on 
energy policy were shaped in technocratic and even bureaucratic processes. Fourth, 
the top elite firms had gained a clientele-type of relationship with the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry as the natural representatives of their respective industries. And 
the final reason was due to the long-term coevolution between the actors. Or as 
Ruostetsaari (1989) puts it: “Over the decades the interaction between energy 
administration and energy policy’s top elite has developed into a reciprocal 
relationship based on mutual benefit; therefore it is obviously not easy for new 
actors to join the established system. This has tended to crystallize power relations, 
which has resulted in the development of mechanisms of negative selection: these 
serve as sort of filter eliminating the entry of interest and demands which might 
upset the stability of the system” (1989:406). 
 
Ruostetsaari’s (1989) research, and the conclusions contained therein, thus supports 
the other findings of long-term coevolution between the electric power industry, the 
other major industries – and the forest industry in particular, and with the 
government. Moreover, the impact of the top elite is clearly causal and purposeful. 
Furthermore, Ruostetsaari’s (1989) findings confirm that the evolution of 
technology in the industry was in many cases also causal due to the influence of the 
institutional subsystems around specific energy sources.  
 
To summarize, there were several public policy events during the period between 
1940 and 1995 that had an impact on the evolution of the electric power industry in 
Finland.  What is notable is that these events were often related to the overall 
evolution of the national society; the countryside electrification actions were 
outcomes of the Second World War, the price regulation in the 1950s and 1970s 
were due to the overall general national economy, and the Oil Crisis in 1973 was a 
global level shock. Nevertheless, all of these impacted directly on the firms in the 
electric power industry – and with different impacts to firms with distinct business 
models. A further noteworthy matter is the reciprocal relationship between public 
policy makers and the electric power industry – not least because most of the 
members of the numerous energy-related committees during this period were the 
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managers of the electricity power firms. Furthermore, this period highlights the need 
for reconstructive public policies. For example, the countryside electrification 
actions caused numerous small electricity distribution firms to be established. As a 
result of the impending evolution of the industry these firms ran into operational and 
financial difficulties. Consequently, the government had to take reconstructive 
action in the form of recommendations and subsidies to merge the small distribution 
firms.  
6.2.3. Electricity Market Act 1995 and other key events 1995-2005 
The preparation work for deregulation and reform of the electric power industry 
started in November 1990, when an Electricity Utility Committee42 was set up. The 
committee gave its report in February 1992. It suggested that competition should be 
increased and electricity distribution should be rationalized. The suggestions took 
into account the fact that Finland was going to apply for EU membership. 
Immediately after the set up of Electricity Utility Committee another committee, the 
Electricity Law Committee43 was initiated in 1993 to prepare a new electricity law 
for the country. The committee gave its report and suggestions in March 1993. The 
latter committee proposed that electricity distribution should be legally separated 
from electricity sales and procurement functions and to also separate them from the 
other functions of an electricity firm, such as power generation. The Finnish 
Electricity Utility Association (SLY) commented on the proposal that is was 
precipitated and unfinished. The association suggested that the markets should be 
opened in phases according to the country’s overall EU development. The 
Federation of Finnish Entrepreneurs44 commented in the Kauppalehti finance 
newspaper in November 1993 that “SLY has badly lobbied against the reform. It is 
of course understandable, since it is a question of a really radical change, which 
would likely imply cutting down in the association’s field of members.”  Thus there 
was evidently a belief that market deregulation would cause firm exits from the 
                                                 
 
42 Sähkölaitostoimikunta 
43 Sähkölakikomitea 
44 Suomen yrittäjien keskusliitto 
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industry. Following the general guidelines of the Electricity Law Committee a 
proposal for a new law was put forward in February 1994.  Following an animated 
debate the parliament enacted a new law in February 1995. The Electricity Market 
Act (386/1995) entered into force on 1st of June 1995 and opened the Finnish 
electricity market to competition. In compliance with the Act, the Electricity Market 
Authority45 was established to supervise power network operations and to carry out 
other public tasks.  
 
The Electricity Market Act had four key contents. The first was that it opened up the 
electricity sales market to free competition and freed the electricity retail business 
from licensing. At the same time the exclusive right to sell electricity regionally was 
removed from electricity retailers. To safeguard the interests of small electricity 
users an obligation to deliver statement was added to the law46. At the initial stage, 
only the major electricity users whose site-specific power consumption requirement 
exceeded 500 kW were allowed to invite tenders from electricity suppliers. The 
introduction of the load profile method in balance clearing in autumn 1998 finally 
enabled the smaller consumers or households to purchase electricity freely from any 
supplier. The second key element of the act was that it specified regional distribution 
firms as local monopolies, which required a network license that was issued by the 
Energy Market Authority. According to the law, the license holder has the exclusive 
right to construct distribution networks and connect customers to the network in its 
geographical area of responsibility and its customers are not allowed to invite 
tenders for distribution services. Moreover, the network operator has an obligation 
to maintain and develop the power network, to connect to his network electricity 
consumption sites and power generating installations and to transmit electricity. The 
network operator is also responsible for the condition of the network and the quality 
                                                 
 
45 The Electricity Market Authority changed its name into the Energy Market Authority in 
August 2000. 
46 An electricity retailer having a remarkable market power within the area of responsibility of 
a distribution net operator shall deliver electricity at a reasonable price to the consumers and 
to other electricity users whose main fuse is maximum 3x63 A and annual consumption is 
maximum 100,000 kWh. 
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of the electricity supplied to consumers. The law has also thorough regulation of 
distribution pricing47.  The third aspect of the Electricity Market Act was that the 
law specified unbundling principles between the network operations or distribution 
business and electricity sales operations. According to the law, the network 
operations shall be legally unbundled from other electricity trade operations if the 
amount of electricity distributed in 0,4 kV network has been at least 200 GWh/year 
during the previous three years. Moreover, on January 1st, 2007 legal unbundling 
legislation applied to firms with over 200 GWh of electricity distributed in 0,4 kV 
level. 
 
The reasoning behind government proposal (HE 138/1994) relating to the Electricity 
Market Act included four key motivations for the new law. First, it referred to the 
European Union and the forthcoming European integration, and thus the new law 
was argued that it was to prepare Finland for integrating Nordic electricity market 
and for the forthcoming integrated European electricity market. Second, it was 
argued that it sought to remove obstacles to competition. Third, it would remove 
unnecessary regulation. And finally, it was envisioned that the increased competition 
would improve the utilization of the electricity production resources and to bring 
about cost savings for electricity consumers. Although Finland’s EU membership 
was one of the causal events leading to electricity market deregulation, as 
Ruostetsaari (1998) has remarked, the evolution of the regulation in Finland towards 
deregulation had already started in the mid 1980s, and would probably have caused 
deregulation without the EU membership. However, the EU was used as a strong 
legitimation argument to speed up the legislative process towards deregulation 
(Ruostetsaari, 1998). 
                                                 
 
47 For example, the price of network services must not depend on where within the net 
operator's area of responsibility the customer is geographically located. Neither can the 
distribution price depend on which electricity vendor the customer buys his electricity from. 
In addition, the prices of network services, such as connection to the network, and distribution 
and metering of electrical energy must be made public, and reasonableness and regional 
impartiality must be followed in their pricing. It must be possible for the customer to agree on 
all the network services he needs with the company to whose network he has been connected.  
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The government emphasized a swift implementation of the changes in the legislation 
for several reasons. The first of these reasons is that similar legislative changes were 
under preparation in EU directives. Secondly, there were upcoming changes in the 
wholesale tariffs and most of the electricity wholesale agreements were to be 
renewed at the end of 1995. Furthermore, a major transition of organization models 
and ownership structures of the electricity firms was ongoing in the industry. Thus 
the decisions of the firms were seen to depend on the new rules of the game defined 
in the new legislation (Ruostetsaari, 1998). As stated in the reasoning of the 
government, one of the expectations for electricity supply market deregulation was 
to decrease the overall price of electricity through competition. The price 
development between 1993 and 2004 is depicted in Figure 15. Indeed, the prices 
decreased during the period between 1997 and 2001. However, there was a high 
peak in the price of electricity in the Finnish electricity market at the beginning of 
2003 due to the sudden increase of wholesale price in the new Nordic wholesale 
market. The reasons behind the increase of wholesale prices were related to a 
deficiency of water in Norway and a very cold winter in Finland. These two reasons 
that the government wished to emphasize a swift implementation of legislation 
change; the decrease of prices due to increased retail competition, and an increase of 
prices due to shortage of production resources, showed that the principles of the new 
opened electricity market worked as planned. In addition, the further expectation of 
deregulation was that it would speed up customers to change their electricity 
suppliers. However, in the year 2004, only 11 percent of customers had in fact 
changed their electricity supplier. Moreover, nearly 60 percent of electricity in 
Finland was bought at a contract price.  
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Figure 15: Evolution of the overall price of electricity 1993-2004 (adjusted with 
Consumer Price Index). Source: Finnish Electricity Market Authority. 
 
In summary, the impact of formal institutions – legislation and regulation – has been 
substantial on the evolution of the electric power industry in Finland. This impact 
has been extensive: institutions have impacted the rules of the game in the market, 
exploitation of technologies, and emergence of distinct business models in the 
industry and subsequently the survival of individual firms. Moreover, there has been 
a reciprocal coevolutionary relationship between the electric power industry and 
related institutions, and surrounding society. Thus, following the logic of the 
research framework, the evolution of electricity consumption and the power 
generation technology will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter. Thereafter the 
evolution of business models of electric power firms will be elucidated. 
 
6.3. Electricity consumption and power generation 
technology evolution 
6.3.1. Electricity consumption evolution 
Electricity consumption started on a very small scale in Finland from the first 
experiments in the 1880s; the consumption in the year 1890 was one GWh. In 1917, 
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when Finland became an independent state, the total consumption was 205 GWh. 
The consumption has grown steadily so that by 2005 it was close to 85,000 GWh. 
The total electricity consumption and the five-year growth numbers are presented in 
Figure 16.  
 
 
Figure 16: Electricity consumption (GWh) growth in Finland 1930-2005. Source: 
Finnish electricity statistics 1930-2004. 
 
 
The proportional growth was greatest in the inter-war period, but both the 
production and the consumption radically decreased after the Winter War when 17 
percent of the electricity production capacity was held in the areas lost to Soviet 
Union at the end of 1939.  The net growth was the largest between 1980 and 1985 – 
a total of 11,376 GWh. This was a period in which the magnitude of the growth was 
substantial and growth alone was at the same level as the total consumption some 
twenty years earlier – in 1963, when the total consumption was 11,058 GWh. 
 
84,79776,00665,89359,47348,98937,61326,97920,23112,8887,9865,3793,1152,5971,3811,8961,073Consumption (GWh)
2005200019951990198519801975197019651960195519501945194019351930Year
466 823
1,216
518
2,263 2,607
4,902
7,343
6,748
10,634
11,376
10,484
6,420
10,113
8,791
-515
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
1925-
1930
1930-
1935
1935-
1940
1940-
1945
1945-
1950
1950-
1955
1955-
1960
1960-
1965
1965-
1970
1970-
1975
1975-
1980
1980-
1985
1985-
1990
1990-
1995
1995-
2000
2000-
2005
116       ANALYSIS OF DATA  
  
 
Table 12: Electricity consumption in Finland 1930-2004 by segment. Source: Finnish 
electricity statistics 1930-2004. 
Segment: Private Services* Public Manufacturing   
Year GWh % of Total GWh 
% of 
Total 
GW
h 
% of 
Total GWh 
% of 
Total Total 
1930 78 7,3 %    29 2,7 % 967 90,1 % 1 073 
1935 103 5,4 %    41 2,1 % 1 753 92,4 % 1 896 
1940 170 12,3 %    29 2,1 % 1 182 85,6 % 1 381 
1945 382 14,7 %    56 2,2 % 2 159 83,1 % 2 597 
1950 465 14,9 %    84 2,7 % 2 567 82,4 % 3 115 
1955 978 18,2 %    131 2,4 % 4 269 79,4 % 5 379 
1960 1 387 17,4 % 485 6,1 % 415 5,2 % 6 183 77,4 % 7 986 
1965 2 378 18,5 % 860 6,7 % 681 5,3 % 9 829 76,3 % 12 888 
1970 3 306 16,3 % 1 482 7,3 % 1022 5,1 % 14 421 71,3 % 20 231 
1975 5 958 22,1 % 2 380 8,8 % 1564 5,8 % 17 077 63,3 % 26 979 
1980 8 646 23,0 % 3 463 9,2 % 2255 6,0 % 23 249 61,8 % 37 613 
1985 17 815 36,4 % 4 982 10,2 % 3377 6,9 % 27 797 56,7 % 48 989 
1990 15 599 26,2 % 6 864 11,5 % 3962 6,7 % 33 048 55,6 % 59 473 
1995 17 046 25,9 % 7 508 11,4 % 4388 6,7 % 36 951 56,1 % 65 893 
2000 18 955 24,9 % 8 967 11,8 % 4852 6,4 % 43 632 57,4 % 76 006 
2004 21 227 25,3 % 10 238 12,2 % 5550 6,6 % 47 051 56,0 % 84 066 
* Included in private consumption 1930-1955      
 
 
As can be seen from Table 12 the consumption of electricity increased in all 
customer segments. The share of manufacturing industries – and forest industry in 
particular – has been substantial throughout the history of the electric power industry 
in Finland. The share of private customers and services has increase most from the 
1970s onwards. One of the key reasons for the growth of the private electricity 
usage was the increased consumption of electricity heating in houses (see Figure 17) 
and the overall economical growth Finland.  
 
There was a lively debate in the country regarding the benefits of private household 
heating methods at the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s. The Oil Crisis and the 
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overall increase of oil prices accelerated the use of electricity for heating in private 
households in the 1970s. This process continued during the rest of the 20th century.  
 
 
Figure 17: Number of houses heated with electricity in 1969-1974. Source: Finnish 
electricity statistics 1969-2004. 
 
The nature of electricity as a commodity is that it cannot be stored for further use. 
Thus production capacity has to satisfy immediate consumption demands. 
Moreover, an extensive electricity transmission and distribution network is a key 
prerequisite of an efficient utilization of the available capacity within an area or a 
country. Thus the constant increase in demand in Finland created a continuous need 
for both new production capacity and for extending the electricity distribution 
network. In an open market, where technology is freely available for all actors, 
legislation does not restrict pricing, and raw materials are freely available, it is safe 
to invest in new production capacity and competition will take care of the prices. On 
the other hand, the available production capacity can restrict the supply and use of 
electricity and decreased demand can lead to overcapacity and thus underutilization 
of investments and consequently to decreased financial returns of these investments. 
However, in the Finnish electric power industry both the availability of technology 
and the electricity market itself was highly affected by the surrounding institutions. 
Therefore the evolution of power generation technologies and their availability to 
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different kinds of firms, and the impact of legislation and regulation have to be 
further understood in order to be able to explain the sources of profitability and 
causes of survival of the different types of firm in the market.  
6.3.2. Evolution of power generation technology  
There are five supply factors of electricity production; labor force, primary energy 
resources, prime movers and electrical equipment, financial resources, and the 
institutional framework (Myllyntaus, 1991). The country of Finland mainly only 
possesses three indigenous primary energy sources; firewood, peat and hydropower. 
The principle energy source in Finland before electricity was firewood. It made up 
about 90 percent of the total energy supply in Finland by the First World War. 
Energy was firstly used for space heating and cooling (Myllyntaus, 1991). The total 
electricity consumption and the amounts of firewood felling are presented in Figure 
18 and Figure 19.  
 
 
Figure 18: Electricity consumption (GWh, left axis), firewood felling (m3, right axis) 
Source: Statistics Finland. 
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Figure 18 shows clearly how electricity replaced firewood as a primary energy 
source. The use of fossil fuels, mainly coal and oil, increased at the same time as the 
electricity consumption, both as a source for producing electricity and for direct use, 
for example in traffic and transportation. 
 
 
Figure 19: Electricity consumption (GWh, left axis) and consumption of fossil fuels and 
peat (PJ, right axis) during 1885-2005. Source: Statistics Finland. 
 
Most of the first power plants used thermal technology for electric power 
generation. More specifically, thermal power generation started with condensing 
technology using coal and oil as primarily energy sources. Later, back-pressure 
technology was introduced by forest and other manufacturing industries to co-
generate heat and power. Moreover, the forest industry started to use their wood 
refuse as a source of energy in these power plants. From the 1960s onwards central 
heating started to diffuse as a form of heating in houses and flats in urban areas. The 
co-generation technology of heat and electricity soon created a basis for vertical 
integration for urban distribution electricity firms, which provided both central 
heating and electricity for their urban end consumers. The synergy of combined heat 
and electricity production also kept the price of electricity down for the urban area 
consumers. 
 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
1885 1905 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Electricity consumption (GWh)
Consumption of Fossile Fuels and Peat (PJ)
120       ANALYSIS OF DATA  
  
 
However, as more rivers were harnessed for electricity production, Hydropower 
technology gradually increased its share over thermal technology at the beginning of 
the 20th century. The key milestone in the increase of the share of hydropower 
technology was the decision in 1921 to build a hydropower plant on the river Vuoksi 
in Imatra. This more than doubled the existing production capacity of hydropower in 
Finland. The government continued to build hydropower plants on the main rivers in 
the country. Consequently, more than half of the electricity in the country was 
produced with hydropower by the beginning of the 1970s. Hydropower technology 
itself was not proprietary, but its utilization was. The utilization of hydropower was 
both directly regulated and impacted through water rights and the associated rights 
to build hydropower plants to the rivers. Moreover, although the investment and 
maintenance of hydropower plants were substantial, the source of energy – the flow 
of water – was free of charge. This, together with the rising costs of the raw material 
of the thermal power plants made hydropower technology financially superior over 
thermal power. For this reason the firms possessing hydropower assets – mostly 
owned by the government –had a significant financial advantage over the traditional 
thermal power generation firms. The co-generation of heat and power with back-
pressure technology in forest and other industries was an exception to this rule 
because of the specific benefits of an integrated production of heat and electricity. 
However, in spite of the financial superiority of hydropower, the legislation and the 
consequent proprietary nature of that technology caused the thermal technology to 
be used increasingly by new electricity firms that entered the industry. 
Consequently, the total share of thermal technology in the Finnish electric power 
industry in 1960 was 36 percent, with half of this produced in manufacturing 
industry firms power plants utilizing the co-generation thermal technology.  
 
From the 1970s onwards, nuclear power technology was also utilized in Finland. 
After lively debates in the Finnish Parliament and a multi-phased, heavily politically 
slanted purchasing process, the first nuclear power plant was eventually built in 
Finland and brought into use in 1977 by the government owned company IVO. The 
second nuclear power plant was built by TVO and brought into use in 1978. Nuclear 
power rapidly became one of the major energy sources for Finland. After the nuclear 
power plant accident in Chernobyl, in Ukraine in 1986, the nuclear power plant 
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building projects were frozen in nearly all parts of the world. The Parliament of 
Finland voted against a fifth nuclear power plant in 1993, but later decided in 2002 
to give a license for a fifth nuclear power plant; the building of that plant 
commenced in 2003.  
 
There were two prerequisites that were needed in order to be able to utilize nuclear 
power technology in Finland. First, building a nuclear power plant needed 
substantial investment – even compared to other technologies such as thermal and 
hydropower which requires substantial investment the nuclear option is a 
considerably larger venture. Second, licensing of nuclear technology needed wide 
institutional support from the Government and from the Parliament of Finland. Both 
IVO and TVO possessed these capabilities and thus it was natural that they were the 
firms that were selected to build nuclear power in Finland. The share of different 
energy sources in power generation in Finland in years 1960 and 2005 is illustrated 
in Figure 20.  
 
 
Figure 20: Sources of power generation by technology or other source. Source: Finnish 
electricity statistics 1960, 2005. 
 
A noteworthy issue that needs to be considered when examining these statistics is 
that in addition to the power generated indigenously in Finland, in 2005 about 25 
percent of electricity consumed in the country was imported from Sweden, Norway 
and Russia. The different power generation technologies are summarized in Table 
1960 2005
Hydropower
Thermal power
Co-generation in
manufacturing
Co-generation in central
heating
Net import
Nuclear Power
1960 2005
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13. The four main technologies have been included in the analysis. The analysis 
shows that three kinds of firms had a technological advantage in the industry.  
 
Table 13: Comparison of the different power generation technologies in the Finnish 
electric power industry 1889-2005 
 
 
First, the government owned electricity firms had an advantage over the others for 
three main reasons: (1) they had property rights for the hydropower technology 
through the ownership of the water rights in the main rivers of Finland, (2) they 
possessed the financial strength to invest first in major hydro power plants and later 
in nuclear power plants and this was backed by the government, and (3) they had the 
institutional support for the licensing of both hydro power and nuclear power 
technologies 
 
The second type of firm that had a technological advantage in the industry was the 
industry specific firms –particularly forest industry firms. – These firms possessed 
an advantage because they had (1) financial strength supported by the owner firms, 
(2) the ability to utilize the co-generation of heat and electricity technology in their 
plants, and (3) the secondary political support of the government. The third 
Technology Thermal power 
Co-generation of heat 
and electricity Hydropower 
Nuclear 
power 
Raw material Firewood, 
peat, oil, 
coal 
Firewood, peat, oil, 
coal 
Water flow Uranium 
Level of  
proprietary 
Low Medium (only 
applicable when 
producing heat) 
Medium-
High (water 
rights) 
High 
(licensing) 
Investment 
costs 
Low-
Medium 
Low (auxiliary costs 
to heat production) 
Low-
Medium 
Very high 
Impact of 
raw material 
price 
High Medium Very low Low 
Business 
model with 
advantage  
 Industry specific 
firms, urban 
distribution firms with 
heat production 
Government 
owned firms 
Government 
owned firms 
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explanation for a technological advantage was that urban distribution firms, which 
provided central heating for the city’s end users, could benefit from utilizing the co-
generation of heat and electricity technology to produce electricity with marginal 
costs in addition to the heat production. 
6.4. Evolution of business models 
A study of the firms in the electric power industry in Finland at the end of the 
observation period, 2005, raises a typical evolutionary question: why are there so 
many and so distinct firms in the industry? In addition, when looking retrospectively 
from the year 2005 backwards to 1889, the next question that comes to mind is: 
what other kinds of firm have we had in the industry and why do they no longer 
exist? In the following chapters, the distinct business models of the industry and 
their characteristics are elaborated. In the final section the key selection criteria are 
summarized. 
6.4.1. Emergence of distinct business models 
As has been previously stated the first use of electricity in Finland was for electric 
lightning in cities and in industrial factories such as flour mills and timber mills. 
Even in the mills the first usage of electricity was solely for lightning purposes. The 
first power firms, some of which were private enterprises, and some public utilities, 
were established from the 1880s onwards for different purposes such as lightning in 
cities and factories and increasingly for manufacturing purposes and employed 
electric motors as source of power (Jaakkola, 1982; Myllyntaus, 1991).  Common 
for these first firms was that they covered the whole value chain: from electricity 
generation, distribution48 to retail or sales49. 
                                                 
 
48 At this stage there was no difference between transmission and distribution. I am therefore 
using distribution to cover both of these two components in the value chain, as distribution is 
the part of the value chain that connects the end user to the source of power. 
49 In these cases, when the owner of the electricity firm was directly using the electricity for 
its own purposes, the sales part of the value chain in practice did not exist because the internal 
sales was not counted in all cases. 
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Diversification of the electricity business had already started on a small scale at the 
beginning of the 1900s. The diversification can be seen from the perspective of 
firms that specialized in power generation for industrial usage, as well as from local 
firms that concentrated on power distribution and sales of electricity to end 
consumers.  However, despite the primary reasons for establishing an electric power 
firm, most electricity firms were, until the 1960s, local utilities, which fulfilled all 
the power needs in their region - from industrial customers to agriculture end 
consumers. They also performed all functions of the electric power value chain from 
power generation to retail. Accordingly, a firm, which had a power plant which was 
primarily to serve a nearby industrial plant also distributed and sold electricity to the 
surrounding population. This point is also observable from the official industry 
statistics.  Only from 1970 onwards did The Finnish Electricity Association and the 
Electrical Inspectorate of Finland50 start to classify electricity firms and utilities in 
their statistics to the following categories: urban distribution, rural distribution, 
power generation, forest industry utility, and other industry utility.  
 
The diversification of the value chain together with different ownership structures 
created different kind of firm segments in the Finnish electric power industry. These 
segments all have distinct business models. The data shows also that the evolution of 
these different segments varies significantly. Moreover, government legislation and 
rules, such as the impact of regulation and deregulation, has been different in the 
different firm segments. The segments of the Finnish electric power industry, their 
short history and status at the end of the research period, the year 2005, are 
described in detail in the forthcoming sections.  A summary of the segments is 
presented in Table 14. 
                                                 
 
50 According to the Electricity Law (1928), the electricity firms were obliged to provide 
statistics of their operations. The Electrical Inspectorate of Finland and its ancestors were 
given the responsibility of producing electricity statistics based on this information given by 
the firms. 
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Table 14: Electric power industry firm segments 
 
 
* until the deregulation, 1995-1998 
**after the deregulation and establishment of the electricity exchange 
*** after the deregulation, 1995-1998 
Firm Segment Major Activities Sub Segment  Customers Examples 
Distribution Building and 
maintaining of 
regional electricity 
network and 
physical distribution 
and sales* of 
electricity in the 
network area and 
connection of 
customers to the 
network. 
Urban 
distribution 
All customers connected 
to the network area in 
urban or city areas. 
Typically over 15.000 
customers 
Helsingin Energia 
Tampereen kaupungin 
sähkölaitos 
Rural 
distribution 
All customers connected 
to the network area in 
rural area. Typically 
below 15.000 
customers. 
Vattenfall Verkko Oy 
Joroisten Energialaitos 
Kymenlaakson Sähkö 
Oy 
Power 
Generation 
Power generation 
and sale of 
Electricity. 
Power 
Generation 
Distribution firms, 
industrial firms, and 
NordPool electricity 
exchange. 
Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy / Generation 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
PVO Lämpövoima Oy 
Power 
Transmission
Nationwide power 
transmission (over 
110 kV lines)  
Power 
Transmission 
All firms connected to 
the national grid such as 
power producers and 
regional distribution 
firms. 
Fingrid Oy  
Industry 
Specific 
Electricity 
Firm 
Power generation 
and/or purchasing 
of electricity.  
 
Forest 
Industry 
Typically the owner 
industry firm. Some also 
sell to other customers 
or to the electricity 
exchange. 
UPM-Kymmene Kaipola 
Stora Enso Kaukopää 
M-real Oyj Kirkniemi 
Other 
Manufacturing
Typically the owner 
industry firm. Some also 
sell to other customers 
or to the electricity 
exchange. 
Neste Oil Porvoo 
Kemira Oyj Oulu 
Valio Oy 
Other Industry Typically the owner 
industry firm. Some also 
sell to other customers 
or to the electricity 
exchange. 
Finnair Oy Hki-Vantaa-
Lento 
Ratahallintokeskus 
Sähköradat 
Electricity 
Sales*** 
Sale of electricity  Electricity 
Retail 
Private and business end 
consumers. 
Fortum Markets Oy 
Helsingin Energia Oy 
Vattenfall Sähkönmyynti 
Oy  
Electricity 
Trading 
Wholesale customers. Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy / Portfolio 
Management and 
Trading. 
Energiakolmio Oy. 
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6.4.2. Electricity distribution  
The first electric public utility started in City of Tampere on November 15th, 1888, 
when the production dynamos, thirty lamps and the required equipment were 
purchased thus providing lightened streets in the City of Tampere for the first time 
(Jaakkola, 1982)51. The electricity operations of the City of Tampere were 
transferred in 1890 to a newly established electricity firm, O.Y. Sähkö. The next 
urban electricity firm, established as a public utility, was set up in City of Oulu in 
1890. Other major cities, Helsinki, Viipuri, Vaasa, Kuopio, Turku, Joensuu and Pori 
all got their own electric firms by the end of the 1800s.  
 
At first some of these were privately own firms, but very soon all the major cities 
established their own electric utilities or firms (Jaakkola, 1982; Myllyntaus, 1991). 
The municipal electric power firms started their business as providers of electric 
lightning for the streets of the city but soon expanded their business to sell electricity 
to private consumers (Jaakkola, 1982; Kunnas, 1984). This built the basis for the 
distribution firms, which at the beginning were situated in urban areas thus forming 
the basis for urban distribution firms. The electrification of rural areas evolved at a 
slower pace than in urban areas. It started with the expansion of the networks in the 
cities to the close-by villages. Moreover, these villages, which had some production 
plant such as a mill, a dairy or a factory, that produced electricity for their own 
purposes, usually started to obtain electricity from these factories. 
 
The first urban distribution firm was Tyrvään Sähkölaitos, which was established in 
the year 1908. Although the number of firm exits were the highest among the rural 
distribution firms, some of the very first of them, such as Joroisten kunnan 
sähkölaitos, established in the 1910s, still existed in 2005, the end of the period of 
research. The key challenges in the rural areas were the long distribution distances 
and the relatively low number of consumers compared to urban areas. From the 
                                                 
 
51 An interesting note is that Finland was at the forefront of municipal electrical provision in 
Europe; only two other utilities (Harnösand, 1985 and Växjö, 1987 in Sweden) were 
established before the electric utility in Tampere. 
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beginning of their existence these challenges caused financial strains to the rural 
distribution firms. The support from the municipalities and from government to the 
urban distribution firms was relatively low before the Second World War compared 
to the time after that conflict (Pylkkänen, 1982). Even if government supported 
countryside electrification after the Second World War, the support was relatively 
modest compared the costs (Turunen, 1992). As a consequence, numerous more or 
less official local electricity co-operatives emerged in the country. The smallest of 
these distribution co-operatives were delivering electricity for just a few end 
consumers. For example, in south-western Finland there were around 1000 small co-
operatives (Haikala, 1987:35). This kind of distribution of work, in which the low 
voltage electricity distribution was taken care of by the small co-operatives and the 
distribution between the high voltage 110 kV network and the low voltage network 
was carried out by electricity distribution firm was typical in many parts of the 
country (Haikala, 1987; Turunen, 1992).  
 
Only the largest of the electricity distribution co-operatives are included in the 
Finnish electricity statistics. The pace of mergers among these small co-operatives 
was even faster than among the larger urban distribution firms and this started to 
increase at the beginning of the 1960s. For example, there were 32 mergers between 
the co-operatives connected to Jyllinkosken Sähkö, a rural electricity firm in the 
west cost of Finland, in the period 1961-1962 (Turunen, 1992). During 1963-1969 
Jyllinkosken Sähkö acquired 55 co-operatives. The key rationale for the mergers 
was the financial challenges faced by the smaller co-operatives and firms (Haikala, 
1987; Turunen, 1992).   
 
Both urban and rural distribution firms have the same responsibilities. The 
distribution network operator had an obligation to maintain and develop the 
distribution network below 110 kV, to connect electricity consumption sites and 
power generating installations to its network, and to transmit electricity between 
them. In addition, the distribution network operator was responsible for the 
condition of the network and the quality of the electricity supplied to consumers. 
Rural and urban distribution firms acted as local monopolies in their areas of 
responsibility. Until deregulation in 1995 they also held the monopoly to sell 
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electricity in their network area. After deregulation they were required to open their 
network to other electricity sales firms. When it comes to the size of the firms, the 
electricity statistics did not differentiate between the size of customer base of the 
urban and the rural distribution firms. This is because the density of the distribution 
network was a more important factor when dividing the firms between these two 
segments. However, in general, the size of a rural distribution firm was below 
15.000 customers, whereas the size of an urban distribution firm was typically over 
15.000 customers. 
 
Table 15: Largest regional distribution firms by number of customers 
connected to the network, year 2005. Source: Finnish electricity statistics 2005. 
Firm Name Number of Customers 2005 
Fortum Sähkönsiirto Oy 410 681 
Vattenfall Verkko Oy 369 664 
Helsingin Energia 327 922 
E.ON Finland Oyj 161 533 
Tampereen Sähköverkko Oy 122 070 
Savon Voima Oyj 104 666 
Kymenlaakson Sähkö Oy 97 021 
Järvi-Suomen Energia Oy 93 236 
Vantaan Energia Oy 90 961 
Pohjois-Karjalan Sähkö Oy 83 239 
 
After deregulation the electricity distribution business was still strongly regulated. 
According to the Electricity Market Act the electricity network operation required a 
network license that was issued by the Energy Market Authority. The network 
license granted to a distribution network operator specifies the license holders’ 
geographical area of responsibility and provides the distribution operator a local 
monopoly and the exclusive right to construct distribution networks. The largest 
regional distribution firms, by numbers of connected customers to the network, in 
2005 are presented in Table 15. The three large incumbents from Finland, Sweden 
and Germany are on the list of the four largest distribution firms together with the 
distribution firm of the City of Helsinki, which is by far the largest city in Finland. It 
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is notable that although there were over 100 distribution firms in Finland in 2000, 
the ten largest distribution firms covered more than half of the geographical area of 
the country and nearly half of the population. 
6.4.3. Power generation  
The first electric power firms had a variety of responsibilities covering the whole 
electricity value chain from generation to sales. Gradually, some of the firms 
specialized in power generation and sold their production of electricity either 
directly to large industrial customers or to the regional distribution firms. In 2005 
there were about 120 firms engaged in electricity generation and about 550 power 
plants in Finland. However, although there were many such firms generating 
electricity, the volumes were concentrated mainly in two groups. Fortum Group 
accounted for 40 percent and Pohjolan Voima Group for 25 percent of Finland’s 
electricity generation. In addition, electricity retailers and energy intensive industries 
such as the forest industry and metals industry were significant electricity 
generators. The largest electricity generators are presented in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Largest electricity generation firms by electricity production in TWh, year 
2005. Source: Finnish electricity statistics 2005. 
Firm Name Electricity Production, TWh 
Share of Total 
Production 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy 21,4 27 % 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy 14,1 18 % 
Helsingin Energia 6,4 8 % 
Kemijoki Oy 4,1 5 % 
PVO-Lämpövoima Oy 2,8 3 % 
Vaskiluodon Voima Oy 2,5 3 % 
Tampereen Sähkölaitos 1,9 2 % 
PVO-Vesivoima Oy 1,8 2 % 
Alholmens Kraft Oy Ab 1,7 2 % 
Oulun Energia 1,4 2 % 
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6.4.4. Power transmission  
The network of long distance transmission lines started to increase from 1920s 
onwards. Originally, they were built by the power firms without any overall national 
plan. From the 1940s onwards there were two separate long distance transmission 
systems, the private and government owned grids. The private transmission system 
jointly owned by forest industry firms and private power generation firms eventually 
evolved into a single firm, Teollisuuden Voimansiirto Oy. The government owned 
system, on the other hand, was owned by IVO and evolved into the firm, IVO 
Voimansiirto Oy. These two firms merged in 1996 to form Finnish Power Grid Plc - 
Fingrid which is responsible for high voltage power transmission on the national 
grid. In addition to the grid comprising of the 400 kV, 220 kV and 110 kV power 
lines, the company owns also cross-border lines between Finland and Sweden, 
Finland and Norway and Finland and Russia. Fingrid’s owners are Fortum and PVO, 
each of which owns about a quarter of the shares of the company, the State of 
Finland which own about one eighth of the shares, as well as some institutional 
investors. In 2005, in addition to the national grid, there were 13 regional high 
voltage (mostly 110 kV) firms operating the regional grids – the grid between the 
national grid and regional distribution networks.   
6.4.5. Industry specific power firms  
The industry specific power firms have their origins in the factories, which required 
electricity, first for lightning and then for the efficiencies of production. The printing 
industry was the pioneer in using electricity as a power source. By 1920 virtually the 
whole printing industry had undergone electrification. Other manufacturing 
industries followed stepwise after that so that by 1960, about 97 percent of 
mechanical drives used electricity in the manufacturing industry (Myllyntaus, 1994). 
The need for electricity in manufacturing processes created a special group of 
electricity firms, whose task was either to generate or to purchase and generate 
electricity for a specific factory or a collection of factories. At the beginning these 
firms also acted as power generators and regional distributors of electricity to the 
nearby villages. Gradually they specialized in serving their dedicated industry and 
sold excess capacity, when available, directly to distribution firms, other enterprises 
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or after the deregulation to the Nordic Electricity Exchange, Nord Pool.  
 
The manufacturing industries share of the total electricity consumption in Finland 
has been significant throughout the period of evaluation: it was over 80 percent until 
the year 1950 and was still at 56 percent in 2004. In Finland, the forest industry 
firms constitute a noteworthy branch among the manufacturing firms. The forest 
industry factories, especially the pulp grinding mills needed a substantial amount of 
heat and steam in their manufacturing processes. For this purpose the Finnish pulp 
and paper firms were at the forefront of developing and utilizing back-pressure 
power plants which co-generated heat (steam) and electricity (Haavisto, 1982). All 
in all the share of the electric power firms specializing in providing power for forest 
industry has been notable in the Finnish electric power industry throughout the 
period of evaluation, both in terms of electricity volumes (GWh) and number of 
firms in the industry. This is depicted in Figure 21.  
 
 
Figure 21: Number of industry specific firms in 1970-1995. Source: Finnish electricity 
statistics 1970-1995. 
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Indeed, the coevolutionary relationship between the electric power industry and the 
forest industry was similar to clusters in the telecommunications industry in Finland 
and Sweden (see Berggren and Laestadius, 200352). 
 
6.4.6. Electricity sales and trading  
Prior to deregulation the sale of electricity was conducted widely by both the power 
generators and the distribution firms. The Electricity Market Act only actually 
liberated electricity sales. In practice the distribution firms could continue to sell 
electricity if they fulfilled the unbundling criteria of the law. In the act unbundling 
means that an income statement and a balance sheet from the electricity sales or 
trade operations shall be unbundled from the grid operations and distribution system 
operations for each financial period. In practice this led to the largest retailers such 
as Fortum (formerly IVO) and Vattenfall to set up new retail sales firms, whereas 
the smaller retailers kept the sales and distribution businesses in the same physical 
firm but merely fulfilled the unbundling criteria in their financial statements. 
However, the notable difference for the regional distribution firms was that they lost 
their regional exclusive right to sell electricity.  
 
According to the Electricity Market Act electricity sales does not require a license; 
anyone can become an electricity retailer. Electricity retail was in 2005 mainly 
carried out by local supply firms. They sell electricity that they have generated or 
purchased from the wholesale market. After the Nordic power exchange Nord Pool 
was fully set up, most of the wholesale market moved there. In addition, the largest 
energy producers continued to sell electricity by direct contract to the large 
industrial customers. Moreover, a number of electricity retailers and dealers that are 
independent of the traditional electricity firms have emerged in the electricity sector 
                                                 
 
52 Berggren and Laestadius (2003) studied the clusters in telecommunications in Finland and 
Sweden in the 20th century. They showed how the clusters developed under various regulatory 
regimes in a complex industrial history and led to competitive public–private development 
pairs both in Finland and in Sweden and this led to accelerated industry growth in the 1990s. 
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since deregulation. The summary of the largest electricity sales firms in Finland by 
turnover in the year 2005 is presented in Table 17. It is notable that the four largest 
firms (when combining the first two Fortum owned firms) are the same four which 
are the largest electricity distributors. The major reason for this is the low rate of end 
consumers that have changed their electricity supplier after the market opening - 
only 11 percent during the years 1996-2004. 
 
Table 17: Largest electricity sales firms by turnover in 2005. Source: Finnish electricity 
statistics 2005. 
 
Firm Name Turnover, Million Euros, 2005 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy 828 
Fortum Markets Oy 672 
Helsingin Energia 257 
Vattenfall Sähkönmyynti Oy 147 
E.ON Finland Oyj 90 
Energiapolar Oy 81 
Savon Voima Myynti Oy 70 
Oulun Energia/Sähkön siirto ja jakelu 69 
Vantaan Energia Oy 64 
Tampereen Sähkölaitos 63 
 
 
After deregulation, in August 1995, a Finnish electricity exchange EL-EX started its 
operation. Power trading, as a Nordic operation, had been extended into Finland 
when a new actor in the Nordic electricity market, Nord Pool, the Nordic Power 
Exchange, started its operation in Finland in June 1998. Nord Pool increased the 
number of sources of electricity supply for large scale users and retailers. Only 
members of the Nord Pool could trade in electricity at the power exchange. Among 
the members of the power exchange are power generation and other electricity firms 
and industrial firms from Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark as well as some 
other countries. The power exchange formed a market price for electricity, which 
was used as a reference price while drawing up electricity sales contracts.  
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6.4.7. Vertical integration as an opposite trend to diversification 
In addition to the diversification of the value chain, a notable phenomenon in the 
industry has been vertical integration. Three distinct business models, all vertically 
integrated can be found in the industry. The first group consists of the industry 
specific electricity firms, responsible for power generation and supply to their 
industry, typically to their owner firm. Following the transaction cost economics 
logic, as a competitive wholesale market did not exist, it was more profitable and 
secure to produce the electricity in-house.  Moreover, in many cases the connection 
to the value chain of the particular industry was closer and more secure than the 
connection to the value chain of the electric power industry. An extreme example of 
this was the forest industry, where the back-pressure technology enabled the residual 
heat of the steam produced in a steam power plant for the pulp process to be utilized 
for central heating or turned to electricity. The second group, the distribution firms, 
had typically kept their power generation plants and operations, even if their major 
operations covered the distribution networks. According to the electricity laws prior 
to deregulation in 1995, the regional distribution firms also had the exclusive right to 
sell electricity to customers connected to their network. Moreover, in urban areas 
were the firm also provided central heating, back-pressure technology enabled 
combined heat and power generation thus providing additional electricity generation 
capacity at practically the expense of producing central heating.  
 
With regard to the third business model, there was a clearly identifiable trend in 
Europe in the 1990s that the originally government owned incumbents, and often 
monopolies in their respective countries such as Vattenfall in Sweden, E.ON in 
Germany, and EDF in France, utilized their position to enter other counties electric 
power markets after deregulation. This also happened in Finland. After deregulation 
the large government owned firm IVO, which prior to deregulation was responsible 
for the national transmission operations and the majority of the power generation in 
Finland, started to acquire electricity distribution firms. IVO (later Fortum) built the 
basis for its electric distribution and retail operation in Finland by acquiring 
Länsivoima Oy (formed from Lounais-Suomen Sähkö Oy) in 1996, finally merging 
it into the mother company during 2000. Another key acquisition in southern 
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Finland, Elnova Oy, was merged into Fortum during 2003. Moreover, during the late 
1990s IVO had already entered the Swedish electricity power market by acquiring 
50 percent of the second largest Swedish electric power firm, Birka Energi. Fortum 
acquired full ownership of the firm in 2001 and merged with it thus building the 
basis for Fortum’s Swedish operations.  
 
In addition, two international firms – Vattenfall and E.ON – which had similar 
vertically integrated business model to IVO (Fortum), entered the Finnish electricity 
industry in the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s. Vattenfall, a limited 
company since 1992, but owned 100 percent by the Swedish government, was a 
market leader in Sweden and started its international expansion in the 1990s, with 
acquisitions of Finnish electricity firms. Lapuan Sähkö and Hämeen Sähkö were 
acquired in 1995, Heinola Energia and Revon Sähkö in 1999, and Keski-Suomen 
Valo and Hämeenlinnan Energia in 2000. Vattenfall has also heavily extended its 
operations towards central Europe during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and 
acquired firms in Germany, mainly from the former East Germany, and in Poland. 
E.ON, one of the largest power firms in Europe, was formed in 2000 via the merger 
of VEBA and VIAG, two of Germany’s largest, and originally government-owned, 
industrial groups. E.ON started its international expansion during the 2000s. It made 
significant acquisitions in Europe and also expanded to the Nordic area: it acquired 
Sydkraft, the third largest power firm in Sweden, during 2001and entered Finland in 
2001 by acquiring the majority of Espoon Sähkö.  
 
To summarize, the analysis of the business model evolution shows that the business 
model of a firm, is a result of both (1) evolutionary and (2) causal mechanisms. The 
underlying change was evolutionary and the creation of the distinct business models 
was emergent and driven by the market and the customer needs. The ‘natural’ value 
chain diversification and the vertical integration on the other hand are good 
examples of two these kind of change processes. Furthermore, there were clearly 
identifiable causal impacts of the regulation on the evolution of business models. 
For example, the electricity and electricity trading business models were created as a 
result of deregulation- the Electricity Market Act. Thus there was a coercive causal 
mechanism behind this change.  
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6.5. Selection criteria  
6.5.1. Impact of size on firm survival  
Based on the existing scholarly literature, firm size and age are considered to be the 
key selection criteria that define firm survival.  There are two key measures of firm 
size in the electric power industry. The first is the number of customers; the second 
is the total supply of electricity, measured in MWh. The latter is comparable to the 
total turnover of the firm and is therefore used in the analysis as the primary 
measure of firm size. The two measures also reflect the area of value chain 
specialization of the firm. The number of customers is high in electricity distribution 
and retail firms, whereas the supply of electricity is typically high in the power 
generation firms. A summary of the analysis of the top ten firms at turn of the 
periods, in the years 1940, 1970 and 199553, is presented in Table 18. The analysis 
shows an interesting phenomenon during the life course of the industry: most of the 
ten largest firms remained among the top ten either directly or as firms merged with 
other firms. This reflects the asset cumulation and asset mass efficiencies of the 
industry. In the industry, seven firms out of the top ten in 1940 were still, either 
directly or as merged with other firms, among the top ten in 1995.  
 
Moreover, all of the top ten firms in 1970 were also still among the top ten, either 
directly or as merged with other firms, in 1995. A notable observation from a 
comparison of the ten largest electric power firms and the largest industrial firms in 
Finland in Hjerppe’s (1979) basic statistics is that five out of the largest electric 
power firms in 1940, in terms of gross value of production, were already among the 
ten largest firms in Finland in 1938. Again, five out of ten largest electric power 
firms in 1970 were among the eleven largest firms in Finland in 1975. Four out of 
these five were forest industry firms.  
 
Table 18: Largest firms by total supply in 1940, 1970 and 1995. Source: Finnish 
                                                 
 
53 These years were selected for the analysis as exact statistics were available from the years. 
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electricity statistics 1940-1995. 
Rank 
1940 Rank 1995  Firm or utility 
Total 
supply 
1940, 
MWh 
Major 
ownership Ownership changes 
1 1 Imatran Voima Oy (IVO) 588,755 Government   
2 >50 Länsi-Suomen Voima Oy 148,612 Several  
3 2* Etelä-Suomen Voima Oy 134,900 Forest industry Merged to PVO 
4 3* Kymin Oy 112,955 Forest industry Merged to UPM-Kymmene 
5 4* Tornator Oy 111,855 Forest industry Merged to Enso-Gutzeit (StoraEnso) 
6 N/A Tampella Oy 106,469 Other industry  
7 10 Helsingin kaupungin sähkölaitos 103,351 Municipal Former Helsingin Energia 
8 2* Nokia Oy 80,166 Other industry Merged to PVO 
9 N/A Rosenlew & Co. Oy 64,973 Other industry  
10 1* Abborfors Oy 47,179 Forest industry Merged to IVO and 2000 to Helsingin Energia 
Ran
k 
1970 
Rank 1995  Firm or utility 
Total 
supply 
1970, 
MWh 
Major 
ownership Ownership changes 
1 1 Imatran Voima Oy 10,503,060 Government  
2 1* Kemijoki Oy 2,200,689 Government Merged to IVO 
3 10 Helsingin kaupungin sähkölaitos 1,961,469 Municipal Former Helsingin Energia 
4 1* Oulujoki Oy 1,952,444 Government Merged to IVO 
5 2 Pohjolan Voima Oy 1,657,032 Forest industry  
6 4 Enso-Gutzeit Oy 1,635,480 Forest industry  
7 5 Outokumpu Oy 1,489,317 Other industry  
8 2* Etelä-Suomen Voima Oy 1,238,936 Forest industry Merged to PVO 
9 3* Yhtyneet paperitehtaat Oy 1,079,732 Forest industry Merged to UPM-Kymmene 
10 3* Kymin Oy 1,007,601 Forest industry Merged to UPM-Kymmene 
Ran
k 
1995 
Rank 1995  Firm or utility 
Total 
supply 
1995, 
MWh 
Major 
ownership Ownership changes 
1 1 Imatran Voima Oy 31,341,690 Government  
2 2 Pohjolan Voima Oy 11,678,733 Forest industry  
3 3 UPM-Kymmene Oy 11,585,892 Forest industry  
4 4 Enso-Gutzeit Oy 8,088,730 Forest industry  
5 5 Outokumpu Oy 4,857,995 Other industry  
6 6 Kemijoki Oy 3,675,938 Government Sold 1997 to IVO, UPM, StoraEnso and municipalities 
7 7 Teollisuuden Voima Oy 3,674,966 Several  
8 8 Teollisuuden Voimansiirto Oy 3,308,200 Forest industry  
9 9 Länsivoima Oy 2,933,349 Municipal Merged to Fortum(IVO) 2000 
10 10 Helsingin Energia 1,588,918 Municipal   
* after merger to another firm 
 
 
138       ANALYSIS OF DATA  
  
 
The analysis reveals three phenomena of the trajectories of the largest firms. First, 
the dominant owners in period after period were the government and forest industry. 
The only municipally owned firm in the top ten list during each period was that of 
Helsingin Energia - the Electric Utility of City of Helsinki, the capital of Finland-
which by far had the largest customer base in the country in terms of number of end 
consumers. The second phenomenon, the mergers in the forest industry with a 
consolidation towards two dominant firms, UPM-Kymmene and StoraEnso, is also 
reflected in the list of the largest firms in the electric power industry, because the 
electricity firms owned by these firms were part of the overall mergers. Thus 
consolidation in the forest industry caused consolidation in the electric power 
industry54. The third phenomenon is that there was a trend of mergers among the 
largest firms towards the two dominant firms in the industry: the government owned 
IVO and the forest industry owned PVO. The analysis shows that those firms that 
survived the first period continued to be among the largest in one form or another 
when the last phase, that of deregulation, started. The largest firms remained large 
for period after period and survived the shakeout – or were to some extent causing 
the shakeout. 
 
Furthermore, deregulation had no impact in the ownership of the largest producers 
or firms with the largest supply, although the consolidation trend continued. For 
example, during the 1990s, Länsirannikon Voima Oy and Etelä-Suomen Voima Oy 
were merged with PVO, which also acquired Oy Nokia Ab’s energy business. 
Furthermore, Fortum acquired Stora Enso’s power generation during 2000. The 
production market share of the three largest producers has been at over 50 percent 
both pre- and post-deregulation, between 1984 and 2004. This is depicted in Figure 
22.  
                                                 
 
54 Similarly, even if not reflected among the largest firms in the industry, the mergers of the 
municipalities caused mergers within the electric power industry as the firms in the industry 
owned by the municipalities were merged as part of the overall municipality mergers. 
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Figure 22: The Share of the Largest Producers: Source: Finnish electricity statistics 
1984-2004. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the analysis of the largest firms in terms of number of 
customers shows that this list was dominated by municipally owned firms. This was 
a result of the early trends – and the subsequent path dependence – that the 
municipalities took care of power distribution for the end users within the 
boundaries of their municipality. Consequently, they established electric power 
firms specializing in power distribution, but which were often also vertically 
integrated or owned the close-by power generation plant that was connected to the 
distribution network. The electricity legislation or regulation supported this trend. 
For example, the government owned IVO was not permitted to provide electricity 
distribution services prior to deregulation. However, after deregulation, both the 
government majority owned Fortum (former IVO) and the international entrants, 
Vattenfall and E.ON entered the electricity market which concentrated on electricity 
sales and distribution to end customers. The change of the ownership after 
deregulation among the largest firms, listed by number of customers is presented in 
Table 19.  
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Table 19: The change of ownership of the five largest firms in 1995 by their 
number of customers: Source: Finnish electricity statistics 1995. 
Rank 
1995 Firm or utility 
Number 
of 
customers 
1995 
Major 
ownership prior 
to 1995 
Ownership changes 
after deregulation 
1 Helsingin Energia 299,687 Municipal No change 
2 Hämeen Sähkö Oy 141,005 Municipal Acquired by Vattenfall in 1995 
3 Lounais-Suomen Sähkö Oy 135,243 Municipal 
Acquired by IVO in 
1996  
4 Tampereen kaupungin sähkölaitos 112,650  Municipal No change 
5 Espoon Sähkö Oy 106,417 Municipal Acquired by E.ON in 2001 
 
6.5.2. Summary of selection criteria 
A summary of the key selection criteria during the life course of the electric power 
industry in Finland is presented in Table 20.  The results of the analysis support the 
view that size and technology were among the selection criteria that age by itself 
was not. However, in some cases age impacted positively on firm size -if the 
legislation of ownership did not restrict it. Generally, it was the right combination of 
size, technology and business model that most impacted individual firm survival. On 
the other hand, the business model had the greatest impact on firm survival, with 
significant differences between different business models. 
 
Table 20: Impact of  key selection criteria on distinct business model survival 
Business Model 
Impact of Selection Criteria on Firm Survival 
 ( No impact = 0, Positive = +,  Negative = – ) 
Age Size Technology Vertical Integration 
Distribution 0 + +/– + 
Power generation 0 + +/– 0 
Industry specific 
firm   0 0 0 0 
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For distribution firms, size, the right technology and vertical integration of 
distribution and generation impacted positively on firm survival. Equally, size and 
the right technology impacted positively on firm survival for power generation 
firms. However, none of the criteria had an impact on industry specific firm 
survival. The linkage of the owner/customer was so strong that it overruled the other 
criteria. Furthermore, it is notable that certain types of ownership structures 
dominated within the distinct business models: municipalities in distribution firms, 
government in power generation and industrial owners in the industry specific firms. 
Thus the ownership structures also impacted the survival of the firms. 
6.6. The two shakeout episodes 
Hitherto the analysis of data in the historical narrative analysis supported by 
evidence from the descriptive numerical analysis has highlighted the key events 
during the life course of the industry and pointed out the key selection criteria. Next, 
a descriptive numeric analysis of firm entries and exits is carried out in order to 
confirm the existence of the shakeouts periods. Thereafter the entries and exits by 
business model during the shakeouts are analyzed to identify the impact of the 
shakeout on distinct business models.  Subsequently, a causal analysis is performed 
and causal diagrams are presented to explain the causal connections between the 
events and identify the key mechanisms by combining the historical narratives and 
descriptive numeric evidence. 
6.6.1. Two shakeout episodes after year 1970 
The analysis of the total number of firms, as depicted in Figure 23, shows that the 
number of firms increased from the beginning of the observation period, 1889, until 
1970 except for two environmental shocks, the Great Depression and the Second 
World War. In 1970 the number of firms reached its peak; a total of 570 firms. 
Thereafter the number of firms started to decline. The analysis of firm exits from the 
industry during this consolidation episode between 1970 and 2005 shows that there 
were two shakeout episodes, when firm exit rates were significantly higher that 
during other periods.  
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Figure 23: Total number of firm number change by year. Source: Finnish electricity 
statistics 1930-2005. 
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Figure 24: Total number of firm exits 1960-2005: Source: Finnish electricity statistics 
1960-2005. 
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As, at the same time, there were a significant number of firm entries to the industry 
after the deregulation, altogether 67 entries between 1995 and 2005, the second 
shakeout episode is not reflected in the total number of firms that are depicted in 
Figure 23. However, a five-year period exit analysis, as depicted in Figure 24, shows 
that the first shakeout period was between 1970 and 1975 and the second between 
1995 and 2000. 
 
A deeper analysis of the firms that exited the industry highlights a key observation 
of the analysis: firm exits were not evenly distributed between the different business 
models during these shakeout episodes. Three types of electric power firms were 
particularly hit during the first shakeout episode. These are shown in Table 21.  
 
Table 21: Exits and entries of different types of firms between 1970 and 1975. Source: 
Finnish electricity statistics 1070-1975. 
 
Business Model 
Number 
of Firms 
1970 
Number 
of Firms 
1975 
Difference 
(n) 
Difference 
(%) Exits Entries 
Urban 
distribution 63 60 -3 -5 % -3 0 
Rural distribution 180 123 -57 -32 % -66 9 
Power generation 37 32 -5 -14 % -7 2 
Forest industry 
power generation 82 82 0 0 % -16 16 
Other 
manufacturing 
power generation 
140 101 -39 -28 % -59 20 
Other industry or 
public sector 
power 
68 19 -49 -72 % -55 6 
Total 570 417 -153 -27 % -206 53 
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First, there were total 66 exits from the segment of rural distribution firms causing 
one third of firms with that business model to disappear from the industry. Second, 
the segment consisting of other manufacturing power firms decreased by 59 firms. 
And finally, other industry or public sector firms decreased radically; there were 55 
exits and the total number of firms decreased by 72 percent. Of all of the exits the 
highest proportion was of rural distribution firms which had already started in 1965 
and continued until 1980. Between 1965 and 1970 there were total 31 rural 
distribution firm exits, which represents 57 percent of all the industry exits. Equally, 
there were 17 rural distribution firm exits between 1975 and 1980 representing 45 
percent of all industry exits. For the other shakeout group, there were very few exits 
during the two five-year periods before and after the shakeout; only 17 altogether, 
which represented 18 percent of all exits during these two periods. 
 
Equally interesting in terms of firm survival are those types of firms that were not 
impacted during this period. Compared to the rural distribution firms, which had a 
significant number of firm decrease, there were only three urban distribution firms 
that made an exit representing a five percent decrease in that group. In addition, the 
total number of forest industry electricity firms remained the same, even if there 
were structural changes within that group with 16 firm exits and the same number of 
firm entries55.  
 
During the second shakeout episode, which occurred after industry deregulation in 
1995, the highest number and proportions of exits were within forest industry power 
firms and other manufacturing firm electricity firms. Half of the other manufacturing 
electricity firms – a total of 52 exits - were driven away from the industry. Also at 
this stage the total number of forest industry electricity firms decreased by 27 
percent.  Industry restructuring between electricity distribution, sales, and 
                                                 
 
55 It is notable at this stage, that in the electricity statistics the firms have been coded with a 
special code. Therefore, firm name or ownership changes do not account as new firms of firm 
exits. Only totally new firm codes have been counted as firm entries. Likewise, only code 
exits have been counted as firm exits. 
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generation, can be seen in the number of firm entries. A summary of the firm entries 
and exits is depicted in detail in Table 22. 
 
Table 22: Exits and entries of different types of firms between 1995 and 2000. Source: 
Finnish electricity statistics 1995-2005 and Adato Energia Oy. 
 
Business 
Model 
Number 
of Firms 
1995 
Number 
of Firms 
2000 
Difference 
(n) 
Difference 
(%) Exits Entries 
Urban 
distribution 46 42 -4 -9 % -4 0 
Rural 
distribution 69 64 -5 -7 % -7 2 
Power 
generation 43 56 13 30 % -7 20 
Forest industry 
power  73 53 -20 -27 % -26 6 
Other 
manufacturing 
power  
87 37 -50 -57 % -52 2 
Other industry 
or public sector 
power 
10 6 -4 -40 % -5 1 
Electricity sales N/A 14 N/A N/A N/A 14 
Regional 
network N/A 10 N/A N/A N/A 10 
Total 328 282 -70 -21 % -101 55 
 
 
In summary, the analysis of data on firm number evolution – entries and exits – has 
shown that there were two shakeout episodes in contrast to one shakeout during the 
industry life cycle, and the shakeouts affected the distinct types of electric power 
firms or business models in a different way. Thus, the business model of a firm 
acted as key selection criteria during the shakeouts. 
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6.6.2. Causal analysis of the first shakeout episode 1970-1975 
The next research challenge was to discover why the industry faced these two 
shakeouts and what the environmental and intra-industry mechanisms behind the 
exits were. I therefore analyzed the key events, which led to firm mergers and 
acquisitions and consequently to firm number decreases in the industry in the 1970s, 
and their causal connections. In doing so I made use of causal diagrams.  
 
There are three identifiable causal flows of events that led to the final shakeout. The 
first flow explains technological path dependence under institutional coercion and 
environmental shocks and elucidates a coevolutionary process; a macro-micro-
macro feedback loop between the levels of analysis. The second clarifies the path 
dependence and institutional driving mechanisms. The third flow explains the 
ownership changes leading to firm exits.   
 
The full causal diagram with the major events during the history of the electric 
power industry in Finland leading to the first shakeout episode is depicted in Figure 
25. The events are presented at the three levels of analysis; the institutional level 
(including the events in the overall society as well as the legislative actions), the 
industry level and the level of the firms. The final events leading to the shakeout in 
the three causal flows is depicted in Figure 26. In the causal diagrams the boxes 
represent the empirically identifiable events during the history. The arrows represent 
the links between the events or the mechanisms. Thus the causal diagrams form the 
behavioral description of the mechanical model (Glennan, 2005); they are used to 
outline the overall phenomenon and to depict what the mechanisms are doing in the 
phenomenon.  The mechanical description of "how the mechanisms do it" (Glennan, 
2005) are developed through the detailed event analysis and summarized in Table 23 
and Table 25. One of the key goals of the mechanical description is to explain and 
describe the key characteristics of the mechanisms. 
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Figure 25: Event analysis leading to the first shakeout episode 1970-1975 
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Figure 26: Final events and causal connections leading to the first shakeout 
 
 
Causal flow 1.1. Technological path dependence under institutional 
coercion and environmental shocks 
The first causal flow and set of events started at the beginning of the period of 
analysis. The legislation (Electricity Laws 190156 and 192857) and the Water Act 
190258 laid the basis for firm diversification. According to the electricity laws 
construction of a plant for the purpose of electricity production required a license. In 
case the plant was built on a river in order to utilize hydropower technology, another 
license was needed. The licensing directed the diversification of the firms; some 
concentrated on power production, others on electricity distribution. In addition, the 
Water Act 1902 made the exploitation of hydropower proprietary and in practice 
                                                 
 
56 'Laki sähkölaitoksista valon synnyttämistä tahi voiman siirtoa varten, 1901'. 
57 'Laki sähkölaitoksista, 167/1928' 
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Mergers and 
acquisitions
Countryside 
Electrification 
Committee II
Power Law: 
price freezing
Firm 
profitability
decrease 
Thermal 
technology
Reliability 
problems
Oil Crisis Ownership 
changes
+
Firm number 
decrease
ANALYSIS OF DATA       149 
 
 
 
 
concentrated its ownership to the government who were the major riverside 
landowner in the country.  
 
The number of firms in the electric power industry started to increase at the 
beginning of the 20th century with clear variation on distinct business models. Due to 
legislative events and their effects the variation among the population was, to a large 
extent, not only emergent and evolutionary, but also causal, directed and coerced by 
government through legislation.  
 
It is notable, that one of the goals of the water acts was to limit the impacts of 
hydropower plants to other landowners and businesses, such as fishermen and 
farmers. However, this goal was considered not to be fulfilled effectively enough 
from the local business point of view and consequently opposition from local 
farmers and fisherman concerning the building of hydropower plants arose 
(Myllyntaus, 1991). Accordingly, the opposition acted as a mediating event to 
further accelerate the selection of technology in the industry (Tuuri, 1976). 
 
A detailed analysis of the effects of the different water acts and the characteristics of 
the generative mechanisms is presented in Table 23. As mechanisms cannot be 
directly identified from the empirical data, one has to identify the events and the 
characteristics of the relationship of the events. In the case of the causal flow 
initiated by the legislative events at the beginning of the 20th century mechanisms 
initiated with a clear agency, the government can be identified. These mechanisms 
directed and coerced variation in the industry. Thus, they can be characterized as 
causal and agency identifiable variation accelerating mechanisms. 
 
The causal chain initiated by the legislative events at the beginning of the 20th 
century, together with the overall technological development of thermal power 
technology and the pressure of increasing demand of electricity, led to a significant 
– and emergent – increase in thermal technology to a total 36 percent of the 
country’s total production capacity in 1960. 
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Table 23: Analysis of the initial causes and effects within causal flow 1.1.  
Causal 
events  
Water Act 190259 and its extensions in 1934, 1940, 1941 and 1957. 
Law of transmitting electricity over Finnish Borders 191960  
Water Act 196161 
Initial goal 
of the causal 
events  
Æ Ensure the rights to use water areas for public purposes and protection 
of water areas59,61. 
Æ Determine principles of construction in water areas1,3. 
Æ Define rights of hydroelectric power utilization for land owners1. 
Æ Make hydroelectric power utilization dependent on a license1,3. 
Æ Limit the impacts of hydropower plants to other landowners and 
businesses, such as fishermen and farmers1. 
Æ Restrict transmission of electricity over the Finnish borders2. 
Interest 
groups 
involved in 
preparation 
Government as the major land owner. 
Land owners.  
Electricity firms. 
Effects of 
the events 
and type of 
mechanism 
Æ Foreign ownership of Finnish rapids was transferred to the government 
(Karjalainen, 1989; Vehmas, 2002). [C,A,I] 
Æ Most of hydroelectric power generation was owned by the government. 
[D, A]  
Æ The Water Act (1901) was considered not to protect properly the local 
farmers' and fishermens’ rights (Myllyntaus, 1991). Consequently 
opposition from local farmers and fisherman to build hydropower plants 
arose; "in construction of hydropower, it is more difficult to sole the issues 
of riparian rights and gain permits from the authorities than to master 
technology (Tuuri, 1976:100, 105-124)". [EV,EM, U] 
Æ Several distribution firms did not have the opportunity to utilize 
hydropower technology, and it was opposed by the local people, who in 
many cases represented the owners of the firms. On the other hand thermal 
technology was freely available. [EV, EM] 
Characte- 
ristics of the  
generative 
mechanisms 
[C] – coercive causal mechanism 
[D] – driving causal mechanism 
[EV] – evolutionary mechanism 
[EM] – emergent mechanism  
[A] – identified agency: in these cases government 
[I] – intentional: the initial goal of the agent became materialized 
[U] – unintentional secondary impact (due to combined impact of other 
parallel processes and mechanisms)     
 
 
                                                 
 
59 'Vesilaki, 31/1902' 
60 'Laki sähkövoiman siirtämisestä maan rajojen ulkopuolelle, 19/1919' 
61 'Vesilaki, 264/1961' 
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Thus, the environmental conditions created by the earlier mechanisms and the long 
lifetime investment nature of the industry caused a technological lock-in to thermal 
technology. Consequently, an evolutionary mechanism that caused path dependence 
for the selected technology in the industry can be identified. Moreover, this 
mechanism can be characterized as emergent, as there is no identifiable agency 
initiating the mechanism.  
 
After the growth period during the first decades of the 20th century, the Second 
World War was an environmental shock not only to the electric power industry in 
Finland, but to society as a whole. The areas in the southeastern part of the country 
that were ceded to the Soviet Union in the truce agreement contained electric power 
firms and power plants operating in that area. Consequently, the number of firms in 
the industry decreased as a result of the truce agreement and the subsequent cession 
of territory. Thus, in this case the connection between the environmental shock and 
the structure of the industry and firm survival was directly causal. However, Finland 
was able to recover from the war with subsequent significant economic growth. This 
economic growth, and the substantial increase in industrial production (Hjerppe, 
1989; Myllyntaus, 1991), led to an increase in consumption of electricity. This 
progress also led to growth of the electric power industry, and is clearly evolutionary 
by nature.  
 
In January 1947, after the Second World War, the government appointed a first 
Countryside Electrification Committee to carry out the electrification of the rural 
areas of the country. The government implemented the proposals of the Committee, 
which caused wide-ranging electrification in the country and as a result 260,000 new 
retail electricity customers entered the market between 1947 and 1960. The overall 
goal of countryside electrification was to stimulate the country's economy after the 
war; as the Committee stated in its report62: "…the main goal of countryside 
electrification is to increase the share of rural areas on the economy of the country, 
                                                 
 
62 'Maaseudun sähköistyskomitean mietintö 1950:9'. 
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which will have an important impact in leveling off the economical fluctuations. It is 
therefore natural that the interest and support of the society is targeted towards 
countryside electrification". The committee included wide expert help in the 
preparation of the report; in addition, the association of countryside electricity 
firms63  was heavily involved in the preparation.   
 
In order to make electricity an attractive energy source the government implemented 
electricity price regulation based on the Countryside Electrification Committee 
recommendations. Government subsidies to build electricity networks and power 
plants were also introduced. As a result, significant number of new electricity 
distribution firms entered the industry, particularly in the rural areas. In this case it 
was also the government that intentionally initiated the mechanisms. These 
mechanisms were, by nature, not directly coercive, but rather driving, as the 
subsidies were targeted toward rural distribution firms. Accordingly, they can be 
characterized as causal and agency identifiable growth driving and accelerating 
mechanisms. 
 
Most of the new firms established as a result of countryside electrification either 
purchased their electricity from the larger power generation firms or established 
their own power plants. Due to chain of events described earlier, most of the new 
power plants utilized thermal technology. 
 
Oil prices started to increase in the late 1960s not only in Finland, but all over the 
world and this culminated in the large hike in prices that caused the Oil Crisis of 
1973. The oil price increases during the 1960s together with the Power Law in 1968, 
which caused the electricity prices in Finland to be frozen for a period between 1968 
and 1972, and the profitability of the electricity firms using thermal technology and 
oil as raw material to decrease. This particularly hit the electricity distribution firms: 
between 1968 and 1971 the average financial result of the rural distribution firms 
                                                 
 
63 'Maaseudun Sähköyhtymien Liitto r.y.' 
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was negative (Simonen, 1973). The unit prices decreased when the size of the firm 
increased, which caused a positive impact for the result: the negative result (-0,2 
p/kWh)64 of the larger rural distribution firms (over 10,000 customers) was half of 
the negative result (-0,4p/kWh) of the smallest ones (below 5000 customers). On the 
other hand, the result for the population center distribution firms, which had a larger 
customer base and a more dense network area to serve, was positive (1,3-1,4p/kWh).  
Thus, the financial difficulties of the small rural distribution firms were caused by 
the combination of several mechanisms, depicted in the causal diagram in Figure 27.  
 
Evolutionary path dependence, which had caused a technological lock-in to thermal 
technology, the environmental shock in the form of increasing raw material prices 
and the worldwide Oil Crisis in 1973, and the governmental agency identifiable 
coercive mechanism, which resulted from the price regulation together caused firm 
profitability problems. 
 
These problems further acted as one of the key events leading to the final firm 
number decrease. The following three quotations from the discourse among the key 
stakeholders of the electric power industry during the beginning of the 1970s 
illustrate the first part of the process. First, Rainio (1970) stated in the 'Sähkö – 
Electricity' journal that ”the long-lasting price regulation will regularly skew the 
relative prices of distinct energy sources and thus cause demand distortion…thus the 
price regulation has caused serious anxiety among the electricity firms”. Second, in 
1971, it was argued in the editorial of the annual report of 1970 of the Electricity 
Utility Association that “the price regulation increasingly hinders the ability to 
manage the finance of an electricity firm…those electricity firms, which are utilizing 
thermal technology, have faced particular difficulties, since their [production] costs 
have increased”. 
 
Third, on March 3rd, 1974the Union of Finnish Towns sent a memorandum signed 
                                                 
 
64 The nominal price for electricity during 1965 was around 15 p/kWh 
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by Veikko O. Järvinen and L.O. Johansson to the minister in charge of the electricity 
price regulation, Jan-Magnus Jansson, in which they urged the price regulation to be 
relieved as soon as possible, since “the changed energy situation… and especially 
the tripled energy [raw material] prices have caused the losses of the [municipality 
owned] electric power firms to increase, which in turn has caused severe challenges 
for the public economy of the municipalities.”   
 
 
Figure 27: Combined causal impact of institutional environment and technological path 
dependence on firm survival 
 
However, while the rural distribution firms experienced a heavy shakeout, the larger 
urban distribution firms survived due to their larger size, which gave them an 
economies of scale benefit compared to the smaller distribution firms. The analysis 
of the Electricity Distribution Organization Committee data shows that the economic 
performance of the larger electricity distribution firms was better that the smaller 
ones. Furthermore, as shown in Table 24, the vertically integrated business model 
that included power generation and which many of the urban electricity firms 
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possessed, also acted as a survival factor against the external selection pressure.  
 
Table 24: The share of firm without own production of all firm exits, 1970-1975 and 
1975-1980. Source: Finnish electricity statistics 1970-1980. 
 
Years 
Number of firms at the 
beginning of the period
Number of exits 
during the period 
Exit share of firms without 
own production 
Total 
Firms without 
own 
production 
Total 
exits 
Exits 
without own 
production 
Within the group 
without own 
production 
From 
all exits 
1970-1975 570 316 206 153 48 % 74 % 
1975-1980 418 193 38 19 10 % 50 % 
 
 
Moreover, as Korhonen (2001) has also pointed out, utilization of the co-generation 
technology of heat and electricity gave an advantage to the largest urban distribution 
firms with own heat production and hence to their central heating customer. The 
analysis shows that vertical integration; a firm having both electricity distribution 
and supply operations, and power generation operations, had an overall positive 
effect on firm survival. From the firms that made an exit from the industry between 
1970 and 1975, 74 percent had no own production or were not vertically integrated. 
This represents close to half of all nonintegrated firms in the industry. As a 
comparison, the share of vertically nonintegrated firms from all exits after the first 
shakeout, between 1975 and 1980 was still high at 50 percent. However, it was only 
ten percent for the group of firms without their own production. 
 
Causal flow 1.2. Path dependence and institutional driving mechanisms 
and a feedback loop between the levels of analysis 
The second causal flow explains the impact of an institutional driving mechanism 
that accelerated the natural evolution of the industry after the Second World War. 
After the war the rebuilding of the country and overall industrialization led to 
increasing demand for electricity, which in turn led to an increase in the number of 
firms in the electric power industry, boosted by the government supported 
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countryside electrification actions. Driven by the natural evolutionary process and 
related mechanisms the maturation of the industry would, at some stage, have led to 
a decrease in numbers of firms. This evolutionary process was, however, mutated by 
causal mechanisms that were initiated by several institutional actors between 1947 
and 1979.  The analysis of the causes and effects are presented in detail in Table 25. 
 
As described in the causal flow under subheading 1.1., above, government actions 
based on the first Countryside Electrification Committee initiated driving and 
accelerating mechanisms that precipitated the growth of the electric power industry. 
These mechanisms caused several intended effects to occur and the electrification 
was successful, as explained in Table 25.  
 
On the other hand, the combined effect of natural evolution, the events and the 
subsequent causal mechanisms described in the causal flow 1.1., and the institutional 
driving mechanisms initiated by the Countryside Electrification Committee, also 
caused the occurrence of unintended effects. The quality of electricity distribution 
was uneven in the country; small electricity firms had problems with distribution 
quality, such as the number and length of power outages. The electricity industry 
association was worried about problems of the reliability of the small rural 
distribution firms and their ability to maintain the electricity network at the required 
service level and capacity.  
 
Consequently, the second Countryside Electrification Committee65, which endorsed 
the view of the industry association, recommended that ownership of the distribution 
firms should be broad-based and that the government should facilitate small rural 
distribution firm mergers. Based on the committee recommendations, the 
government implemented subsidies that accelerated mergers between the 
distribution firms.  The result can clearly be seen in the descriptive statistics. 
 
                                                 
 
65 'Maaseudun sähköistyskomitean mietintö, 1966:A3' 
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Table 25: Analysis of the initial causes and effects within causal flow 1.2. 
Causal event 
#1  
Countryside electrification committee I66 
Initial goal 
of event #1 
Æ Overall goal: increase the share of rural areas on the economy of the 
country to level off economical fluctuations 
Æ Establish a plan to electrify to electrify those rural areas that could be 
electrified with reasonable expenses 
Æ Propose forms of government subsidies for the electrifying process (such 
as direct financing, interest subsidies, and end-used entry fee leveling) 
Æ Propose tariffs or price regulation to enable viable business for the 
electricity firms as well as make electricity an attractive and competitive 
energy source for the end-users 
Interest 
groups 
involved in 
preparation 
The government of Finland 
Rural distribution electricity firm association67 
Wide group of experts (such as congressmen, industry experts and rural 
area representatives) 
Primary 
effects of 
event #1 and 
type of 
mechanism 
Æ Proportion of electrified residences increased from 50% to 80% between 
1947 and 1960, to 83% in 196468 and to 91% in 197069 [D,AI] 
Æ Electricity consumption in rural areas increased 58% between 1959 and 
1964 (from 303 million kWh to 480 million kWh)3 [D,A] 
Æ The standard of living increased in rural areas, which could be seen in 
the transfer from natural to monetary economy [D,AI] 
Æ Increase of small and medium size industries in rural areas3 [D,A] 
Secondary 
effect of 
event #1 and 
causal event 
#2 
Æ The quality of electricity distribution was uneven in the country; small 
electricity firms had problems with distribution quality, such as number and 
length of power outages. Larger organizations were proved to be able to be 
more effective in network building and maintenance as well as gain lower 
(volume based) prices from power producers370 [EV,EM,U] 
Effect of 
causal event 
#2 
Æ The countryside electrification committee II3 proposed government 
subsidies for small rural electricity firms to merge with each other or to 
larger firms3. These subsidies were also implemented leading to various 
mergers4. 
Characte- 
ristics of the  
generative 
mechanisms 
[D] – driving causal mechanism 
[EV] – evolutionary mechanism 
[EM] – emergent mechanism  
[A] – identified agency: in these cases government 
[I] – intentional: the initial goal of the agent became materialized 
[U] – unintentional secondary impact (due to combined impact of other 
parallel processes and mechanisms)     
                                                 
 
66 'Maaseudun sähköistyskomitean mietintö, 1950:9' 
67 'Maaseudun Sähköyhtymien Liitto r.y.' 
68 'Maaseudun sähköistyskomitean mietintö, 1966:A3' 
69 'Maaseudun sähköistämisen loppuunsaattamistoimikunnan mietintö 1985:33' 
70 'Sähkönjakelun organisaatiotoimikunnan mietintö 1974:46' 
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Moreover, an Electricity Distribution Organization Committee71 1973-1974, which 
was set up to “investigate, whether a better and even-handed service level for all 
electricity consumers could be achieved with centralization of electricity distribution 
to larger entities all over the country72” argued that “in the present conditions the 
small electricity distribution firms are no more able to offer a satisfactory service 
level…already the electric power purchase costs are disadvantageous for the small 
firms”. Thus, the Committee proposed that small electricity distribution firms should 
be merged with each other or with the larger firms in order to reach a larger 
minimum size of electricity distribution firm.  
 
The chain of events in this causal flow is depicted in Figure 28. Two kind of driving 
and accelerating mechanisms from the institutional level can be identified. First, the 
Countryside Electrification Committee I initiated a mechanism that accelerated and 
mutated the effect of the evolutionary variation mechanism. Second, the Countryside 
Electrification Committee II and the Electricity Distribution Organization 
Committee initiated an intentional and agency identifiable selection accelerating 
mechanism. This causal flow also elucidates one of the macro-micro-macro 
feedback loops between the levels of analysis and the situational, action-formation, 
and transformational mechanisms.  
 
The recommendations of the Countryside Electrification Committee I in 1950 and 
the subsequent government actions resulted in a downwards causation through a 
situational mechanism which caused firm numbers to increase significantly in the 
electric power industry after the Second World War. Several intervening and 
mediating events can be identified to explain this downward causation. Furthermore, 
the proximate causes of the action-formation mechanisms resulted in reliability 
problems, which caused the industry associations to support the merger of small 
distribution firm. Consequently, some 16 years later the second Countryside 
Electrification Committee decided to recommend government subsidies through a 
                                                 
 
71 'Sähkönjakelun organisaatiotoimikunnan mietintö 1974:46' 
72 'KTM Energiatoimisto. Muistio 24.3.1972. Seppo Rautio'. 
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transformational mechanism, which mediated the information from the industry 
directly, and through the industry associations in particular. 
 
 
Figure 28: Macro-micro-macro feedback loop 
 
Causal flow 1.3. Ownership changes leading to firm exits  
The third causal flow explains the impact of ownership changes on firm mergers and 
acquisitions. Between 1970 and 1975, there was a substantial amount of firm 
mergers and thus exits from industry in two segments of firms: rural distribution 
firms and other industry or public sector power firms.  
 
First, with regard to rural distribution firms, the change in the number of 
municipalities in Finland impacted directly to the number of electricity firm exits, 
particularly to the rural distribution firm exits. The number of municipalities in 
Finland increased steadily until the Second World War. However, the number 
decreased by 45 due to the cession of territories to the Soviet Union after the war. 
Thereafter the number of municipalities stayed stable until the political discussion of 
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problems with small municipalities started in the 1960s. Consequently, a Small 
Municipality Committee73 was set up in 1961 and it gave its report in 1965. The 
report proposed that municipalities below 8000 inhabitants should be merged with 
others. The Ministry of the Interior endorsed the proposals of the Committee in 
1972, although a law was newer passed due to political disagreements (Niemivuo, 
1991, Merisalo, 2007). However, the guidelines caused a major change in the 
number of municipalities; they decreased by 85 between 1965 and 1981 and by 41 
during the first shakeout period of the electric power industry; between 1970 and 
1975.  
 
The long-term change in the number of municipalities in Finland between 1900 and 
2005 is depicted in Figure 29. The impact of the municipality mergers, several of 
them coercive by the government (Niemivuo, 1991), was that the urban distribution 
electricity firms of these municipalities merged accordingly. Thus there was a direct 
causal linkage between the mergers of municipalities and the consolidation of the 
electric power industry. However, there was not an agent directly behind the effect, 
but it was an emergent result of the municipality mergers.  
 
Second, the other two large exit groups during the period between 1970 and 1975, 
the manufacturing and other industry74 and public sector electricity firms, were 
already earlier impacted by coercive regulatory causal mechanisms such as price 
regulation and the inhibiting regulatory causal mechanisms leading to the building 
of thermal power plants. However for these industries, there were additional 
mechanisms due to their specific business model and closely connected to their 
ownership model. In this model the owners of the firms where also the major 
customer of the firm. 
                                                 
 
73 'Pienkuntakomitean mietintö 1965:A:1' 
74 Excluding the forest industry electricity firms. 
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Figure 29: Number of municipalities 1900-2005. Source: Statistics Finland. 
 
Thus the evolutionary selection forces stem from the coevolutionary relationship 
between the electricity firms and their owners. The Oil Crisis and the recession that 
followed (Hjerppe, 1989) caused many of the owner firms either to reduce, 
restructure or close their operations thus also causing corollary causal effects to the 
related electricity firms. From the group of firm exits there were a number of 
Finnish enterprises, where this kind of restructuring was took place such as Wärtsilä, 
Outokumpu, Osuustukkukauppa, Fiskars and Lohja. Consequently, many of the 
electricity firms they owned made an exit from the industry either through mergers 
or acquisitions. Moreover, public sector organizations such as the Defense Forces, 
the State Railways and the Road Office also restructured their electricity firms 
during the first shakeout period, between 1970 and 1975. These industries and firms, 
for which the cost of electricity formed a major share of their cost base, the 
increased oil and consequently the increased electricity price was one of the main 
causes for lowered profitability. Thus this mechanism was also acting from the 
electricity firm towards the owner firm. Accordingly, the low profitability then 
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impacted back to the electricity firm. This kind of two-way, self-reinforcing 
mechanism can be either positive or negative for the electricity firm profitability and 
their survival. 
 
To summarize, the impact of the ownership changes on the industry shakeout were 
both causal and evolutionary. The municipality mergers are typical events, which 
had a direct causal impact on the number of municipality owned distribution firm 
mergers. On the other hand, the changes in the industrial owners caused an 
evolutionary change to occur. 
6.6.3. Key events and trends between the two shakeouts 
The electricity legislation prior to the Electricity Market Act had restricted the 
ownership of electricity firms in Finland. The overall liberalization of the electricity 
markets in Europe led the national incumbents to extend their operations 
internationally. Consequently, Vattenfall from Sweden, E.ON from Germany, and 
TXU (Texas Utilities Company) from United States entered the Finnish electric 
power market by means of acquisitions. These acquisitions were part of the ongoing 
international expansion programs of the buyers, as deregulation had also opened 
markets in several other countries. The financial strength of the offering incumbents 
was substantial compared to the earlier mergers and acquisitions, which were mostly 
carried out between the local distribution firms. This led to an offering process, 
which was at its hottest between 1993 and 2000 that increased both the expectations 
and the realized prices of the sold distribution and retail operations. Thus that 
process increased the interest of the municipalities to sell their electricity firms, 
which again led to further acquisitions. 
 
As a result of the early trends and long-term evolution of the ownership structures, 
the municipalities were major owners of the electricity distribution firms. The 
electricity firms were, prior to deregulation, a secure source of income due to their 
local monopoly and thus also provided a source for subliminal taxation 
(Ruostetsaari, 1998). However, The municipalities faced financial difficulties at the 
beginning of the 1990s due to the overall recession in the country. These difficulties, 
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in combination with the willingness of the vertically integrated domestic and 
international incumbents to acquire the electricity firms owned by the 
municipalities, also caused the mergers of the distribution firms to continue 
gradually between the two shakeouts.  
 
Consequently, in November 1990 the Ministry of Trade and Industry set up an 
Electricity Utility Committee75 to analyze the development needs of the 
organizations and operations of electricity distribution utilities and firms. Moreover, 
the Electricity Utility Committee was set up to analyze the impact of the several 
mergers and transactions in the industry and the changes in ownership structures 
(Ruostetsaari, 1998). The Committee report was finalized in 1992. In the report, it 
stated that the number of electricity distribution firms had decreased from 230 in 
1972 to 129 in 1990. The committee spotted  (1) mergers between the distribution 
firms, (2) acquisitions by power generation firms, and (3) external investors entering 
the industry and acquiring local distribution firms as key reasons for the high 
number of market exits. The two first reasons were already identified in this research 
during the first shakeout period between 1970 and 1975. However, the international 
investors entered the industry after the first shakeout period. The Committee 
envisioned similar evolution in the form of market consolidation to also be 
continued in the future. Moreover, the Committee recognized the possibility that EU 
decisions might have an impact on the electric power industry. The Committee 
proposed several actions and the removal of regulation. Thus, in practice the 
Committee recommendations already covered the key content of the forthcoming 
Electricity Market Act.  
 
The preparation of the new legislation continued directly after the Electricity Utility 
Committee work in the form of an Electricity Law Task Force76 set up by the of 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Task Force report stated that most of the actors 
in the industry would benefit from deregulation. However, it was notable, that the 
                                                 
 
75 'Sähkölaitostoimikunnan mietintö 1992:15' 
76 Sähkölakityöryhmä 
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report indicated firm exits and industry consolidation would be continued: the group 
that would suffer from the new legislation would be the small distribution firms, 
which would be merged with larger firms.  
 
Ruostetsaari (1998) argued that the roots of the 1995 Electricity Market Act were in 
the overall trends of liberalization and deregulation of the economy, which had 
already started in the 1980s. Moreover, the evolution of the electricity legislation in 
the UK, Sweden and Norway also acted as an example for Finland. In the UK the 
industry deregulated in 1991. Ruostetsaari (1998) also stated that the relatively 
distributed ownership of the electric power firms in Finland favored the fast 
implementation of deregulation in the country. The ownership structure in Finland, 
with strong municipal and industrial ownership in addition to the government 
distinguished Finland from countries such as Germany, France, and Italy, in which 
the government had, in practice, a one company monopoly over the entire value 
chain from power generation to distribution and sales and thus leading to slow 
progress in deregulation. On the other hand, there were other examples in Europe, 
such as the UK and Sweden, which also had wide-spread government monopolies 
similar to those of Germany, France, and Italy – but which implemented 
deregulation even faster that Finland. The distributed ownership cannot therefore be 
seen as a direct causal argument for the new Electricity Market Act. However, it 
certainly can be seen as a key feature of the industry in Finland, which has eased the 
process of deregulation. This is because there was no need to break up the 
government monopoly. 
6.6.4. Causal analysis of the second shakeout episode 1995-2000 
The key events prior to and during the second shakeout episode are depicted in 
Figure 30. The analysis shows that there were two key phenomena, related causal 
flows and particular mechanisms during the second shakeout period between 1995 
and 2000. 
 
These two phenomena are elucidated in the two causal flows, ‘industry 
restructuring’, and ‘opportunities and beliefs as intervening and mediating events for 
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industry specific electricity firm exits’. All the identifiable mechanisms, which 
impacted firm survival or exits from the industry, were related to the new Electricity 
Market Act, the law that deregulated the industry. The new legislation, and its 
preparation process, included several events, which caused not only opportunities 
for the distinct actors to act, but also impacted their desires and beliefs. The desires 
and beliefs, on the other hand, impacted the content of the deregulation legislation, 
the 1995 Electricity Market Act. 
 
Causal flow 2.1. Industry restructuring 
The first phenomenon during the second shakeout period between 1995 and 2000 
was industry restructuring. Together with the high number of firm exits (101 firms), 
for the first time since the early growth episodes the industry faced a relatively high 
number of firm entries.  
 
The Electricity Market Act and the subsequent amendments declared that the 
different electricity operations should be unbundled from each other. Particularly 
important was the unbundling of electricity distribution operations from electricity 
sales and power generation operations. This unbundling first had to be done 
operationally and from the beginning of year 2007 the firms had to be broken up as 
separate legal entities. The unbundling is a key explanation behind the relatively 
high number of firm entries after the enforcement of the Electricity Market Act: in 
total 55 new firms were established between 1995 and 2000, out of which 20 were 
new power generation firms (representing a 47 percent increase) and 14 were 
electricity sales firms. The pace also continued during the next five year period, 
although with a lower rate, with 29 new firms established during the period between 
2000 and 2005. The restructuring also caused three new business models to be 
created: the electricity retail and electricity trade firms77 were first established after 
1995. Moreover, a new type of electricity distribution firm, a regional network 
                                                 
 
77 In the statistics the electricity trade firms are totalled together with the electricity sales 
firms. 
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operator responsible for medium distance power transmission, was created after 
deregulation. 
 
 
Figure 30: Event analysis leading to the second shakeout episode 1995-2000 
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The foundation of a joint electricity sales firm, Kymppivoima Oy in October 1993, 
combining the sales operations of ten large electricity distribution firms is a good 
example of the process of industry restructuring. Häikiö (1996:134-144) explained 
the process that led to the establishment of Kymppivoima, from the viewpoint of the 
largest of the shareholders, Savon Voima Oy. The process started in 1991, when the 
management of Savon Voima familiarized themselves with the deregulation process 
of the electricity markets in other European countries. Consequently, market 
liberalization was selected as the focus area in the 1992 strategy process. In the 1992 
strategy it was stated that “the competition will stretch first the largest customers, 
but then possibly to all customers”. The board of directors made an excursion to 
England to acquaint themselves of the deregulated electricity market in the country. 
The excursion strengthened their view about the upcoming competition. The 
company was particularly worried about the forthcoming competition within the 
large customer segment and felt a pressure on electricity purchase prices. As Häikiö 
(1996) stated, there was a gentlemen’s agreement between Imatran Voima and the 
distribution companies that Imatran Voima would not enter the electricity 
distribution business and the urban electricity distribution firms would not enter 
power generation at a large scale.. Thus many of the electricity distribution firms 
purchased electricity mainly from Imatran Voima.  Savon Voima and other urban 
electricity distribution firms, which prior to deregulation engaged in electricity sales 
activities, negotiated about bulk discounts with Imatran Voima but without results. 
To join their forces and to gain a stronger negotiation position against IVO, the ten 
urban distribution firms merged their sales operations into Kymppivoima Oy in 
1993. Thus the beliefs of the forthcoming competition caused by deregulation and 
the path dependent lock-in to the specific business model caused the sales operations 
merger and for the establishment of new firms to occur. 
 
One of the key rationale for the power generation firms to acquire electricity 
distribution firms was to ensure (and extend) their market share after deregulation 
(Ruostetsaari, 1998). With new actors in wholesale market segment the large power 
generation firms, such as IVO, faced competition in wholesale electricity sales in the 
new market and this increased the potential for these power producers to lose 
customers. The more direct end consumers a power generation and wholesale firm 
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has, the less it has to worry about the wholesale competition. Consequently, this 
business logic has been one of the key drivers for large power generation and 
wholesale firms to acquire electricity distribution and sales firms. The retail market 
information that the distribution firms possessed was considered to be the key to 
success for the power generation firms in the retail business (Pineau and 
Hämäläinen, 2000). Due to this trend and the concerns among the electricity 
distribution firms, the Ministry of Trade and Industry set up a Vertical Integration 
Task Force, which gave its report in the spring of 1997. The Task Force found that 
the total electricity prices for the end customers of the vertically integrated IVO and 
Vattenfall were statistically higher than the prices for the customers of the other 
firms. The Task Force proposed that electricity sales and distribution firms should 
be legally separated according to the Swedish model, the monitoring of the pricing 
of the electricity sales and distribution prices should be improved, and that the 
maximum ownership of electricity distribution capacity for one company in Finland 
should be restricted to 20 percent. Later, in the spring of 2002,  the limit was enacted 
in the restraint of competition law at a level of 25 percent in the 400 kV distribution 
networks. Based on the recommendations, an Amendment to the Electricity Market 
Act was brought into force legal separation from the beginning of year 2007. 
 
As legislation evolves so also does the related mechanisms that impact the industry 
and the firms within the industry. The restructuring mechanism, which acted behind 
the selection and variation of business models evolved from a directive evolutionary 
mechanism to a coercive causal mechanism as the content of the regulation changed. 
The new amendment to the Electricity Market Act which obliged the larger firms to 
separate the sales and distribution operations also, from the beginning of year 2007, 
legally caused the restructuring mechanism to evolve to a coercive causal 
mechanism. 
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Causal flow 2.2. Opportunities and beliefs as intervening and mediating 
events for industry specific electricity firm exits 
The second phenomenon during the second shakeout period between 1995 and 2000 
was the high number of manufacturing electricity firm exits. In total 78 
manufacturing electricity firms disappeared from the market, out of which 26 were 
from the forest industry. The explanation can be found in the basic arguments of 
wholesale deregulation: as there was a competitive wholesale market present for 
electricity, the manufacturing firms were able to purchase electricity either directly 
from the electricity exchange or from the large wholesale suppliers such as Fortum 
or Vattenfall, and there was no longer a need to have an own firm for that purpose. 
Thus the rationale behind the industry specific electricity firm to exit during the 
second shakeout, after deregulation, can be derived from transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1971, 1985) theory: after opening of a competitive wholesale market, 
the government controlled planning mechanism was abolished and substituted by 
market mechanisms. The uncertainty of the environment in terms of the costs of 
continuing with a business model where the electricity operations78 the of the 
industry was kept as an own firm owned by the industry, no longer existed 
compared to the direct purchasing of electricity from the market. Also the 
expectations were that the new legislation would decrease the price of electricity, as 
stated in the preamble of the Government proposal for the Electricity Market Act79, 
“the industries that use electricity can in the future purchase their electricity from the 
most affordable source. The small and medium size industries would evidently gain 
more. According to some estimates their electricity cost gain would be up to 10-15 
percent. Thus the impact for the national economy level would be substantial.” 
 
Thus the new regulation changed the industry characteristics so that it gave an 
opportunity for the actors to exit their electricity firms from the market. In this case 
the causal link between the institutional level change in regulation and the firm 
                                                 
 
78 In some cases with vertically integrated operations included power generation and supply, 
in some other just the supply of electricity.  
79 'Hallituksen Esitys HE 138/1994' 
170       ANALYSIS OF DATA  
  
 
number decrease can be explained with an intervening and mediating event, the 
market formation gave an opportunity for the manufacturing firms to withdraw their 
electricity firms from the market. If the firms possessed power generation or 
distribution assets, those assets were then divested to other firms and the electricity 
was purchased directly from the wholesale market. There was a belief among the 
industry that the competition would increase after deregulation and that larger firms 
would be more competitive that small ones, as the two following quotations 
illustrate. First, in year 1994, it was argued in the editorial of the annual report of 
1993 of the Electricity Utility Association that “the electricity firms have prepared 
themselves for the new electricity market…with increased competition. This 
preparation has manifested itself as firm mergers, municipal utility incorporations, 
establishment of new co-operation firms and as personnel reductions.” Second, in 
the preamble of the Government proposal for the Electricity Market Act80 it was 
stated that “the increased number of firm mergers during the last years may have 
boosted due to the preparation of the Electricity Market Act…the electricity retailers 
have already, before the implementation of the new law, started to establish 
electricity procurement and sales firms. It is evident that small supply firms will also 
be merged in the future. However, it is impossible to estimate the impact of the 
Electricity Market Act on the quantity of mergers, especially because of the ongoing 
consolidation process due to other causes.” 
 
In addition, there was according to Ruostetsaari (1998), a belief among the other 
industries – based on the preparation work of the Electricity Market Act – that 
vertical integration would be restricted in the new law and therefore the power 
generation firms would not be able to carry on electricity distribution business. Thus 
the industrial owners of electricity power firms appeared to be misguided by the 
final forms of deregulation as they hurried to divest their electricity distribution 
firms in the belief that vertical integration would be restricted in the Electricity 
Market Act. This belief acted as an intervening and mediating event that caused the 
                                                 
 
80 'Hallituksen Esitys HE 138/1994' 
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mergers and acquisitions. Thus the belief of vertical integration restriction and the 
opportunity to purchase electricity directly from the market represent partly, but not 
fully the restructuring mechanism. The legal coercion to separate electricity 
distribution from electricity generation and sales as legal entities forms another 
representation of the mechanism that influenced the the evolution of the industry at a 
later stage. The graphical presentation of these intervening and mediating events is 
shown in Figure 31. 
 
 
Figure 31: Beliefs and opportunities as intervening and mediating events 
 
All in all, the law preparation has already led to consolidation of electricity 
distribution; this is evidenced by the statement of congressman Louekoski in the 
parliamentary discussion about the proposal for the new Electricity Market Act81: 
"Already when the law preparation started in the Ministry of Trade and Industry the 
owners of distribution firms started to trade with the firms. Especially those small 
                                                 
 
81 31. 187.1994 9) HE 138/1994 1 K Ed. Louekoski (31.01.1995)   
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firms, which have concentrated on electricity distribution locally, and who do not 
possess production capacity of their own, have been put up for sale and the buyers 
have been the larger distribution firms acting in the neighboring area. This trend has 
been remarkably extensive and seems to continue all around the county. In other 
words the Electirity Market Act coming into force and the very preparation of the 
law has led to electricity distribution consolidation". 
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7. DISCUSSION  
 
Causality has reached limited attention as part of the evolutionary explanation of 
how industries evolve, why certain firms survive while others do not, and how the 
institutions impact the natural lifecycle of industries. The key contribution of this 
research is that it offers causal arguments as new and complementary components to 
the evolutionary explanation. The research shows that causal mechanisms provide 
additional explanatory power to explicate the fine-grained elements of long-term 
change. Moreover, it shows that multiple levels of analysis are needed in order to 
give meaningful causal explanations in evolutionary research. This research has 
three key findings, which provide answers to the research questions. The findings 
represent contributions to structural constructs of the industry evolution explanation, 
formation of selection criteria, and patterns of industry life cycles. The details of the 
key findings are discussed in the following sections.  
 
First, the analysis shows that the fine-grained mechanisms that provide explanations 
for long-term evolutionary change can be characterized either as evolutionary or 
causal. In addition, they are by nature either emergent or agency identifiable. 
Second, the business model of a firm was identified as a key evolutionary selection 
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criterion. The formation of a business model was effected by both evolutionary and 
causal mechanisms. Thus the selection process could be explained more explicitly 
through the use of mechanisms. Third, the pattern of a regulated industry life cycle 
was, to some extent, dissimilar to the life cycles of traditional open market industries 
(cf. Klepper, 1997). The divergence can be explicated with causal explanations and 
by means of the effects of causal mechanisms. They affected the fundamental 
interplay of institutions, technology, and the market in the industry and caused two 
shakeouts to occur. Two kinds of events that induced the mechanisms were 
identified in the research: public policy measures and external shocks. The causal 
effect was clearly identifiable in a regulated industry, in which the impact of 
institutions, in the form of legislation, regulation and public policy measures was 
palpable on the industry. It could be argued, however, that similar kinds of causal 
effects can also be identified in other types of industries.   
7.1. Nature of mechanisms in evolutionary explanation 
The existing industry evolution and evolutionary economics literature shows that 
mechanisms are useful constructs to explain the more fine-grained occurrences 
beneath the high-level evolutionary change processes. The nature of mechanisms as 
part of the evolutionary explanation in the existing literature is considered to be 
principally evolutionary. For example, such general mechanisms as ‘mechanism to 
winnow the variation’, or ‘selection mechanisms’ (Nelson, 1995b) are by nature 
evolutionary. Several evolutionary mechanisms were also identified in this research. 
These evolutionary and emergent mechanisms created emergent and episode specific 
force fields, which reflected the rules of periodic games in society and in the 
industry and further impacted the change process and the structure of the industry in 
the subsequent phase. However, all fine-grained processes cannot be explained with 
evolutionary mechanisms and causal ambiguity. As a result of external interventions 
– such as public policy measures or environmental shocks in particular – there acts 
also other kind of mechanisms: mechanisms with a causal nature.   
 
On the other hand causality, causal methods and causal mechanisms have been 
broadly used in social sciences. Causality has evolved over the years from a 
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mysterious concept to mathematical models. This has led to ‘law-like’ explanations 
(Runde, 1998) and rigorous predictions (Pearl, 2000). Recently, based on the 
research of Pearl (2000), Machamer et al. (2000) and Goldthorpe (2000), Hedström 
(2005) proposed a next level of causal reasoning, causal explanation with causal 
mechanisms as a contrast to law-like causal predictions. According to Hedström 
(2005) “mechanisms should be seen as theoretical propositions about causal 
tendencies, not as statements about actualities ... they might be inadequate to predict 
actual outcomes, because also other processes work at the same time” (2005:108).   
 
Explanations with causal mechanisms are particularly appropriate for extending 
evolutionary explanations, since both mechanism based explanations and 
evolutionary explanations are process-based and have a temporal nature. The 
explanation of evolutionary change processes needs to go beyond surface 
descriptions, variable methods and statistical explanations (cf. Walsh, 200782) to 
elucidate the logic behind observed temporal progressions and to identify the 
generative mechanisms that cause observed events to happen (Van de Ven and 
Poole, 2005). Or as Mayntz (2004) has put it: "statements about mechanisms are 
links in theory; they are causal propositions that explain specific outcomes by 
identifying the generative process that, given certain initial conditions, produces 
them" (2004:253). Mechanisms enable filling of the the gap between high-level 
evolutionary theory and VSR processes and the empirically identified phenomena. 
Hence they are useful building blocks of middle-range theories (Merton, 1957; 
Mayntz, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the identification of mechanisms is 
challenging because empirical representations of mechanisms (Bunge, 2004; 
                                                 
 
82 There is a recent discussion between the two competing interpretations of the synthesis 
theory of evolution (Bouchard and Rosenberg, 2004; Stephens, 2004, Millstein, 2006; Shapiro 
and Sober, 2007). According to the dynamical accounts, evolutionary chance such as selection 
and drift are causes of population change (Reisman and Forber (2005). On the other hand, 
according to statistical interpretation,  evolutionary selection and drift are not causes of 
population change; they are mere statistical effects (Matthen and Ariew, 2002; Walsh et al., 
2002; Walsh, 2007). 
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Mayntz, 2004) do not exist. There are, however, methodological solutions to the 
identification of mechanisms (Machamer et al, 2000; Goldthorpe, 2001; Glennan, 
2005). Moreover, Pearl (2000) suggested rigorous episode-specific evidence 
gathering as a basis for making claims about actual causes. Building on the 
aforementioned existing body of knowledge, in this study I used a methodology in 
which I first summarized the findings of a historical event analysis and a descriptive 
numerical analysis in a form of causal diagrams (Pearl, 2000). Based on the 
behavioral description (Glennan, 2005) of the phenomenon presented in the causal 
diagrams I subsequently analyzed and described the characteristics of the generative 
mechanisms. 
 
The focus of this study is on the interplay of the institutions with the underlying 
market and technological evolution of an industry. Therefore the mechanisms that 
have been identified are, by nature, 'metamechanisms' (Bunge, 2004) in contrast to 
the 'micromechanisms' found in biology such as mechanisms transmitting neural 
signals across synapses (Machamer et al., 2000), or intra-firm mechanisms such as 
those explaining decision making within industrial firms (Pajunen, 2004, 2008). One 
of the key characteristics of micromechanisms is their internal structure and 
hierarchical organization (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Machamer et al., 2000; 
Pajunen, 2008). In organizational science, micromechanisms are useful constructs to 
explain micro-evolution (Lewin and Vorlberda, 2003) within organizations. 
However, the internal structure of mechanisms is not the focal interest of 
institutional metamechanisms and longitudinal studies. On the contrary, the focus is 
on coevolution between several processes at different levels of analysis (Volberda 
and Lewin, 2003); long chains of intervening and mediating events (Pearl, 2000; 
Morgan and Winship, 2007) in the distinct levels of analysis and the causal 
mechanisms that intervene the 'natural evolution' of an industry. 
  
Indeed, in evolutionary explanation the evolutionary process is the backbone of the 
explanation and thus causal mechanisms provide only partial explanations - the 
long-term explanation comprises the combined effect of both the evolutionary and 
causal mechanisms. Hence, the underlying evolutionary process and the related 
mechanisms provide an answer to a counterfactual question of "what would have 
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happened" without the institutional events and the effects of the mechanisms that 
they initiated. 
This research shows that some of the evolutionary mechanisms can further be 
explained with mediating and intervening events and thus the full mechanism is 
represented by its component parts and with the mediating and intervening events. 
The two distinct types of mechanisms, causal and evolutionary, and their 
combination are depicted in Figure 32.   
 
 
Figure 32: Evolutionary and Causal Mechanisms 
 
On the other hand there are cases in which the intervening and mediating event is 
not part of the internal structure of the mechanism. Rather, the intervening and 
mediating event is shared with another chain of events or process, which is in a co-
evolutionary relationship with the process in focus. In these kinds of cases the result 
is an impact of a combined effect of the two co-evolutionary processes. An example 
of this kind of combined impact is presented in Figure 33.  
 
X ACausal YEvolutionary
X YCausal
Causal
Mechanism
X → Y
Combined
Mechanism
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with mediating
event A
Event EventMechanism
X YEvolutionary
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Mechanism
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Figure 33: The combined impact of both evolutionary and causal mechanisms 
 
An example of the impact of regulation on the evolutionary selection process 
elucidates the combined impact. Under normal open market circumstances market 
mechanisms are active. Thus the evolutionary selection mechanism X → Y selects 
the most profitable, and as has been shown by the existing research, the ones with 
the most competitive83 technology, to survive. However, if a regulation event B 
restricts or prohibits the exploitation of the most competitive technology to date or if 
it limits the profitability prospects of firms with price regulation, it induces a causal 
mechanism B → A, which impacts the selection criteria A. Consequently, the 
impact of the evolutionary selection mechanism X → Y is changed. 
 
Furthermore, one key characteristic of an evolutionary mechanism is that it is 
ontologically emergent in the sense that it is not additive, not predictable from 
knowledge of its components, and not decomposable into those components (see 
                                                 
 
83 As the literature review shows, the ‘most competitive’ technology might be either the most 
advanced as a result of R&D investments, or the dominant design of the industry. 
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Sawyer, 2001). On the other hand some scholars (North, 1990; Durand and Calori, 
2006; Hodgson, 2007) have highlighted the role of agents and their purposive 
activity as key explanations for change processes. In addition, an extension of the 
research framework to include multiple levels of analysis – as in this research – 
raises the need to include the role of agency in the methodology (Felin and Hesterly, 
2007). Indeed, the findings of this research support the view that political decision 
makers have an agency effect and are using a ‘visible hand’ (Chandler, 1977) with 
causal impact – sometimes purposively, sometimes unintentionally – which has 
impacts on survival of firms and on the overall industry structure. In addition, this 
research, together with the key findings of earlier studies (Ruostetsaari, 1989, 1998), 
provides empirical evidence that the firms in the electric power industry and 
industry associations acted as agents with an identified causal impact on the 
institutions and public policies of the country.  
7.2. Characteristics of a regulated industry evolution  
There are two interesting findings in the research of a regulated industry evolution.  
First, the industry life cycle contrasted with the open market industries life cycles 
due to the impact of institutions. Second, the business model of a firm was identified 
as a key selection criterion during the life course of the industry and, in particular, 
during the shakeouts.  
7.2.1. The impact of institutions on industry life cycle  
The findings of this study provide support to industry life cycle (Klepper, 1997) 
research with an interventional (Woodward, 2003) causal explanation; the effect of 
the market mechanisms in a general industry life were manipulated through the 
effect of the mechanisms initiated by government actions. And vice versa; the 
explanation provided by industry life cycle research gives us a counterfactual 
explanation on regulated industries; it explains what sort of difference it would have 
made for the explanandum (number of firm entries and exits in a regulated industry) 
if the factors in the explanans (government regulation) would have been different 
(such as no regulation at all).  
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The pattern of industry life cycle in a regulated industry, as identified in this 
research, follows the general pattern of industry life cycle defined by Klepper 
(1997). However, the research shows that the general pattern was affected by 
institutions as well as by external shocks – and induced by either agency identifiable 
or emergent causal mechanisms. Thus Proposition 1 is supported. There are key 
distinctions in the three stages of evolution of the electric power industry compared 
to the ‘market-based’ industries and the related research.  
 
The first is the initial stage of industry life cycle. At this stage the fundamental 
characteristics of regulated and market-based industries are equal: the market 
volume is low; uncertainty is high, technology development is in an early stage, and 
firm entry rate is high. However, in a regulated industry there are two key 
distinctions: competition is restricted by legislation and regulation and product 
innovation exists, but regulation restricts exploitation of innovations and technology, 
and utilization of raw materials. The central facts are similar at the second stage of 
the industry life cycle. At this time output growth is high, and the design of the 
product begins to stabilize. In open market industries the competition and the market 
rules specify the selection criteria as they push down industry prices after the growth 
phase. Returns from R&D provide an advantage to the earliest entrants, which forces 
the smallest and least capable innovators out of the industry and thus contributing to 
a shakeout. In a regulated industry, it is not only the benefits of R&D and the 
utilization of the technology, but in a noteworthy way it is also the property rights, 
license based advantages, and ownership structures that provide an advantage to 
certain types of firms who have the right business model. Even if a firm is among 
the early entrants, regulation might restrict the firm’s expansion or its opportunities 
to exploit technologies. Thus the selection of the right business model in the light of 
current and foreseeable legislation and regulation, consequently influencing the 
institutional environment, become key advantages for a firm to ensure their survival.  
 
Moreover, during the shakeout there is significant institutional inertia (Djelic and 
Ainamo 1999) in the regulated industry, which slows down the shakeout. This 
inertia acts as a social mechanism which is caused by public ownership structures 
and firms organized with business models of stability and control -for example 
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vertical integration. In the third stage, the mature stage, output growth slows, entry 
declines further and market share stabilizes. However, because the ‘rules of the 
game’ are not defined by the market, but by regulation, major changes in the 
institutional environment such as new regulation or deregulation act as an 
environmental shock for the firms and may have significant impact on individual 
firm survival. The deregulation of the Finnish electric power industry in 1995 offers 
good empirical evidence for such an incident; this caused another shakeout for the 
industry. 
7.2.2. Business model as a selection criterion 
The analysis shows that the dominating selection criteria that impacted firm survival 
were the business model of a firm in addition to its size, the power generation 
technology it possessed, and its ownership structure. This is notable, as it differs 
from the selection criteria identified in the previous studies of industry life cycles, 
which highlight the role of technology and R&D (Klepper, 1997). On the other 
hand, it is compatible with the arguments of population ecologists, who point out 
that the organizational form of a firm is a key selection criterion (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977). Three key reasons can be identified for the difference between 
industry life cycle research and that which predominantly concentrated on open 
market industries.  
 
First, the impact of innovation and R&D are less important in regulated industries in 
comparison with others operating in a pure market environment. Therefore the 
benefit of age is non-identifiable, as there is no race to be technically ahead of the 
competition in the early phases of the industry.   
 
Second, size is important in both kinds of industries, but for different reasons. In 
open market industries the benefit of size is that it contributes to the ability to invest 
on R&D and thus gain advantage over competition with fewer resources. However, 
in electric power industry, the benefit of size comes primarily from economies of 
scale leading to relatively better profitability than the rest of the industry. This 
applies to both electricity distribution and power generation. From the owners’ point 
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of view, even in regulated industries profitability is after all a key decision criterion 
for whether to retain or divest a firm.  
Third, the analysis shows that during the shakeouts the non-vertically integrated 
specialized firms had the least chances of survival. On the other hand, the survival of 
vertically integrated business models can be explained by the excess capacity 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977) that firms with that kind of business model possessed. 
The excess capacity of firms enabled them to redirect their resources in times of 
change.  
 
The business model had an impact through two mechanisms:  institutional coercion 
and technological lock-in. In addition, the analysis shows that industry structure and 
firm survival was a result of the interaction of direct causal mechanisms of public 
policies and the evolutionary path dependence and asset constraints and the related 
evolutionary mechanisms. Thus, both Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 are 
supported. The combination causes far-reaching impacts on public policies at both 
industry and firm level. These outcomes are sometimes, as has been shown here, 
different from the goals of the initial purposive actions, as the process has been 
interfered by the underlying  or emergent evolutionary processes and related 
mechanisms.  
 
In addition, the exploitation of power generation technologies as a key component of 
the business model was also substantially impacted by the surrounding institutions 
and the related individuals. This is illustrated by the following two examples from 
the previous research. First, in research in Finland Ruostetsaari (1989) identified 
several institutional subsystems (Self, 1972; Jordan, 1981; Rose, 1980) that was 
constituted of public and private actors who were interested in certain energy 
sources and the related technologies. The wide range of actors in the subsystems 
included political parties, industrial organizations and governmental institutions. The 
key subsystems, which were evolved around different energy sources after the Oil 
Crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, included (1) domestic fuel, particularly peat, (2) 
natural gas, and (3) nuclear power. Ruostetsaari’s (1989) key argument was that the 
determination of energy policy in Finland was at least partly explained by the 
subsystems. Thus the determination of the technologies to be used in each time 
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period was not purely impacted by the technology itself, but by the effect of the 
related subsystems and their actions. However, Ruostetsaari (1989) noted that “when 
purely economical stimulus to change the energy policy is forceful enough, the 
impact of the institutions and organizational setups [such as subsystems] are 
insignificant” (1989:308). As examples of economical stimulus he used the 
technological changes from animal power to wood, from wood to coal, from coal to 
oil and further from oil to nuclear power, and to sustainable energy forces. These 
changes in energy production sources and the related technological changes caused 
an inevitable change to occur (Lucas, 1985).   
 
As a second example, Myllyntaus (1991) showed that the roles of individuals and 
the supporting institutional framework with education and government support 
enabled Finland to utilize the new technology and carry out electrification of the 
country at least as rapidly as the other European economies, and without excessive 
reliance on foreign involvement, even though the country remained predominantly 
an agricultural economy for much of this period. In addition to the role of 
individuals he highlighted the role of government and related institutions to the 
evolution of the industry and concluded that even if the government had a major role 
in hydropower plant development and the establishing of the nation-wide 
transmission network “the government regarded large-scale electrification and the 
utilization of hydropower more as a political than an economic or technological 
question” (p.71).  
 
In addition to Myllyntaus (1991), Ruostetsaari (1989) highlights the role of 
individuals. According to him, the informal personal contacts played a central role in 
making of the Finnish energy policy in the 1980s (Ruostetsaari, 1989) and the 
informal personal contacts had a significant impact in public exercise of power 
(Ruostetsaari, 1998). It is obvious, that although not part of the research framework, 
individuals as microfoundations of organizations as the lowest level of analysis have 
to be recognised. There are two standpoints regarding the significance of individuals 
each representing distinct epistemological and methodological traditions; 
methodological collectivism and methodological individualism. Although the two 
standpoints have traditionally been seen as contradictory, their borderline has 
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become blurred and the two doctrines no longer appear as clear-cut opposites 
(Udehn, 2002). The ‘structural individualism’ or ‘weak form of individualism’ 
presented by Coleman (1990) and Hedström and Swedberg (1998) and the 
consequent literature offers a mix, or synthesis, of individualistic and holistic 
elements. In structural individualism the social structure is seen “as a system of 
interrelated positions that is relatively independent of individuals, at least of each 
particular individual” (Udehn, 2002:496). 
 
However, it has been common in the evolutionary economics tradition to abjure 
behavioral complexity (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and the microfoundations of 
organizations. In their theoretical paper, Winter et al. (2003) presented ‘a baseline 
model for industry evolution’, where they note that they have resolved a number of 
issues of microeconomic foundations with quite simple assumptions. In their model 
they neglect the impact of individual actors “when simpler alternatives are adequate 
to explain aggregate phenomena and there exists no direct empirical support for the 
more complex assumptions” (Winter et al., 2003, p.357). Furthermore, selecting the 
organization as the lowest level of analysis often implicitly means that 
methodologically the lower levels are considered to be homogenous. Or to put it in 
another way, as Howard Aldrich has stated in his co-authored paper: “if we truly 
focused on routines, competencies, and practices and so on, we would not follow 
people any more in our research...people would disappear from our equations” 
(Murmann et al., 2003).  
 
Institutional theorists, do however highlight the importance of individuals. For 
example, North (1990) argued that “organizations and their entrepreneurs engage in 
purposive activity and in that role are the agents of, and shape the direction of, 
institutional change” (p.73). Moreover, Barley and Tolbert (1997) claim that 
“through choice and actions, individuals and organizations can deliberately modify, 
and even eliminate institutions” (p.94). Furthermore, neglecting the impact of 
individuals as the lowest level of analysis has been challenged by recent research. 
Felin and Hesterly (2007) provided evidence that individuals play a big role in 
creating new value in knowledge intensive industries. In addition, Durand and 
Calori (2006) challenged the ‘sameness or homogeneity within organizations and 
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they argued that powerful agents influence organizational change processes. 
 
In this research, the focus is on the interplay between industry and the market, 
technologies, and related institutions. However, as is the case at the other end of the 
hierarchy of the levels of analysis, the surrounding society and the key events in 
society has to be taken into account when forming the causal explanations. Similarly 
the lowest level of analysis, the agents cannot be neglected. In causal analysis the 
purposive nature of the agents in activating the mechanisms that cause the change to 
occur has to be taking into account. Indeed, it is the synthesis of methodological 
collectivism and individualism that is needed to add causal mechanisms as a 
complementary component to the evolutionary explanation. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
8.1. Theoretical contributions 
The key concepts of this research, causal and evolutionary mechanisms, originate 
from the existing body of knowledge in industry evolution and evolutionary 
economics research. Evolution is not just a process of aging in which the processes 
of variation, retention and selection shape populations. It is the interplay between 
institutions, such as legislation, regulation and public policy actions, technology and 
related firm assets, and the market, and the competitive forces that collectively form 
the key explanatory factors behind long-term change; industry life cycles and 
shakeout, changes in industry structures, and individual firm survival (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Nelson, 2005; North, 1990; Klepper, 1997). Mechanisms represent 
the fine-grained constructs of the evolutionary explanation (Nelson, 1995b; 
Murmann, 2003).  
 
Complementing existing research this study provides four key contributions. First, 
the research offers causal explanations as a complimentary element to providing a 
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full evolutionary explanation. Second, in addition to the existing constructs, the 
research findings presented in this dissertation provides evolutionary explanations 
through mechanisms, which are either evolutionary or causal, and either emergent or 
with identified agency. Consequently, the long-term change is a result of the 
interplay of both the causal and evolutionary mechanisms. Third, the research 
framework presented in this research provides multiple levels of analysis. This is 
much is needed to be able to give causal explanations in evolutionary research. 
Fourth, compared to the existing studies of industry life cycles, the causal 
explanations provide elucidation of the differences in the industry life cycle caused 
by public policy actions and external shocks. 
8.2. Practical implications 
In addition to the theoretical contributions, there are four key findings of this 
research with practical implications for public policy makers, and for stakeholders of 
electric power industries – and for the management of electric power firms in 
particular. 
 
1. Public policies have primary causal and secondary emergent 
impacts on industry structure and firm survival. The emergent 
impacts are a result of the interplay of the direct causal 
mechanisms and the underlying evolutionary mechanisms. 
2. Evolutionary path dependence and asset constraints cause far-
reaching impacts of public policies on both industry and firm 
levels. 
3. External shocks intervene the ‘normal’ evolution of the 
industry and the intended causal impacts of public policies. 
4. A firm’s business model and vertical integration act as a key 
selection criteria both prior to and after deregulation. 
 
Understanding long-term evolutionary change is essential to the building of long-
lasting strategies and to the planning of the actions required for the long-term 
survival of a firm.. Moreover, it is fundamental for public policy makers to 
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understand the underlying evolutionary process and the related mechanisms and 
their interplay with the purposive actions of public policy makers. Given the 
importance of this the findings and their practical implications on the electric power 
industry stakeholders will be elaborated in the following two sections. 
8.2.1. Nature of public policy impacts 
This research provides evidence that public policies, legislation and regulation have 
a crucial impact on industry structure, an individual firm business model and firm 
survival in the electric power industry. This impact is both directly causal -with 
clearly identifiable agency and intention- and evolutionary and emergent as a result 
of the interplay with the underlying evolutionary mechanisms. In the latter case the 
actions may cause unintentional results. Thus the findings of this research and the 
underlying theoretical constructs, causal and evolutionary mechanisms, provide a 
verification of North’s (2005) argument that “the gap throughout history between 
intentions and outcomes reflects the persistent tension between the scaffolds that 
humans erect to understand the human landscape and the ever changing ‘reality’ of 
that landscape” (2005:ix). Indeed, the bounded rationality (Cyerth and March, 1963; 
Williamson, 1975) is not only a key attribute of a firm or the decision makers within 
a firm, but all human decision makers both in firms and in the surrounding society, 
in institutions and of public policy makers (Colombo and Rossini, 1997). Although 
there is a certain amount of causal ambiguity in the evolution of industries; some 
just have good luck and hit the jackpot (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), the main reason 
is that the causal chain or process may appear stochastic, because humans have 
problems to identify some of the relevant variables or events. Another characteristic 
of the relation between public policies and electric power industry is that it is not 
one-way. This coevolutionary reciprocal relationship based on mutual benefit 
previously identified by Ruostetsaari (1989) had an impact on the evolution of the 
industry. Moreover, ‘human evolution’84 (North, 2005) and the beliefs and 
                                                 
 
84 North (2005) argued that much of long term change in societies may be presented with a 
causal chain: “perceived reality → beliefs → institutions → policies → altered perceived 
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opportunities of the different stakeholders of the industry acted as intervening and 
mediating events which explains some of the firm exits from the industry.  
 
Due to the twofold nature of the public policy effects, the bounded rationality of the 
decision makers both in the government and local government as well as within the 
firms, it is important that future public policies and subsequent measures are 
prepared in mutual co-operation between the government, related authorities, and 
the electric power industry in the form of industry associations, as well as with 
individual firms. Both the causal and the evolutionary effects should be thoroughly 
evaluated during the preparation of a law or regulation in order to limit the 
unintended results and avoid any corrective actions that might be required later. 
 
In addition, this research indicates that evolutionary path dependence and asset 
constraints cause institutions to have both direct causal and long-term evolutionary 
effects on industry structure and firm survival. The asset constraints; asset mass 
efficiencies and time compression diseconomies are especially significant in the 
electric power industry due to the high capital investment requirements and long 
term planning horizons. Moreover, public policies and regulation restrict the use of 
technology through direct (such as nuclear power licensing) or secondary (such as 
water acts) causal mechanisms and thus cause additional asset constraints. Pineau 
and Hämäläinen (2000) noted that there are two major concerns with Finnish electric 
power market deregulation, which call for careful attention by market authorities. 
First, a small number of dominant players can, to certain extent rule the market. 
Thus the economical goal of marginal cost prices of deregulation is hardly achieved. 
Second, the vertical integration of electricity distribution and power generation will 
reduce competition in the industry. Indeed, as shown in the analysis, the 
evolutionary path dependence has led to market dominance by a few firms. In 
addition, the combined impact of evolutionary and market mechanisms, which have 
                                                                                                                   
reality and so on”. Moreover, he argued that human evolution “is guided by the perceptions of 
the players; choices – decisions are made in the light of those perceptions with the interest of 
producing outcomes downstream that will reduce uncertainty of the organizations – political, 
economic, and social – in pursuit of the goals” (2005:viii). 
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set the scene for vertical integration and the limitations of the regulation, have led to 
a situation in which there is a high risk of decreased competition in the market.  
 
Moreover, evolutionary path dependence and asset mass efficiencies of established 
technologies slow down the utilization of new technologies without public policy 
changes and supporting public measures. Recently, climate change and the 
worldwide ambition to decrease the CO2 emissions has caused the electric power 
industry to search for new low carbon technologies such as solar and wind power 
and other renewable energy technologies. Thus, in the light of path dependence, 
public policy makers should carefully analyze what the supporting and accelerating 
mechanisms needed to foster the new technologies and the preventing mechanisms 
for the old or unwanted ones would be (see Christensen, 2002). In addition, the 
secondary effects of these causal mechanisms to the survival of firms should be 
analyzed. Similar analysis of the existing and future technologies and the related 
assets is of course of crucial importance for the individual firms. Event based multi-
level ‘pathway analysis’ supported with economic data analysis is a useful tool for 
individual firm management to understand the current state of a firm as an 
accumulation of their history. This kind of pathway analysis can act a basis for 
future scenario work and provides useful information for decision making when 
selecting technologies in which to invest.  
 
Furthermore, this research shows that external shocks and major environmental 
changes intervened on the ‘normal’ evolution of the industry and the antecedent 
intended causal impacts of public policies. These environmental shocks have both 
direct causal consequences, but they also create a certain amount of causal 
ambiguity, because other – and often evolutionary mechanisms with stochastic 
consequences – are also simultaneously active. Therefore, a rigorous analysis should 
be made by the authorities to analyze the potential effects of external shocks. 
Although this kind of analysis would not provide full predicting power, it would 
serve as an important basis for possible future scenarios of the effects of 
environmental shocks on the electric power industry. The recent climate change 
debate is an outstanding example of a chain of events starting from an external 
shock that could have been analyzed and thus acted a priori rather than the need for 
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ex post analysis (Sijm et al., 2006).  Climate change has led to significant CO2 
emission reduction targets85 and further to emission trade regulation in the European 
Union. This regulation caused windfall profits for some electric power firms. The 
research carried out by Kara et al. (2008) of these windfall profits and the identified 
counter-measures against the foreseeable negative side-impacts of the emission trade 
is a good example of such an ex post analysis.  
8.2.2. Business model as a selection criteria  
According to the analysis of the Finnish electric power industry, a firm’s business 
model is a key selection criterion that explains firm survival in the industry. The 
business model of a firm is a result of both institutional coercion as well as 
institutional normative and mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In 
particular, the findings of the research support the prevailing view that vertical 
integration as part of a firm’s business model increases its viability in the long-term. 
However, it is notable that vertical integration also remained as an important 
selection criterion after deregulation. The reasons for this are threefold. First, there 
are transaction cost benefits to linking power generation and supply, both wholesale 
and retail, and electricity distribution. The second reason is based on the exploitation 
of certain power generation technologies. The co-generation of heat and electricity 
technology provides a technological and financial advantage for distribution firms, 
which have both electricity and central heating customers. Similarly, the back-
pressure technology to generate combined heat (steam) and electricity for industrial 
use provides a comparable advantage for industry specific firms. The third reason is  
the combination of the ‘obligation to deliver’ statement86 of the 1995 Electricity 
                                                 
 
85 The European Union has committed to decrease CO2 emissions unilaterally by 20 percent 
by year 2020 percent from the 1990 level and to increase the share of renewable energy by 20 
percent throughout the whole European Union by year 2020 (Vanhanen II Government 
Platform of Finland, April 19th, 2007). 
86 According to the ‘obligation to deliver’ statement of the 1995 Electricity Market Act “an 
electricity retailer in a major market position within the area of responsibility of a distribution 
system operator shall deliver electricity at reasonable prices to consumers and other users of 
electricity (EMA Chapter 6, 21§)”. The ‘reasonable price’ is the standard contract price of the 
firm. 
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Market Act, the fact that the retail customer turnover has stayed at a significantly 
low level after deregulation and that most of the electricity was bought at a standard 
contract price (instead of offer price). This threefold combination provided a vertical 
integration benefit for the firms with own power generation and acted as a barrier of 
entry for sales competition.  
 
Understanding these selection criteria and the rationale behind them is important for 
public policy makers, since the measures needed to debase or break them are more 
extensive than other actions. Likewise, more powerful and long-lasting policies and 
measures are needed to support development of technologies that have frail selection 
power, such as new emerging technologies. On the other hand these findings provide 
useful information for firm management and shareholders in the planning of their 
future business models as well as for their political agendas.  
8.3. Limitations and suggestions for further studies 
Despite of the theoretical contributions and valuable practical implications, there are 
also certain limitations to this research. The first point, the issue of keeping 
discipline in the complexity in a research setting and framework, is always a 
challenge for the researcher. Moreover, as noted by Nelson and Winter (1982): 
“theorists should aim to tell the truth in their theorizing, but they cannot aim to tell 
the whole truth. For to theorize is precisely to focus on those entities and 
relationships in reality that are believed to be central to the phenomenon observed 
— and largely ignore the rest” (1982: 134). From this perspective, in order to keep 
the complexity down and to be able to study the impact of institutions together with 
technology and market on the patterns of industry life cycle in regulated industries, I 
have left the impact of individuals outside of the research framework. In this 
research the causal impact of cognition of individuals and the subsequent beliefs 
were based on secondary sources (Ruostetsaari, 1986; 1998). However, I claim that 
the conclusions drawn from the event analysis are sufficient for the selected level of 
analysis in this research. Nevertheless, I suggest that further studies of the impact of 
cognition through the addition of individuals to the research framework would give 
more insight to the causal processes. This kind of analysis could also provide 
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analytical evidence that there are no back-door paths in the causal inference that 
would provide alternative explanations. A firm level case study or comparative case 
study would be a suitable methodology for this kind of examination of cognitive 
effects. A second issue is that of the empirical setup of this is research which is 
based on the evolution of one industry in only one country. Analyzing other 
congruent countries, like Sweden, Norway or Spain would bring findings which 
would either strengthen the theoretical findings or bring new perspectives to them. 
Moreover, in this research I have concentrated on only one deregulated industry. A 
research of other deregulated industries and the comparison between them is 
strongly recommended to support or defuse the findings and propositions and to be 
able to generalize the key findings and offer a universally applicable general pattern 
of industry life cycle in regulated industries. In addition, the impact of the changes at 
the boundaries of the electric power industry from national to Nordic and further to 
European wide industry on firm survival is a suggested area for analysis. These 
kinds of studies would provide answers to questions concerning the differences in 
survival between firms with different counties of origin. Furthermore, they would 
provide answers to why the routines and assets evolved in some national settings 
would dominate over others.  
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